Quote:
Originally Posted by Rococo
That's what I thought. You have absolutely no idea how to tie federal deposit insurance to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
First, cash from customer deposits isn't what fueled a loosening of underwriting practices for residential mortgages. And in any case, removing FDIC insurance wouldn't have significantly affected amounts on deposit.
Second, FDIC insurance has been highly effective at preventing depositor runs on banks. It is far from obvious to me that the financial crisis would have been less painful if depositors had engaged in more massive bank runs.
Third, it's a complete joke to say that FDIC insurance undermined incentives for customers to do due diligence on their banking institutions. Your average guy with $20,000 on deposit at XYZ Bank has no way of monitoring the safety and soundness of his bank.
Fourth, and I concede that this is just speculation, I suspect that eliminating FDIC deposit insurance would result in bank consolidation and increased prevalence of banks that are too big to fail.
Yes ofc the federal guarantees reduces the frequency of bank runs, I didn't argue otherwise.
But if I write 50+ lines and you insist on not following the logic under which the existence of FDIC and all other regulatory and legislative actions in the past made it clear the guarantee extended to many more creditors, implicitly but for real as proven repeatedly, then you make it on purpose.
I mean you repeatedly ask me for why i think federal guarantees co-caused the crisis I give you the logic and you only comment stopping at the first layer which on it's face looks like it had nothing to do with GFC per se.
But it's the whole building up of federal guarantees , not only deposits but mortgages as well, explicit and implicit, that causes excess risk build up. Excess vs a scenario with no federal guarantees, where they implode sooner.
The guy with 20k has the same tools to judge the solidity of his bank counterpart the random guy who wants to buy a smartphone has of actually knowing how smartphone performs before he buys them: asking around.
In a world where the state isn't involved firms build up credibility , reputation, other firms build a credibility about assessing firm credibility, and the customer does his job of choosing in an informed way if he wants to, or pays the price of ignorance if he doesn't.
As with every other good or service in the economy.
It is not because of the benignity of the state and it's holy regulatory duty that I know the restaurants I go to don't serve rat meat.
You don't need a state regulator telling you how quick tab loading must be in a browser for it to be legal.
And btw a ton of depositor headaches would be solved if we just allowed people to put money somewhere without it being a ****ing loan to a financial institution.
Maybe in a world with no depositor guarantee firms start offering checking accounts which aren't loans to a bank, rather the equivalent of digital safes , where your money isn't lent to anyone without your express permission, and you just spend it when you see fit. Then they have to reward you appropriately for risk if they instead want to loan it.
And then if you are getting yield, when you lose it's your loss and you suck it up.
This whole idea of most money being actually a loan is one of the original sins.
Some proposals are about the fed giving access to depositors, you just have that as the default state guaranteed option, the rest pays you more but the risk is up to you.
That would actually be a state role which could be justified under minarchism, if we put the payment system under the short list of essential, existential elements of society, then have the state provide the basic option if the market can't (like with the police).
Or the fed does that and then you deal with private companies for the actual UX and all added services, but your money is never a loan unless you want it to be so and you get rewarded appropriately.
Yet again another option would be streamlined account where your money is used to buy tbills, you cash getting a day loan from the intermediary who then proceeds to sell the proper amount of tbills.
The intermediary takes fees for operation and a cut on the tbill yield.
Your money is then a loan but an actual direct loan to the state, rewarded appropriately at market rates, instead of a guarantee with a cap.
See how many ways you can fix what you want to fix without regulatory violence?