Quote:
Originally Posted by David Sklansky
This is simply a fancy way to state a probability principle. And the common saying is a bit lacking. A more accurate statement is that if someone expects their claim of something extraordinary to be accepted as more than 50% likely to be true, alternative explanations have to be even more unlikely. If a guy who lies 5% of the time told you he ate seven hot dogs yesterday, you would tend to believe him. But not if he told you he ate twenty hotdogs. However if your friend who you have never seen lie, said he ate twenty hot dogs you would accept his claim. But that doesn't mean that the first guy's claim should be dismissed out of hand. He might have been in a hot dog eating contest. But you will remain skeptical unless he produces pictures of himself in the event.
I think this gets at part of it, but there's another part too.
And that is that, whatever one's view about causation generally, we certainly expect things that have repeatedly happened in particular scenarios to keep happening.
So, when I tell you that I was playing live no limit hold'em yesterday, got my money all-in pre-flop heads up with pocket aces, and they held up, that's the sort of claim that seems quite trustworthy. It is what usually happens.
If I told you that the sun came up this morning, that is even more trustworthy. The only time that doesn't happen is during an eclipse, an exceedingly rare event.
But if I told you that, in fact, the sun never came up this morning, or that I was playing live no limit hold'em, got my money all-in on the flop with four aces on an AsAdKd board against Jd4c, and lost to a runner-runner royal flush, those are not things that usually happen. Those are things that almost never happen.
The point of extraordinary claims needing extraordinary evidence is that you can believe claims that are plausible and consistent with lived experience and causal rules as we understand them, and you will usually or even always be correct in your belief.
However, when you are presented with claims that are not plausible and consistent with lived experience and causal rules as we understand them, and you choose to believe those claims, you are much more likely to be wrong than you are in the previous scenario. Because a claim's consistency with lived experience and causal rules as we understand them increases the likelihood that it is a correct descriptive claim.
Thus, the second category of claim requires a far stronger evidentiary showing than the first category of claim requires.