08-24-2014 , 04:39 PM
up
08-24-2014 , 08:03 PM
Ayo Will Tipton! send me a copy of this asap . You understand me?
08-26-2014 , 11:26 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Al Mirpuri
I recently purchased this book: heads up is not my game, holdem is not my game.

Reasons for purchase (in no particular order):

1. The author has spent much time in this thread responding to questions. He deserves a medal for all his input!

2. The book is an invaluable addition to the poker literature.

3. It is not going to get any cheaper (see point 2).

4. I fully expect (having read the Look Inside excerpt on Amazon) that it will help me in my games.
Re #3: I don't expect to be out of print too soon :P Hope you enjoy!
08-26-2014 , 11:38 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by 4-Star General
I'm building a simply model in order to gain some experience of your method to calculate EV.

I'm trying to find, how much I could invest preflop to setmine, facing an openraise.

80BBs eff stack
UTG opens with AA
Hero wants to flat with 44 to setmine

EV fold = 100
EV call = %miss * investiment pre + %hit * (avg eq * stack after we won)
so
http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i...80.81*181.5%29
Quote:
100=0.878x+0.122*(0.81*181.5)
100-X=6,5 (maximum investiment pre in order to BE)
Looks like there are a couple issues with your equations. The convention is that we're working with expected stack sizes at the end of the hand. If you start with 80BB, and you're not in the blinds, and you fold to an open, then you end the hand with 80BB:

EV fold = 80

Maybe you're saying Villain has 80 but you have 100? That's fine then, although it might be easier to just work with eff stacks. In any case, please fully describe the situation. I guess this is not HU? Are you in the blinds or no?

If we call, we end up with: the chance we hit times how ever much we end up with if we hit, plus the chance we miss times however much we end up with when we miss. To some approximation, this will look like

EV call = %miss * (80 - open raise size) + %hit * (stack size we expect to end up with after we hit)

Quote:
What about if we are in the BB?
Instead of winning 181.5 BBs are we winning 180.5?
I'm not exactly sure what the situation is, but yea it'll make a bit of difference if you're in the blinds. Also, it seems pretty ambitious to expect you'll both win the pot and get the guy's whole stack every single time you hit.
Quote:
And in order to find out how much we can call what we should do?
99-X, or 100-X?

Set EV(call) > EV(fold) and solve for the constraint on X.
08-28-2014 , 01:16 PM
Sry for the confusion, obv that's my fault, I'm hoping I'm expressing better this time

Goal: build a simple model in order to gain experience with your EV calc method

Model 1

6max

UTG (Villain, 80bb) raises with AA
Hero (BTN, 100bb) has 44 and want to setmine

Villain cbets 100%
Hero folds everytime doesn't hit the set
When Hero hits, Villian is going to stack off 100% of the times

Quote:
Looks like there are a couple issues with your equations. The convention is that we're working with expected stack sizes at the end of the hand. If you start with 80BB, and you're not in the blinds, and you fold to an open, then you end the hand with 80BB:

EV fold = 80

Maybe you're saying Villain has 80 but you have 100? That's fine then, although it might be easier to just work with eff stacks. In any case, please fully describe the situation. I guess this is not HU? Are you in the blinds or no?
Maybe I didnt' understand well, I thought our expected stack size will be our stack, not the effective stack.
So in my model above, the EV fold = 80?

Model 2

6max

UTG (Villain, 80bb) raises with AA
Hero (BB, 100bb) has 44 and want to setmine

Villain cbets 100%
Hero folds everytime doesn't hit the set
When Hero hits, Villian is going to stack off 100% of the times

In the first model when we are on the BTN, the maximum that we can win is the eff stack (80bbs), but what about model 2 when we are on the BB
How much are we winning everytime we stack off?
181,5 or 180,5?

Quote:
Also, it seems pretty ambitious to expect you'll both win the pot and get the guy's whole stack every single time you hit.
Off course, you are def right, but before working on realistic models, I have to understand perfectly how it works on the dumbest model possible
08-30-2014 , 10:09 AM
I'm working through the book and am at the chapter 2.2.1, maximally exploitative strategy exercise. I modified the exercise and would like to know if I'm doing everything correctly:
We are 25bb deep and hero is SB with T9s. Hero can either raise 2bb or fold, villain can fold or shove and hero can call shove or fold to shove.
Villain's shoving range (Sh) is 22+,A2s+,KJs+,A6o+,KQo = 18.3%=0.183
Villain folds (Fh) everything else = 81.7%=0.817
Hero's equity (EQh) against villain's shoving range is 40.58%=0.4058

EV=max(24.5BB[Fh*26BB+Sh*max(23BB,50BB*EQh)])=
=max(24.5BB[0.817*26BB+0.183*max(23BB,50BB*0.4058)])=
=max(24.5BB[0.817*26BB+0.183*max(23BB,20.29BB)])=
=max(24.5BB[0.817*26BB+0.183*23BB])=
=max(24.5BB, 25.451BB)=
=25.451BB

Therefore we can conclude that hero should raise, but fold to shove.
09-01-2014 , 02:19 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by 4-Star General
Sry for the confusion, obv that's my fault, I'm hoping I'm expressing better this time

Goal: build a simple model in order to gain experience with your EV calc method

Model 1

6max

UTG (Villain, 80bb) raises with AA
Hero (BTN, 100bb) has 44 and want to setmine

Villain cbets 100%
Hero folds everytime doesn't hit the set
When Hero hits, Villian is going to stack off 100% of the times

Maybe I didnt' understand well, I thought our expected stack size will be our stack, not the effective stack.
So in my model above, the EV fold = 80?
Ah, about the effective stacks -- the thing is, (in a cash game) it won't affect your decision at all if stacks are 80 and 100 (as they really are) or 80 and 80, since Hero's extra 20bb behind won't ever come into play. And some calculations are a bit easier if stacks are even, so I usually just do calcs as if both players had the effective stack. But let's not take that shortcut, for the sake of the exercise.

So,
EV(fold) = (stack we end up with when we fold) = 100
and
EV(call) = (chance we hit)*(stack we end up with when we hit) + (chance we miss)*(stack we end up with when we miss)

So, if you assume the blinds always fold, you hit 12.2% of the time (took that number from your earlier post), and when you miss, you snap-lose the pot, and when you hit, you stack Villain, we get:

EV(call) = 0.122*(181.5) + (1-0.122)*(100-X)

where X is how much you have to call preflop to see the flop (i.e. his open raise size).

You can set EV(call) == EV(fold) and solve for X to find the open sizing that makes calling and folding have equal EV, and then if the open size is any smaller, calling is better, and if it's any larger, folding is better.

Quote:
Model 2

6max

UTG (Villain, 80bb) raises with AA
Hero (BB, 100bb) has 44 and want to setmine

Villain cbets 100%
Hero folds everytime doesn't hit the set
When Hero hits, Villian is going to stack off 100% of the times

In the first model when we are on the BTN, the maximum that we can win is the eff stack (80bbs), but what about model 2 when we are on the BB
How much are we winning everytime we stack off?
181,5 or 180,5?
Yea, in the first model if the blinds fold and you stack Villain, you end up with your original 100, plus the 1.5 in blinds, plus Villain's stack for 181.5 total.

In the second case, you get your original 100, plus Villain's 80, plus the SB for 180.5. (Or you could say, you end up with 1.5 in blinds, Villain's 80, plus the 99 you have after you post blinds.)
09-01-2014 , 02:40 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by slenderhusband
I'm working through the book and am at the chapter 2.2.1, maximally exploitative strategy exercise. I modified the exercise and would like to know if I'm doing everything correctly:
We are 25bb deep and hero is SB with T9s. Hero can either raise 2bb or fold, villain can fold or shove and hero can call shove or fold to shove.
Villain's shoving range (Sh) is 22+,A2s+,KJs+,A6o+,KQo = 18.3%=0.183
Villain folds (Fh) everything else = 81.7%=0.817
Hero's equity (EQh) against villain's shoving range is 40.58%=0.4058

EV=max(24.5BB,[Fh*26BB+Sh*max(23BB,50BB*EQh)])=
=max(24.5BB,[0.817*26BB+0.183*max(23BB,50BB*0.4058)])=
=max(24.5BB,[0.817*26BB+0.183*max(23BB,20.29BB)])=
=max(24.5BB,[0.817*26BB+0.183*23BB])=
=max(24.5BB, 25.451BB)=
=25.451BB

Therefore we can conclude that hero should raise, but fold to shove.
Yup, I added some commas, and card removal will make those shoving and folding freqs not quite right, but looks good.

Against an opponent folding so frequently, raising will be better than open-folding with ATC, but we'll need a strong hand (say 44+, ATo, A9s) to call a jam.
09-01-2014 , 06:42 AM
So I finally got round to finishing this book. I have a Masters degree in a pure science, and boy was this book tough, especially towards the end. I probably understood 20% of the book tbh, there was one particular chapter with lots of 'ah ha' moments and take aways that can be pretty much implemented into my game, but the majority of the book is really theoretical and intensive study is probably the only way to get anything of value out of it. Not taking anything away from this book, I do think its excellent - but only for those willing to dedicate themselves to it. Onto Volume 2!
09-01-2014 , 09:55 AM
Good luck with Vol2 if you got 20% out of Vol1.

This work is neck and shoulders above any other poker literature of that type.
The thoroughness and the level at which the work is (was) being done for it is surprisingly high. Figuring out that kind of stuff (conceptualizing it all then putting that to use) is really not easy.

And so it is also quite complex material.
09-06-2014 , 12:06 PM
I'm at p. 92-93 raise/shove game sub-chapter. Do I understand correctly that if SB first decision point (minraising) deviates from the GTO strategy, BB can still shove using the chart and be unexploitable? Or if BBs shoving range is different than the chart, SB can still call all-in unexploitably by following the chart?
09-10-2014 , 02:30 PM
Quote:
if the BB is shoving less than 50%, the SB should never open-fold – he should raise the button 100%.
In the graph below, SB's open percentage doesn't go to 100% as soon as BB's shove percentage goes below 50%. Why is this?
10-05-2014 , 03:04 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by MasterBuilder
So I finally got round to finishing this book. I have a Masters degree in a pure science, and boy was this book tough, especially towards the end. I probably understood 20% of the book tbh, there was one particular chapter with lots of 'ah ha' moments and take aways that can be pretty much implemented into my game, but the majority of the book is really theoretical and intensive study is probably the only way to get anything of value out of it. Not taking anything away from this book, I do think its excellent - but only for those willing to dedicate themselves to it. Onto Volume 2!
Quote:
Originally Posted by Eagle7
Good luck with Vol2 if you got 20% out of Vol1.

This work is neck and shoulders above any other poker literature of that type.
The thoroughness and the level at which the work is (was) being done for it is surprisingly high. Figuring out that kind of stuff (conceptualizing it all then putting that to use) is really not easy.

And so it is also quite complex material.
Glad you guys have enjoyed it . I learned a lot from the writing too..
10-05-2014 , 03:10 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by slenderhusband
I'm at p. 92-93 raise/shove game sub-chapter. Do I understand correctly that if SB first decision point (minraising) deviates from the GTO strategy, BB can still shove using the chart and be unexploitable? Or if BBs shoving range is different than the chart, SB can still call all-in unexploitably by following the chart?
Um so maybe this is a question about what exactly "unexploitable" means. It means playing a strategy that's part of an equilibrium strategy pair. So yea, trivially, if one guy is playing an equilibrium strategy, and the other guy deviates, then the first guy is still playing unexploitably. More interestingly, (in heads up but not nec 3+player games) playing unexploitably does get us guaranteed lower bounds on our EV, regardless of how villain deviates. This is all really important fundamentals that I talk about a lot, so maybe browse again through Chs 1&2 if it's fuzzy.

Also, of course the chart just describes the equilibrium of the raise/shove game. The equilbria of the full game don't necessarily look similar.
10-05-2014 , 03:16 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by KarlssonOnTheRoof

In the graph below, SB's open percentage doesn't go to 100% as soon as BB's shove percentage goes below 50%. Why is this?
Card removal. Just because BB is folding 50% of all hands doesn't mean BB is folding exactly 50% for any particular SB holding.
10-16-2014 , 06:15 AM
I am 6max player but this book together with vol.2 is by far best I ever read. And its not eaven close.
10-17-2014 , 12:55 PM
1. which theorem in game theory tells us that there exists equilibrium solutions in HUNL?
2. if we use this principle to solve minraise/3 bet/4 bet/shove game, then the 3bet/4bet/shove should remain unchanged since they are independent of stack size. However why is their GTO frequencies depends on the effective stack size? p.118
in my opinion, we shouldn't use indifference principle to calculate the optimal strategy. because indifference principle is true if GTO tells us to play raise fold sometimes and raise 4 bet fold sometimes, so if GTO tell us never play raise fold, then indifference principle fail

Quote:
Originally Posted by Amature3921
1. which theorem in game theory tells us that there exists equilibrium solutions in HUNL?
2. if we use this principle to solve minraise/3 bet/4 bet/shove game, then the 3bet/4bet/shove should remain unchanged since they are independent of stack size. However why is their GTO frequencies depends on the effective stack size? p.118
in my opinion, we shouldn't use indifference principle to calculate the optimal strategy. because indifference principle is true if GTO tells us to play raise fold sometimes and raise 4 bet fold sometimes, so if GTO tell us never play raise fold, then indifference principle fail
i think you didn't solve minraise/3bet/4bet/shove game GTO frequencies correctly. For example, at effective stack size of 100, GTO suggests BB to have folding hand(since 3bet to 5BB is not 100%) and 3bet folding hand (since shoving frequency is not 100%), then indifference principle can be applied to BB's folding hands and 3 bet folding hands, and we obtain SB 4 bet frequency=3/7, but in the GTO graph, the frequency is about 0.3

another obvious mistake is that SB fold to shove frequency+ SB calling frequency=100%, but from figure 4.2 a) and b), the sum of two frequencies clearly not =100%

the graph have a lot of mistakes, i hope you to provide us a correct graph,

Quote:
Originally Posted by slenderhusband
I'm at p. 92-93 raise/shove game sub-chapter. Do I understand correctly that if SB first decision point (minraising) deviates from the GTO strategy, BB can still shove using the chart and be unexploitable? Or if BBs shoving range is different than the chart, SB can still call all-in unexploitably by following the chart?
most of the time our opponents are not playing GTO, therefore, we should play maximally exploitative strategy rather than GTO (it is possible that maximally exploitative strategy=GTO) because we can have higher EV

Last edited by Mike Haven; 10-18-2014 at 08:27 AM. Reason: 3 posts merged
10-18-2014 , 07:41 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Amature3921
1. which theorem in game theory tells us that there exists equilibrium solutions in HUNL?
2. if we use this principle to solve minraise/3 bet/4 bet/shove game, then the 3bet/4bet/shove should remain unchanged since they are independent of stack size. However why is their GTO frequencies depends on the effective stack size? p.118
The frequencies are not independent of stack size. Indifference considerations fix ratios between sizes of some, but not all, ranges in that game. And also, as discussed, indifferences can break down at extreme stack sizes.

Quote:
in my opinion, we shouldn't use indifference principle to calculate the optimal strategy. because indifference principle is true if GTO tells us to play raise fold sometimes and raise 4 bet fold sometimes, so if GTO tell us never play raise fold, then indifference principle fail
Well, the point of that discussion is not so much to find the solution of the minr/3bet/4bet game (which isn't v useful in itself) but rather to understand the indifference principle. I think you'll find that it does give us a useful way to understand many aspects of many equilibrium strategies, but understanding when it doesn't apply is v important as well, and examples and discussion of that are often neglected. I spend a lot of time in that chapter talking about when indifferences break down.

Quote:
i think you didn't solve minraise/3bet/4bet/shove game GTO frequencies correctly. For example, at effective stack size of 100, GTO suggests BB to have folding hand(since 3bet to 5BB is not 100%) and 3bet folding hand (since shoving frequency is not 100%), then indifference principle can be applied to BB's folding hands and 3 bet folding hands, and we obtain SB 4 bet frequency=3/7, but in the GTO graph, the frequency is about 0.3

another obvious mistake is that SB fold to shove frequency+ SB calling frequency=100%, but from figure 4.2 a) and b), the sum of two frequencies clearly not =100%
Sorry if it isn't clear, but all the curves in Fig 4.2 represent sizes of ranges as fractions of all hands. So for example, we'd expect SB fold to shove + SB call shove to equal not 100%, but the fraction of all hands in SB's range when facing the shove, i.e., SB 4bet. With that in mind, I believe the graphs are correct.
10-18-2014 , 07:43 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by sigis123
I am 6max player but this book together with vol.2 is by far best I ever read. And its not eaven close.
10-19-2014 , 06:12 AM
thanks yaqh, everything make sense now
10-20-2014 , 03:26 PM
I own both volumes of "Expert Heads Up No Limit Holdem" and I want to study the books and possibly the video packs to improve my 6max cash game. Is there any sections and exercises that I should skip that won't help me much for 6max cash games?
10-20-2014 , 03:46 PM
If I could only buy one of the video packs, should I buy volume 1 or 2 to help improve my 6max cash game?
10-21-2014 , 05:19 PM
I'm having a difficult time trying to understand the following from page 250:

Quote:
The second inequality comes from the fact that the top of Hero’s bluffing range can not ever win when called. If it did, then that would mean Hero was bluffing with some hands strong enough that Villain calls every single time he has a better hand. In other words, these bets completely fail as bluffs, and Hero should be checking back with these hands instead.
Can you explain where the second inequality comes from in a different way?
10-22-2014 , 01:03 PM
In section 7.4.3 you give the solution to a river hand where the BB can choose between block betting and a pot sized bet,

Quote:
his equilibrium strategy involves block-betting 60 percent of the time and splitting the rest
of his range almost evenly between his checking and his near-pot-sized bet options.
I'm pretty sure in the earlier chapters you only showed how to set up the indifference equations for one bet size or the other (essentially each was its own game with its own solution). So how do you set up indifference equations for mixed bet sizes? It isn't immediately obvious to me where to place different actions along our range

ie
(1................................................ .................................................. ........0)
(big bet call, block bet call, check call, check fold, block bet fold, big bet fold)

ie should the very bottom of our range be a big bet or small bet? The indifference equations will show the cutoff hand but not the ordering. Do you just guess and then maybe verify that the overall EV of one ordering is > than another?

Honestly the more I think about this the more confused I get. Where does check raising get put in the range?

Great book btw
10-23-2014 , 11:06 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by RFoley03
I own both volumes of "Expert Heads Up No Limit Holdem" and I want to study the books and possibly the video packs to improve my 6max cash game. Is there any sections and exercises that I should skip that won't help me much for 6max cash games?
I don't really think there are any entire sections that are only relevant to HU players. Pretty much every new part of the books introduces some new theoretical ideas, and HUNL is just used as an example. Even the sections which are only examples have a lot of widely-applicable observations, I think. Non-hu players feel free to chime in..

Quote:
Originally Posted by RFoley03
If I could only buy one of the video packs, should I buy volume 1 or 2 to help improve my 6max cash game?
Well, again, neither really stands out as particularly HU-centric, but the packs are pretty different in their content. I'd recommend checking out the free samples (there's several hours of free content for the Solving Poker pack and lots of shorter samples from the earlier pack) to see which you think might be most useful.

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