Quote:
Originally Posted by bobman0330
I guess I understand this position even less than the one I thought you were advancing. You're agree that we can be confident that there was a serious safety flaw that caused both crashes, but it's an issue that's been figured out and solved, and we can also be adequately comfortable that the reason it caused the recent crash is [some particular factor relevant to that case--poor training?] and not some aspect of the technical problem that isn't adequately addressed by the solution implemented after the first crash? That seems like a lot of things to believe with high confidence.
The technical issue seems most likely to be a system not being as redundant as it should be.
If pilots were aware of this issue and trained on the procedure for dealing with it, then the expectation is that the technical issue wouldn't result in a crash.
It seems plausible that after the first crash and the communication from Boeing, the FAA, etc. that some pilots were still unaware of the issue and/or not trained properly in how to react. This wouldn't be the first time that this has happened. There are many of these communications that come out and pilots can miss them or not really grok the implications.
The chance that after this second issue that 737 MAX pilots are unaware of this problem and how to deal with it seems vanishingly small at this point.
Similarly, the sensor that malfunctioned in the first crash that caused the MCAS system to malfunction was originally treated as a not-urgent repair. Planes were allowed to fly with it broken. Again, especially after this second crash, that seems very unlikely to happen. Nobody is sending a plane out with this sensor broken.
Again, you can weigh all these factors and come to different conclusions in terms of the risk. But its not at all as simple as saying two planes from the same model crashed within 6 months of each other.