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Originally Posted by DVaut1
But the basic premise is that in 2016, something slightly less than 55% of eligible voters turned out. That's down from Obama's victory in 2008 when 63% of voters turnout. The difference between uber majorities for Democrats (e.g., 350 EVs, 60+ Senators) and small losses to crypto fascist reality game show hosts are more or less in the 8% of voters who didn't show up. It's glib and probably not exact, but close enough.
See my chart: the voters we lost were working class voters. They didn't decamp for the right-wing spectrum of anything from cultural grievances to race wars. They just stayed home.
The way to create a mass movement which can create durable, lasting political coalitions (e.g., big majorities in Congress that can effectively make the changes we want) is to become much more populist in message: namely tax the rich, redistribute the money. The left has always and will always only have one durable advantage over the right that is basically almost a truism: we are proposing an economic system that serves to benefit the greatest number of people. Democrats do well to remember that.
I agree with this. I just think it might be wishful thinking to believe that the cultural issues are all epiphenomenal and will go away if underlying economic policy is addressed. But certainly I agree that one of Clinton's flaws as a candidate was her inability to sell this kind of economic message, and that it's a problem with the democratic establishment in general.
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Originally Posted by DVaut1
Regarding the "well, would it solve our long term problems with culture?" No. Almost surely not.
But I made this post back in October 2016, and have been making variants of basically weekly since:
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I've hammered commenting on this over the past few months but it's because it's one of the best examinations of Trump voters: Gallup economics study over 70,000 respondents over 1 year, studying Trump voters
The long and short of it is neighborhood level exposure to minorities predicts lower membership in populist nationalist parties in the US *and* Europe and elsewhere. So then we get that the lack of exposure to minorities predicts higher membership in populist nationalist Trump type movements. In fact it's the most predictive indicator. Astounding in a way. Also predictive: not when economic conditions are objectively poor but when they are relatively poor for racist nationalists, or their children, relative to expectations. See the opiate addiction as a signal here.
http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/sh...php?p=51066378
I have also previously ruminated upon residential segregation as one of the most important social issues in the US, so I agree with that. I also agree that loss of status ("relative to expectations") is important, but there's an important difference between loss of status and overall economic anxiety. Because if status anxiety is relative to a racist expectation that minorities should be worse off then improving economic conditions across the board won't entirely ameliorate it.
It's also not clear to me how these considerations really demonstrate your original conclusion at all, and this seems like a restatement of that conclusion, despite the caveats you go on to mention:
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Originally Posted by DVaut1
The basic mechanics of the fuel behind Trump and populist nationalism everywhere start with economic degradation.
It seems to me that you've pointed out reasons to think the situation is more complicated than that, explicitly with respect to cultural politics.
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Originally Posted by DVaut1
So again, my prediction: you are not going to cure most of these people. You might salvage some, and you have some hope to salvage their kids. And it won't happen over night. It you may not see the effects for years.
Right. I think we basically agree as to the short-term practical solution (focus on working class economic populism and policy) as well as the long-term difficulty. And I largely agree with the argument you make for the strategy you're suggesting, and which I've snipped. But where I perceive we may disagree is that you don't seem as worried about the long-term problem of regressive cultural politics as I am. I agree that people on the left should focus a good deal of their energies, as you say, on issues of economic justice. But I also think the long-term problem of salvaging these folks' kids is important, and thinking about how issues of social justice and inequality should be framed is also important.