04-20-2014 , 01:47 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by minotaurs
Yea tnx a lot Will, I dont think other authors would do this man
And im dying to see that 2nd volume with that awesome video pack. IPython already installed.
And if i can ask how many hours do u actually sleep per night? Do u een have any free time?
My secret is a carefully-managed caffeine dependence.
04-20-2014 , 01:55 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by JudgeHoldem1848
Damn, this is one HUNL video I will be watching for sure.

Will a dedicated student of your books and videos eventually be able to port these tools/concepts to HUPLO?
Not sure, but my best guess is: not easily.

The theory pretty much all applies very straightforwardly to PLO, but I imagine a lot of practical difficulties arise from the number of hole card possiblities in PLO. How do you even visualize or write down a PLO range? Also, a lot of operations involve doing something (e.g. finding the most profitable way to play) for every one of our possible holdings. And that takes a lot more time if there are a lot more hole card possibilities. Some sort of hole card bucketing is probably the right way to deal with these issues, but that's not something I'll be talking about.
04-20-2014 , 02:08 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by KnutXX
I'm close to finishing the book (gonna re-read it obv) and just came across the exercise on p. 288 which suggests making a table.

Are the type of hands (eg. BB hand/SB threshold hands) supposed to be lined up as mentioned (i.e. bluff bet-folding hands, bluff check-raising hands etc.) or do I have to pick a hand example and line up the exact hand values (tp+, 2nd pair, mid pair etc)?
Ah, I had the first option in mind, but yea you could do either/both.

Quote:
Originally Posted by KnutXX
What is meant by "moving each SB threshold to the left or to the right"?
The idea here is that we want to change the SB's strategy (i.e. make him play suboptimally) and try to see how the BB's strategy changes to exploit it. For example, in the equilibrium strategies on pg 268, the way SB splits his river range when he's checked to on the river looks something like:

(worst hands) |--b/f--|-----------check----------|--b/f--|-b/c-| (best hands)

We called the threshold hand between b/f and check hsbbf (hand SB bluff bet-fold). If we move that threshold hand to the left, it means SB is bluffing less when checked to on the river. How does that affect each of the BB's holdings' max expl play? Stuff that used to be indifferent between c/c and c/f is probably now all c/fs. (But not all of his previous c/c range was indiff.) What about stuff that was planning to c/r bluff? Should it now c/f? Should he blufflead more or less than before? What about the top of his range? Should he value bet more since he gets less money in the pot by checking?

Anyhow, if you consider each of SB's threshold hands and each type of BB hand, you can make a table, and fill it out with the proper max expl adjustment..
04-20-2014 , 02:32 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Zarathoustra
Hey,

I have multiple troubles understanding the statement p.174.

Quote:
In the case of Figure 6.1, we see from the graphs that the BB's average hand strength increased slightly with the advent of the flop
It seems to me that on the contrary the strength of BB's average hand have decreased with the flop. If I plug the ranges into pokerstove I get for BB:

Preflop: 56.2% equity
Postflop: 54.3% equity

and then:

Quote:
...since the dotted line is on average higher than the solid one
The dotted line represent the end of the preflop and the solid one the the beginning of flop play... So it should be the contrary, it should say : "since the dotted line is on average lower than the solid one"

At which graph should we look btw? The left or the right one?

Quote:
and the opposite is true for the SB
Lol. Give me an aspirine.

You're right, the last paragraph on p 174 doesn't seem to be backed up by the graphs it refers to.
04-20-2014 , 02:48 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by kaby
So, after watching the vid pack I tried my hand on some Gambit. Don't know if this is the correct thread, hopefully it is.

IMAGE 1:

I tried to model a situation where there's a straight on the board and players either have the split or the 6-card straight. Both

have the 6-card straight 10% of the time. There's a pot of 1, and a stacksize of 1 behind. Players can jam or fold.

First question: did I get all the information sets right? Follow up: is C:2 and C:3 one information set?

I guess it's ok that the BB never checks a straight OOP because the SB/BTN can't put enough pressure on him anyway, only jamming

30% (.1*1 + .9*(2/9)) of the time when checked to.

It's a bit weird to note that being in position in this game has 0 value. Even when it's asymetric. When the BB has 20% nuts and

the SB only 10% pay-offs are 33/20 and 27/20, if it's the other way around payoffs are 27/20 and 33/20.

The game looks the same when we increase SB nuts frequency. BB jams his nuts and some splits. SB calls everything. BB checks rest

of his splits and calls everything.

This is true for up to SB nuts 33/100 (BB nuts still 1/10). See IMAGE 2.

At SB nuts 34/100 it completely shifts. See IMAGE 3.

Now, the BB checks everything, and the SB jams all his splits, as many nuts as he can, and checks the rest of his nuts behind. BB,

interestingly, only calls his nuts and folds his splits, so folds 90% of the time. I can see why, but it's still weird to see.

Side question: what do we make of the calling frequencies in nodes the BB doesn't take? For example, the SB folding the nuts to a

bet (upper 2:1)? Just ignore.

It seems like in this situation, BB play is to either frontjam nuts and enough splits, c/c all other splits. Or if SB is too

strong, just check everything and calling all your nuts, folding everything else. This is def not what I expected ><

Interestingly, this remains true when we vary BB nuts frequency (1% but also 90%). Yet, even though SB frequency is the only

variable affecting what the game looks like, position has no value in this game. Why is that ?_?

Cliffs: Would like to know if I used Gambit correctly/modelled the situation correctly. Would like to discuss the weird-looking results - nothing seems to matter but one infliction point that totally changes how the game looks.
Quote:
Originally Posted by kaby
Just saw the split pot vids, funny that I did exactly what you did (and correctly too!)

Totally missed the all equilibria option though.

Yup, your games look right, well done.

There's no advantage to being in position in the first game (the low nut frequency regime) because both players have the same ranges and nobody ever folds. They have the same amount of nuts, they both get paid when they have the nuts, both pay off when their opponent has the nuts, and when they do show down, it's a chopped pot.

Solutions to these spots are a bit weird/subtle to interpret, since many strategies are co-optimal. For example, you note the SB is doing something weird in a spot that never comes up because BB's play means we never get to that spot. Well, the thing is that SB can play any way he wants there and still be at equilibrium, so long as he doesn't play badly enough to make BB want to start showing up there with some hands.

Anyhow, I think I talk a lot more about this stuff in the vid. If you still have more questions now that you've seen it, please let me know.
04-20-2014 , 02:55 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sevendeuceo

I am currently doing the exercise proposed on p.130 with some post-flop scenarios pulled from my game and this is incredibly instructive both as a means to reviewing the previously covered material but also for finding possible heroic leaks and exploitable villainous tendencies.

Few minor errors not yet listed in the errata (or typos almost not worth mentioning that might be fixed in the next printing):

p.82: last line of text, "8-6o" should read "8-7o"
pp.98-99: the references to figures 3.3 and 3.2 should rather be to figures 3.9 and 3.8 respectively.
p.131 bottom third of the page: "than Hero should bluff 100%" should read "then...".

I am also looking forward to the eventual release of your next video together with the computational tools mentioned earlier in the thread. I understand you've been busy moving. I have of course pre-ordered vol.2 and will buy the video pack shortly.

Also, congratulations to the author for the award of his PhD and for his new job at Google!
Glad you're enjoying the book . Also I appreciate the corrections. We're currently preparing for a second printing of Vol1, and these (and the rest of the currently know errata) should all be fixed there.
04-20-2014 , 03:03 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by PoP T1me
I have both the ebook and hardcopy. When I go thru the examples I think it would be aweesome if I had the range syntax to put into software (such as propokertools odds oracle or flopzilla) just so I can look at the range and look at equities by myself. Such as...

Page 48
Quote:

A♣-J♣, K♣-J♣, Q♣-J♣, J♣-10♣, 5♣-4♣, K♣-J♥, Q♣-J♥, K♦-J♣, Q♦-J♣,
5♦-4♦, K♦-J♥, Q♦-J♥, K♥-J♣, Q♥-J♣, A♥-2♥, A♥-5♥, A♥-8♥, A♥-J♥, K♥-J♥, Q♥-J♥,
J♥-10♥, A♠-10♣, K♠-J♣, Q♠-J♣, A♠-10♦, A♠-10♥, K♠-J♥, Q♠-J♥, Q♠-6♠ - Q♠-10♠,
10♠-7♠, 9♠-7♠, 8♠-7♠, 3♦-3♣, 3♥-3♣, 3♥-3♦, 6♠-6♣, 6♦-6♣, 6♦-6♠, A♠-A♣,
A♦-A♣, A♥-A♣ excluding those hands which conflict with the board. This is
45 hand combinations.
If we count all these combos that /= 45. besides point, anyway to copy+paste these into pptoo or flopzilla without writing them down individually?

Great book still early in it.
Well, fwiw, that is 45 combos. I've bolded the term you might have miscounted. The symbol Q♠-6♠ - Q♠-10♠ is meant to represent 5 combos: Q6ss, Q7ss, Q8ss, Q9ss, QTss.

I agree that it's hard to list long exact ranges. It gets much worse when some combos are played with non-0%, non-100% frequencies. In vol2, I often turned to figures (like Fig 7.1) which should hopefully make reading, if not copy&pasting, easier.
04-20-2014 , 03:55 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by unlimited.
Hey Will,

I just finished rereading chapter 7 and once again, I have a bunch of questions. Hopefully you can help:

Quote:
Originally Posted by p213, you write:
"In fact, there is no advantage for him in having the best hand 100% of the time at the equilibrium. As long as he can put in a bet, having it almost all of the time is just as good."
The 'almost' here depends on the effective stack size on the river, right? It depends on how much we can bet/overbet relative to the pot?
Ah, well I discuss the short stack case in the next section. So, you're right, but it's not what I was thinking about there. I was actually thinking about the case where Villain is playing badly. As long as we can bet large enough, there's no advantage to always having the nuts over always having the nuts, at equilibrium, since we never get called in either case. But if Villain sometimes incorrectly calls, ofc it's better if we always have the nuts.

Quote:
Originally Posted by unlimited.
Quote:
Originally Posted by p215, you write:
"Now, let P be the size of the pot and S the effective remaining stacks at the beginning of river play." and below that, you write: EVVilain(folds) = S
Do we assume that the stack sizes are the same sine it's HU?
So, whenever I say effective stacks, I mean the shorter of the two stacks. Any extra money that one player has behind isn't usually strategically relevant. This was defined/explained on pg 16.

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p226, you write:
"To find the bet size which maximizes EV Hero (betB), we simply take that quantity’s derivative with respect to B and set it equal to 0"
I remember using the prime symbol (') when dealing with derivatives and I'm wondering what B* is here. Do we have:

B* = EVHero(betB)' (prime) or maybe
B* = the value of B which satisfies EVHero(betB)' = 0
Something else?
Well, as it says, B* is the GTO betsize, the special value of B that maximizes EV_Hero(bet B).

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p228 talking about SB's distribution after he cb flops, turn goes x/x and BB doesn't lead river, you write:
"and due to how narrowly defined the BB’s hand is, the SB’s range is effectively polar"
Do you mean when/if SB bets the river or SB's getting to the river range?
I'm referring to the river starting ranges.

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p230, you write:
"And, even if a small fraction of the player’s range is strong because of the new card or a slow-play, these hands generally have reason to keep playing the same way as the weaker ones in the player’s range."
Are you talking about the ability to play more bluffs profitably by raising a wider polar range on the river? Or, do we assume the "checker" won't have enough strong hands in his range to bet/take the lead (similarly to what you said on page 223, section 7.2.5, where wilain had some slow plays)?
I don't understand the question. Did you use the right quote here?

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p238, you write:
"Might that be a good approach to play on particularly volatile flops? (§2, last sentence)
By 'approach', you mean overbetting here, right?
yes

Quote:

After studying the examples figure 7.10 (section 7.3.1) and reading the beginning of section 7.3.2, there is something I don't get:

OK, from section 7.3.1, since checking means losing:

1. I understand that we use our top X% to bet, even if some of them have an EQ < EQSB(Hc)
2. It also makes sense to me when you say we could have used our crappiest hands as bluffs (same result when called)
3. In example 7.10d we remove some of our value hands and you say that in this case the equilibrium change: Since our overall betting range has gotten weaker if we keep betting all the hands whose EQ is > Mb, SB's previous cutt-off hand, hc, becomes a clear call.

Here is what confuses me:

- If you compare 2&3, in both cases (say we actually used our crappiest hands as bluffs) our overall betting range is weaker and yet in case #2 it would not make a difference, whereas in case #3, it does.

So... is it the equity of our overall betting range that matters or is it the overall equity of our value betting range, the hands whose EQ is > EQSB(hc) or even maybe the number of combos that beat Hc?
This is the BB bet-or-check game.

If BB is going to be both betting and c/f with hands that never win when called (equivalent hands for practical purposes), SB must be calling just enough to make all those indiff to bluffing. (e.g. 1/2 the time for a PSB).

So, (if we're using PSBs), BB's betting range has to make SB's 50th percentile hand indifferent to calling (b/c then all his stronger hands will call and weaker hands will fold and overall he'll have the correct 1/2 calling freq). OK, so SB's 50th percentile hand is indifferent to calling if it has 33.3% equity vs BBs betting range.

So, I guess I'd say that what matters is that the equity of SB's cutoff hand vs our betting range is 33.3%. And that's equivalent to saying that the average equity of our entire betting range vs that one hand is 66.6%

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p280, talking about the possibility for SB to check down, you write:
"The showdown EV of each of his hands is different (with the exception of those holdings with which the BB would have led the river)"
I don't understand the part that's in parentheses.
The big idea in that quote/section is that the BB's potential bluffing hands all have the same EV of checking, even if some are slightly weaker or stronger in an absolute sense, since none of them ever get to showdown and win after checking. That is not so for the SB's potential bluffs, except for his v weak hands which are all equivalent since they all lose to all of BBs checking range, since BB would have led the river if he held one of his weakest river starting hands.

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p282, you write:
" First of all, if Villain is never bluff raising, a bet-fold is clearly better than a check whenever Villain calls with a worse hand more often than he holds a better one (whether he calls or raises with it)."
The first part of the sentence makes sense to me but again, I don't get the part in parentheses. if vilain raises us with worse, he's bluff raising us, right? Did you mean whether he calls or folds with it?
No, the sentence is correct. Rephrased -- if Villain never bluff-raises, then value betting is better than checking if Villain calls with a worse hand more often than he holds a better one (regardless of whether he calls or raises with those better ones).

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p287, you write:
"If the SB is checking all his thin value hands intending to check-call"
Do you mean BB here?
Yes.

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p303, you write:
"Just as importantly, whereas before even his bluffing hands were ahead of almost half of his opponent’s range, he can now tempt many of the SB’s weaker hands to call a bet, and thus he has more reason to bet with his real hands too
Do you mean that since he has a bunch of air hands, many of the SB's weaker hands have more incentive to call a bet?
If even our bluffs are ahead of some component of Villain's range, he can't be thinking about calling with those hands, even if he thinks we're bluffing.

Quote:
Quote:
Originally Posted by p315, you write:
"To the degree that a long, flat region is a dominant feature of the player’s distribution, his opponent’s equilibrium strategy will favor bet sizings and ranges which target those hands. Even if all his hands do not have the same equity, we can think of targeting any large groups of his hands that do."
Is this "general rule"? I mean, should we generally try to devise our strategy to target the largest group of hands in our opponent's range that have the same/similar equity?
Well, we've certainly seen that if we get to the river and pretty much all of Villain's range is made up of hands with the same equity, then our distn is going to be relatively polar, and we know more or less what the equilibrium is going to look like there. And I think that is often at least approximately the case in river play. But I dunno that there's a general rule that applies when the situation is more complicated.

Quote:
One more...

How does it feel to have a real job ?
Ton of new stuff to learn, but I'm enjoying it so far, thanks .
04-21-2014 , 06:51 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by yaqh
No plans for any more books. They're a lot of work!
Especially if you write good books...

Quote:
Originally Posted by yaqh
If I were to do more introductory work, it'd be more on reading our own range, a la the end of this post:http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/sh...&postcount=353
I completely agree, I think this is one of the most important idea really.I often feel like I don't know what I'm doing and the main reason for this is that I don't know my own range.

Quote:
Originally Posted by yaqh
Well, as it says, B* is the GTO betsize, the special value of B that maximizes EV_Hero(bet B).
I'm trying to understand how we get to this GTO betsize B*, mathematically that is.

Given what you say in the book, it looks like:
1. you created a function, say f(B) = EVHero (Bet B)
2. Calculated its derivative, f'(B)
3. Set f'(B)=0 and solved for B

I guess my question is, if the above is true, what's the outpout of f(B) here, do we have f(B) = FJ (S − B) + (FBC)(S + P + B) + (1 − FJ − FBC )(S + P)?

If so, how do you get its derivative, f'(B)? I have only worked with very simple functions, I'm not used to seeing so many variables.

Quote:
Originally Posted by yaqh
I don't understand the question. Did you use the right quote here?
I used the right quote, but maybe my question didn't make sense.
You say that even if a turn card improves a small fraction of our range significantly, these hands have reason to keep playing the same way as the weaker ones and I want to make sure I understand why.

What are these reasons?

Quote:
Originally Posted by yaqh
A cocktail party level of poker theory understanding (which is available from a number of sources these days) is just enough to feel confident sitting down and losing money.
Cocktail party level poker theory... Nice .

I agree that this is not the right approach to poker theory but look at it from an author's perspective. Well, OK, say an author who doesn't care too much: No questions from the readers! Sure, these cocktail party poker theorists may quickly go from no questions from the readers to no readers...

Point is, I really appreciate you taking the time to answer all my questions.

Thanks!
04-23-2014 , 01:39 PM
quick question:

on p48 9s6s is in villains range (at least i assume that is what 9s4s+ means), on p50 it's not anymore. why not?
04-23-2014 , 06:39 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by kaby
quick question:

on p48 9s6s is in villains range (at least i assume that is what 9s4s+ means), on p50 it's not anymore. why not?
It should be in the range. This has been mentioned in the errata available on this books webpage on the editor's site.
04-24-2014 , 07:01 AM
so it's not in the iteration/ev numbers in the book are slightly off?
04-24-2014 , 03:38 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by unlimited.
Quote:

Originally Posted by yaqh View Post
Well, as it says, B* is the GTO betsize, the special value of B that maximizes EV_Hero(bet B).

I'm trying to understand how we get to this GTO betsize B*, mathematically that is.

Given what you say in the book, it looks like:
1. you created a function, say f(B) = EVHero (Bet B)
2. Calculated its derivative, f'(B)
3. Set f'(B)=0 and solved for B
Yes, this is right.

Quote:
I guess my question is, if the above is true, what's the outpout of f(B) here, do we have f(B) = FJ (S − B) + (FBC)(S + P + B) + (1 − FJ − FBC )(S + P)?

If so, how do you get its derivative, f'(B)? I have only worked with very simple functions, I'm not used to seeing so many variables.
Yes, that's the EV of betting that we found a couple paragraphs earlier. So, I think derivation is beyond the scope of the thread, but taking derivatives of long expressions w/ lots of variables isn't to bad if you remember a couple rules:
- derivative of a sum of things is the sum of the derivatives of the individual things
- if X is something that doesn't depend on B, then the derivative (with respect to B) of X*B is just X
- derivative (with respect to B) of something that doesn't depend on B is just 0

Other than this, the thing you'll need to look into is known as the Quotient Rule, because FJ and FBC are fractions which involve B.

Quote:
I used the right quote, but maybe my question didn't make sense.
You say that even if a turn card improves a small fraction of our range significantly, these hands have reason to keep playing the same way as the weaker ones and I want to make sure I understand why.

What are these reasons?
Well, this is one of the lessons we learned from the PvBC-plus-traps game. Suppose we're on the river, BB has mostly bluffcatchers but also a few slowplayed nuts, and SB has some value hands and some air. Then, BB's few nut trapping hands do make the most money by continuing to slowplay, checking the river.

Why? Well, since the traps are the nuts, they simply make the most money when they play in whatever way gets SB to put as much money in the pot as possible on average. And it turns out that SB puts a lot more money in the pot vs a check.

This is b/c most of BB's checking range is bluffcatchers, and we know SB will bet big with all his value and some air as bluffs when checked to w/ a range of mostly bluffcatchers. On the other hand, if BB leads himself with traps (which are then value hands) and bluffcatchers (which he turned into bluffs) then all of SB's air has to fold, and SB's value becomes effectively bluffcatchers and might sometimes fold.

So checking gets money in vs all of SB's value and some air, while betting gets money in vs no air and maybe not even all his value. So, BB gets a lot more money in w/ a check on avg.

Quote:
Cocktail party level poker theory... Nice .

I agree that this is not the right approach to poker theory but look at it from an author's perspective. Well, OK, say an author who doesn't care too much: No questions from the readers! Sure, these cocktail party poker theorists may quickly go from no questions from the readers to no readers...

Point is, I really appreciate you taking the time to answer all my questions.

Thanks!
no problem
04-24-2014 , 03:42 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by kaby
quick question:

on p48 9s6s is in villains range (at least i assume that is what 9s4s+ means), on p50 it's not anymore. why not?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sevendeuceo
It should be in the range. This has been mentioned in the errata available on this books webpage on the editor's site.
Quote:
Originally Posted by kaby
so it's not in the iteration/ev numbers in the book are slightly off?
Yup, the missing 96ss combo is already noted in the errata, but I don't believe there are any issues with the EV or iteration numbers. If you're getting conflicting results or something, be more specific and we can try to figure out what's going on.

Generally, I'd recommend to anyone starting to read the book to get the errata from the website and mark the edits in your copy.
04-24-2014 , 09:06 PM
Awesomeness... Thank you very much, Will!
04-25-2014 , 05:11 PM

Regarding Pokersnowie Im not so sure it isnt legit. As I understand it the authors simply told the bot the rules of the game. And then let it play against itself for years, allowing it to establish the most effective play vs itself in any number of possible situations. Being very far from a GTO expert myself as we have established, in my limited understanding would this system not produce maximally exploitative play? Anyway I bought the freakin' thing tonight based on a very simple criterion: it beats me far more often than I beat it. It is as simple as that.

Much respect, Mark
04-26-2014 , 01:16 AM
Hi Will!
I'm reading the book for the second time and realising that it should be treated like a Bilble and be read every weekend forever
I think my doubts probably will disappear very soon with Vol. 2, but just to be a Vol.1 expert:
-On page 88, at the end of "3.1 Shove/fold chapter" are explained the applications of the solutions in real play but you mention that at around 7 BB at equlibrium the SB can not raise-fold.
Do you mean it also in real play or only in preflop-only-games? I find the evidence in the next chapter for preflop-only-games, but don't know if at equilibrium in real play the BB shoving range (having the option to call) would give the odds to the SB to call with his entire raising range at arround 7 BB.
-On page 102 "3.3 Bet sizing considerations": In the last paragraph it is explained that in preflop-only-games the player putting in the last best was in disadvantage if he had a bad risk/reward ratio on his all-in bets, so it can sometimes to be worthwhile to make a bigger bet in a spot if doing so will cause a Villain to play shove-or-fold.
In real play it is only possible if Villain is playing badly, i.e he is shoving at deeper stacks than he should be? Or could even exist this possiblilty in a GTO strategy?
Thanks very much for your atention Will!
04-28-2014 , 04:44 AM
Hi i was doing 1 exercise and i found this place what i cant understand.

On page 115 book says that when we know that BB 5 bet shoving range is 20.6 % SB calling range will be hands with 38% equity and they are {A2o+,.....} (25.5% of hands)

(stacks are 50 bb and 4 bet size is 12 bb ) so yea i understand that we should have 38% equity not less coz we loose just 12 BB if we fold (50-12 = 38) and if call we win EQ*100 so equty should be greater than 38.

But when i check equity of A2o versus his 5 beting range its ~35%

As i understand 38% + is needed for each individual hand not all range together right? if this is true than A2o shouldnt be in his calling range right? When few hands come off this range it would mean its actually not 25.5%, but number 25.5 was used to calculate his total 4 beting range and also open raising range. Not a huge deal but than it means they would be a little different than in the book.

Last edited by minotaurs; 04-28-2014 at 04:53 AM.
04-28-2014 , 08:34 AM
Hi Minotaurs!
I was on the same page and think I can help with that.
Maybe the mistake is in your ranking of hands. For simplicity, the book points out that the hands are ranking by their preflop all-in equity versus any-two-cards in these situations. So 20.6% would be something like:{55+, A3s+, K8s+, QTs+, A7o+, K9o+, QJo}. Versus that range A2o have near 40% equity.
04-28-2014 , 09:07 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by mmowgli
Hi Minotaurs!
I was on the same page and think I can help with that.
Maybe the mistake is in your ranking of hands. For simplicity, the book points out that the hands are ranking by their preflop all-in equity versus any-two-cards in these situations. So 20.6% would be something like:{55+, A3s+, K8s+, QTs+, A7o+, K9o+, QJo}. Versus that range A2o have near 40% equity.
Hi man tnx for answer. I did choose the top 20.5% of hands (used slider so i think software (PT4) takes top equity hands against any2 hand range) and as i told A2o had nearly 35 %
04-28-2014 , 10:07 AM
I sometimes use the Hand Range Selector from PT4, but it only allows two models to ranking hands: 'Sklansky-Karlson' and 'Hand vs 3 Randoms'. My easiest way to visualize a range vs ATC is in www.icmizer.com and selecting: Ranking Vs Random Hand.
04-28-2014 , 11:23 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by mmowgli
I sometimes use the Hand Range Selector from PT4, but it only allows two models to ranking hands: 'Sklansky-Karlson' and 'Hand vs 3 Randoms'. My easiest way to visualize a range vs ATC is in www.icmizer.com and selecting: Ranking Vs Random Hand.
Yea man ill check it out, i probably used Sklansky-Karlson so maybe there is this difference. Thanks man
04-28-2014 , 11:32 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by minotaurs
Yea man ill check it out, i probably used Sklansky-Karlson so maybe there is this difference. Thanks man
I just realize that on p.116 the BB Shoving Range is written!!
04-29-2014 , 04:21 AM
Hey i have a noob question. If i play unexploitable i end up with 0 profit against another opponent who plays just like me right. But if i play against some crazy guy i would still profit by not changing my game at all (playing unexloitably) right? I would profit, just not as much as if i would be by maximaly exploting him right?
04-29-2014 , 06:03 AM
Hi,

just wanted to do the exercise on p. 125 and wanted to know how to calculate the top x% of Hero's range vs Villain's range on the 8h6c5d flop. Isn't it just all hands that have at least 33,3% equity? Can somebody pls recommend a tool which can do these kinds of calculations?
Thanks

m