Quote:
Originally Posted by Haizemberg93
This is very cool.
It would be interesting to see how much ev range betting 1/3 is losing vs equilibrium strategy. I'm not sure if you can do that with scripts.
I did for few specific flops.
Often the GTO straegy for cbetting has every combo being mixed or pure betting, and rarely pure checking.
Therefor the EV of range betting vs Nash Equilibrium will be the same as GTO on a lot of boards, and only be lower on boards where we have pure checks.
Not sure why you'd want to calculate this though
Quote:
Originally Posted by 1llegAl
This is something confusing to me. Like in this situation if IP is playing his equilibrium (forced range) he will gain EV by definition because OOP deviates.
But from OOP perspective, who is playing his own equilibrium (against a mixed strategy) he will gain EV by definition because IP deviates.
I am missing something and can't figure it up.
If IP loses EV by range betting, it's either because villain adapts and exploits, or because he is taking wrong lines, like betting a pure check hand.
If OOP doesn't adjust to villains range betting, he won't yield any less EV than in equilibrium, but he will yield the same or more EV (in case IP is betting pure checks). He will, though, yield less EV than he would by exploiting villains deviation