Quote:
Originally Posted by clowntable
I belive this is the core idea behind "share holder value" which of course has been twisted into some sort of evil-short-term-speculation-metaphor as in "companies are only interested in share holder value"
of course it is the initial idea, but with institutional shareholders often having turnover periods of 6 months or less (i.e. they turn the entire portfolio of shares over twice a year, on average) and management paid in options and shares, the incentives (as per Nich's? linked essay) are tied, not to creating a company of long term sustainable profitability, but to earning a short run high share price (which has some correlation to the long term obviously, but it is far looser than it ought to be) and thus it is not a metaphor of short-termism, it is a real flaw in the way that the markets have developed in the last 20 or so years.
There ought to be no argument that US/UK style markets are 'short-termist' and Japanese-style governance is able to take a longer view (an argument which IS made, fwiw, in a lot of academic literature) since well run markets should be long term oriented. But they haven't been.
If a CEO gets paid in options which vest over 3, 4, 5 years, he is interested in making sure that the share price is high for the next 5 years. If he is going to receive a dividend stream for the rest of his life, he has to make sure that his company is able to pay dividends for the next 20-30-40 years. Different ball game.