My post wasn't meant to be sarcastic.

The problem that is being discussed (fiction/reality) functions way prior to the idea about how brains turn physical impulses into subjective experiences and prior to the many assumptions that the brain idea operates from.

Experience is not representation. Experience IS reality and there is no other reality. Sometimes experience is such that it contains thoughts that suggest that even things that are not in present experience are real, and that these things are responsible for creating experiences. This process of imagining is real, but its suggestion is not.

It is only after we define a context based upon the necessary assumptions for the "brain idea" to make sense that we can start talking about how brains create experiences. Then we will come to what I call contextual truths. But these contextual truths are never in competition with the living truth, they are categorically different. One is alive and non-conceptual (actual immediate experience present right now), the other is imagined/conceptualized.

Reality is self evident and non-conceptual. Back to the red colour example. When I write "red colour", then what happens is that (and you can verify this in your experience) we read the words, experience thoughts and we experience a pattern that suggests that the thought's suggestion is referring to something real (so-called "red colour"). The actual experience of this process is real, the suggestions are fiction. When you actually see lllllllllllll then lllllllllllllll is self-evident and non-conceptual. When you read "red colour" then you're experiencing a suggestion/reference, the experiencing of the suggestion is self-evident, but the narrative content isn't, it's referential and not self-evident.

Reality is always self-evident by virtue of being present in actual alive experience. Fiction is whenever something is being imagined by way of reference/suggestion/narrative.

Sounds like a very mushy and unnecessary distinction.

Experience is not "reality", experience only is. From everything we can gather, experience is also individual and relative and thus it makes no sense to claim that experience is not a representation. We certainly know of no possible way that experience could be anything but a representation.

This is correct. However, you seem to be taking as an implication of this that the name of a thing is not a thing. Less abstractly, it is true that the word "red" is not itself the property red (or redness if you don't like property talk). However, the word red is itself a thing--for instance, this is true: "Red" has three letters (more pertinently, I would say this is true: the word "red" refers to the property red, or to redness). This shows immediately that Ramana's claim that the distinction here is used to distinguish between reality and fiction is false.

I'm not that interested in fighting over the the definition of the word "truth." If you want to use it in a different way, then fine. However, just know that the above is exactly what I mean by "truth." I would say that "true" doesn't refer to reality directly (it would be silly to say that reality is true), but to statements or propositions. It is, in how I use the word, not meaningful to say that reality is true, or that a non-representational experience is true.

I feel bad responding to an atheist's post when there are lots of interesting posts I have yet to respond to from the spiritual guys, but I strongly agree with the bolded and feel that I can't really continue unless we all understand that my questions refer to OrP's definition of "truth".

So, when I say that I believe that "there are no spiritual truths" I provisionally mean that "there are no spiritual statements or propositions that are true". My position would be better described, however, as ignostic sbout "spiritual truth" in that the subset of truth-bearing statements described as "spiritual truths" is too ill-defined to discuss meaningfully.

So to return to some of my original questions in light of this clarification:

e.g. we might say that a scientific truth is defined as "a statement or proposition that refers to the nature of physical reality" and an aesthetic truth is "a statement or proposition that refers to the nature of art, beauty, or taste". And a spiritual truth is "a statement or proposition that refers to _____" (fill in the blank, ideally not with something too circular).


e.g. is the statement "The tao is not the tao" a spiritual truth? What other specific statements/propositions are there?

edit: just to tie this all in to at least a couple of the responses so far, Lemonzest kinda implies that spiritual truths are moral truths, which makes sense to me. I know that boath Lemonzest and I are moral realists and believe that moral propositions can be true or false. Hainesy starts well with defining spiritual truth, but then states that a "something which can be experienced is a truth" (paraphrased) which doesn't meet the criteria of truth being a proposition... which, to be fair, I've only just brought up.

edit 2: I really do expect that my mind can (is likely to?) be changed in this thread, at a minimum I think you guys can show me that "spiritual truth" is a meaningful concept, and, depending on how it's defined, that at least some "spiritual truths" are actually true.

Does truth exist without language?

Reality is what is. "What is" is identical with immediate alive experience.

From within a certain conceptual context and if we accept many assumptions then we can say that experience is individual and relative. But, even though it may be highly useful it's still only theoretical. In immediate alive experience reality is neither individual nor relative.

We experience only this moment, within this moment exists a memory/thought that suggests the existence of another moment, such is the nature of reality right now... but there is still only this moment, there will never be a moment other than this one right now. We look at other people and we experience the suggestion that there is an I and another I (you) and that this other I has a consicousness equal to my own... but actually I never experience the other person's consciousness. The suggestions are experienced, but their promise never translates into actual experience.

The referencing is real. The referent isn't real. Whether or not within the act of referencing and conceptualizing we determine that x or y is real has no bearing on what actually is real. Reality can't be referred to, it can only be experienced. The correct way is to see the experience of referencing alongside and as ontologically equal to all other qualia (colours, sounds, etc).

Red exists only when redness is actually present, the redness then is self-evident in alive experience. This actual alive redness can't be referred to. What is ever being referred to is just an idea. Think of the process as a flying referential arrow. The arrow is real, it is happening, it is such that it suggests that it refers to something real, as if its target is real, but actually the arrow has no destination, ther arrow is just flying, and the nature of this referential arrow is to create the illusion that it does have a destination and that its destination is real.

No (understanding language broadly as meaning representation).

The word "red" has three letters. That is a fact about the world. It is not just a feature of my phenomenological experience. As such, the statement, ""Red" has three letters," is true. It is true by nature of the fact that it represents something about the word (how many letters a particular word has). This representation only works because one of the things we can represent is words or names, such as "red." Thus, while it is true that the name of a thing is not the thing itself, sometimes the thing we are talking about is a name. Thus, it is not correct that our statements about names are all fictional or false.

This doesn't help me much. The declarative statements you make here I disagree with, and the the arrow story isn't helping me understand or agree with your point.

Before there was language, there was, what we call, gravity, lightning and air. These things had attributes, effects, properties, etc. Did those things exist before there was language to describe them? Were they what they were, are they what they are, if there are no words-placed-in-a-proper-order to sort, compare and order them?

Yes.

Like I said, there is a categorical difference between the living truth and conceptual truths. I'm talking about how referencing/conceptualization relates to the living truth. Conceptualization is highly useful, but if one wants to understand the nature of reality then it's even more useful to understand how conceptualzation works in actual experience.

Let's take a look at what "the name of the thing" actually is. In your example the actual phenomenological experience (fact about the world) is that we see black squiggles on a white background (that's the word "red") and at the same time we experience a pattern that suggests a reference to these exact squiggles, then we experience a conceptualization that turns these squiggles into a thought we call "word" and a further conceptualization that differentiates it into three letters, then we experinece the suggestion that this word "red" refers to a colour, etc. It's automatic, yet highly complex process, we should not ignore it and quickly jump to conclusions.

When this process is not occuring then there is no such phenomenological fact about the world, and certainly no fact about the world that there exists the word "red" and that it has three letters and refers to this or that. If the word doesn't exist in phenomenological experience then it doesn't exist at all. It is only after we have "decided" (which is the wrong word, because obviously it all happens by itself) to function from the conceptual context and only after we have agreed to operate from certain assumptions that we can say that ""red has three letters" is a fact about the world." The "world" that we are then referring to is not real, it's theoretical.

To many people all this is extremely counterintuitive, but only if ideas obstruct the view. Instead of relying on ideas, we must investigate the problem empirically, and the context of our empiricism can thus be none other than immediate experience.

IMHO, a spiritual truth is a statement about the spiritual realm ( which includes Hashem = "G-d", and other spiritual beings ). Spiritual beings do not always manifest in the physical cosmos and they sometimes manifest indirectly, such as through the human mind.
IMHO, by simply asking, seeking, knocking, and doors will be opened; this is quite close to what Yeshua, the Messiah, stated.
There exists a unique "G-d", Hashem ( YHWH Elohim ), by whom all things came into being.
There exist spiritual beings other than Hashem.
Yeshua HaMashiach is recognized as having divine authority by spiritual beings.
Hashem has manifested Himself in the physical cosmos through Yeshua HaMashiach.
On the side of "light", without being given direct revelation from the Ruach HaKodesh, the Spirit of Truth, a human being would either have to accept testimony of other human beings or trust in Scripture ( but not necessarily to the extent of biblical inerrancy ) or trust in Yeshua HaMashiach. Those in "darkness" are usually and often influenced by spiritual beings opposed to the Way of Life and Light, so it's important to recognize the source: e.g., is it from the Spirit of Truth?

An interesting example that is not very uncommon is that some human beings have experienced alien abductions, but this is ( IMHO ) a manifestation of demonic beings affecting the mind of the experiencer. Joe Jordan of the CE4 Research Group has an interesting finding among "Christian" experiencers: some of these people were able to stop and even terminate this experience from their lives, simply by calling on the name and authority of "Jesus Christ" ( = Yeshua, the Messiah ). Thus, for a human being, putting absolute trust in Yeshua the Messiah and asking for his help or guidance ( through the Ruach HaKodesh ) is a good place to start.

Do you think you are any closer to understanding the answer to your first question (what is meant by the term spiritual truth)? I am not.

I can usually understand questions about whether something is true, but I do not understand what happens when that word true is turned into truth. It sounds like some kind of non-specific wisdom claim, at least when not preceded by the grounding word 'the', when 'the truth of X' really just is another way of saying 'is X true'. So is truth just suffering from flowery word syndrome, or is there something different about truth and being true?


Don't you think that someone's experience of reality can be artificially changed, either with or without their knowledge? For example, do you think it is possible for defective sensory organs to be replaced with artificial ones, given sufficient technology? Not simply fixing a defect of the organ (like cochlear implants), but bypassing the sensors completely. Artificial bionic organs that basically plug into the brain, or at least somewhere along the neurological pathway between the organ and the brain. Such devices need not convey reality to the recipient. Or less science fiction, what about the medical condition phantom limb: this also places an individual's experiences and reality at odds with one another. How do such things affect your ideas about the experience of reality? Or am I completely missing your point?


As I asked earlier, What changed after there was a word "tree"?
Also, we don't need to see the word "tree" to think about a tree, or see the word "red" to think of the colour blue. I mean red

From what I've heard and read I believe that this it is possible. But yes, you've missed the point. There is a categorical difference between actual reality and conceptual conclusions. That experience is dependent on the functioning of unconscious matter is a big assumption, if we include many other assumptions then we have to come to certain conclusions, but this process functions on a conceptual level, we come to conceptual/contextual truths. Actual reality is categorically different from these conceptual truths. If one wants to be good at conceptual conclusions then one has to be smart and knowledgable, if one wants to understand the living truth then nothing whatsoever is required because the living truth is self-evident. For example if you want to know conceptual truths about the colour red then you have to be a very good thinker, but in order to attain the living truth about the colour red then you only have to see lllllllllllllll.

Let's assume we're a neurosurgeon and we tinker with someone else's brain. After the operation the patient says that his experience is different. Do we know the patient's experience directly like we know ours? No, not even remotely. What is actually happening in our experinece? We have a thought that differentiates the field of experience and suggests that there is an I, we have a memory that suggest that this I is a neurosurgeon, we have thoughts that suggest that the shapes over there are an objectively separate entity, that we performed an operation on this entity, etc. What is really happening is that reality manifests in such a way that it is of many colours and sounds, feelings and smells, and also many suggestions... all these qualia happen simultaneously in the present moment, such is the nature of reality in that given moment.

Now, in case we're the patient. When we wake up after the operation we have thoughts that suggest that there exists time, a past instance, and we have memory that in that past instance we had experiences that were so and so. Then appear thoughts that suggest that they represent present experience and compare this present experience to the past experiences. Still reality is identical with the qualia that are actually present in our experience, and reality is then such that it suggest many things, and reality is such that it contains many thoughts and many memories, these thoughts/memories/suggestions are present in the same way as all the many colours, sounds, feelings, etc.

What changed with what? idk what you are asking.

(What changed when I drove to Topeka: my location, the altitude I was at, the temperature, the make of the roads I drove, the air currents, my car's gas guage, tire wear, and a million other things)

You said the following:
What are you trying to convey with that final paragraph? You introduced a thing, a tree, and then introduced an event, that a tree could be described with the word "tree". Why is that significant? What changed when you have a word for something?

No, the tall thing in your backyard ("tree") doesn't change just because we're constructing words and speaking sounds to represent it. Truth is similar. Truth is what it is. Truth is.

(The reader of this determines whether it's significant to him. And the penny has to drop for each reader to realize this. The more it's explained, the more the reader is in danger of taking the explained concepts as the truth; confusing the representation for the represented.)

Maybe not just because of our words and sounds, but the tree in your backyard can change as a result of our words. I say some words, and the tree is turned into a well-made bridge. I say some different words and the tree is turned into a poorly-made bridge. Others and it is made into a table.

Fair enough. As usual, I don't really know what you're talking about, so maybe I am just missing it. As far as I can tell, talk of a "living truth" mostly ends up confusing the issue and I don't see much use in it.

How do you know all this? Are you a cognitive scientist or have you studied cognitive science? Or are you just speculating?

My point is that the bolded presupposes a false dichotomy. Indeed, when we talk about words, we are talking about a conceptual (theoretical) "world." But that doesn't mean that we are talking about something that is not real. One way we can show this is by pointing out that we can say true things about concepts or words (such as that the word "red" has three letters).

I disagree strongly with this. I am very skeptical of the ability of our minds or senses to somehow get before our concepts or representations of the world to some kind of direct or immediate experience of the world.

Phenomonelogical investigations can be interesting as investigations of the phenomenology of various experiences, but I don't think they tell us much about the actual world, nor do I think they lay bare to us a world without representations.

You don't accept that the buddha attained nirvana then? or that it exists as an experience?

There is no need to have studied anything except one's own immediate experience. Immediate experience is self-evident even if we have not studied other sciences. We need to study other sciences if we want to articulate how immediate experience relates to these other sciences.

Immediate experience is real and self-evident. If we say that a conceptual world is real in the same way as immediate experience then we're using the word "real" wrongly, because the conceptual world and immediate experience are not "real" in the same way (and, in fact, not even in a similar way). We can use the word "real" for both immediate experience and concepts but then we're using two completely different definitions of the word "real".

The actual thought "the word "red" has three letters" functions entirely on the level of qualia. The truth-claim within "the word "red" has three letters" functions on a conceptual level.

Whenever we think "the word "red" has three letters" then this thought is an experience, it's a process, it's qualia, we can look at this experience and see how if functions, how it feels like. We can identify the suggestions, patterns, the referencing, the feelings of certainty, confusion, etc. The experience of this though is self-evident, it reveals its nature/texture (how it feels like) by its mere presence.

Whenever we think "the word "red" has three letters" and we believe to express about the world a fact that we believe to remain a fact even in the absence of us thinking "the word "red" has three letters" then it's entirely conceptual. We have expanded the definition of "world" beyond what is by definition empirically observable, i.e. we will by definition never experientially participate with a fact that we're not experiencing... so on what grounds are we claiming it to be a fact of the world? That there exists a trans-experiential world can be a useful idea, but there is no need at all to claim that it expresses something real, we can work with that idea entirely without believing that it is expressing a fact about the world, we can avoid a lot of confusion by not misinterpreting it's truth-claim and the idea still remains just as useful, we may in fact even gain clarity about how exactly this idea functions.

The sum of all qualia in this very moment IS the world, it doesn't represent anything, it is existence/reality itself. There is nothing beyond the immediate experience, only thought suggests that there is something beyond immediate experience... And where does this thought occur? It occurs of course in immediate experience.

Then why are you making these posts about language and objects? You asked OrP whether, of gravity, lightning and air, "Did those things exist before there was language to describe them? Were they what they were, are they what they are...?" Why ask this seemingly rhetorical question?

Perhaps you could give an example of this problem that you described as "confusing the representation for the represented"? I can at least understand the description, but when or how does such a problem manifest?

Then a lot of people from the Western spiritual side of things can’t continue with you. To them spiritual truth signifies knowledge by acquaintance; not knowledge by adjudicating propositions and the like. For instance, when Jesus says, “I and the father are one,” he’s not signifying knowledge as the conclusion of a syllogism or knowledge through the mediation of concepts; but knowledge, or a spiritual truth, gained through acquaintance or participation. (Since no significant theologian thinks of God as a being or a higher being) the latter is more akin to a participation in or acquaintance with the highest state of being, i.e., Supreme Being.