Originally Posted by PairTheBoard
"That's the total of madnakian determinism? It sounds more like what you think madnakian determinism implies about human behavior."

I'm trying to establish what is madnakian determinism. I proposed it was this:
You said that was "close". But that you are only suggesting ... yada yada yada about human behavior.

I said that just looks like what you think madnakian determinism implies about human behavior. You're not telling me what madnakian determinism is in total.

Now you agree with that distinction. So are you evading my question? What is madnakian determinsim? You don't like the definition I gave you? You'd rather talk about what it implies about human behavior? What is it about my definition you don't like? What are the general principles of madnakian determinism? And how do you reconcile them with poker players around the world using indeterminate randomness devices to make their "Call x% Fold 100-x%" probabilistic decisions?

PairTheBoard

that humans ''call x%, fold 100-x%" in certain situations is a post hoc description of their behavior. it does not necessarily (almost certainly doesnt) describe the decision-making algorithms they use to generate their behavior.

I'm not proposing it to madnak for that purpose. I'm presenting it here strictly as an argument against a Determinism+Quantum Randomness worldview that assumes quantum randomness does not rise to classical levels in nature. We know poker players make probabilisitic decisions. What I'm proposing is supplying them with quantum based randomness devices so that their probabilisitic decisions become subject to the Uncertainty Principle. This can be done in fact and I claim debunks such semi-deterministic worldviews.

As far as whether people generate their everyday behavior in this way, the model was accepted by many here as reasonable for the situation described in the OP. It could also be argued that an Internally Generated Randomness would be an evolutionary advantage for situations where action is required for borderline decisions.

You can say what you like and are entitled to your opinion. But I really don't think you know.

PairTheBoard

PTB,

i neither said nor implied that all of the decision-making algorithms generating human behavior are deterministic. the post immediately preceding my last even suggests that they may be deterministic, indeterministic, or self-deterministic (whatever that may mean; incidentally that is the crux of the issue).

what i did imply was that human beings could be using nothing but deterministic decision-making algorithms and still behave probabilistically. that is obvious. the passage of yours i quoted was problematic if only because it was potentially misleading.

merely clarifying, not objecting to your thesis. everyone is sensitive!

But 5 was as much of an option for the computer as cherry was for your in the ice cream parlor. Neither could have been chosen.

What distinction is there between "calculating" and "deliberating" in you mind? Because it seems to me that they are exactly the same in the way that you are presenting it. In both case only one option could be chosen.

Of course you do not think my position holds, hence the discussion I have been spending most of the time trying to figure out how you are defining things. This is from merriam-webster
Choice implies that I could have done differently. If I choose X then in another possible world I could have chosen Y

I don't see how a computer deliberates. It only has the ability to choose 1 thing, it might calculate but not deliberate. Unless of course you have a new definition for deliberate as well

I'm trying to grasp how I can do something else at any point, what would tip me to the something else?
Nothing? Then I'm acting randomly which doesn't fit with the coherent approach we see humans take in situations.
Something? Like a nano-sized input from somewhere or .... ? Then when we rerun the situation and we get to the point where the nano arrives I make the same choice ...again, the nano is now just another input, sigh.

The problem is that the concept of "choosing freely" has no meaning. Whether natural or supernatural it can't be called "choosing" if it's a random event that pushes it in one direction or the other.

I'm clarifying my philosophical position. What you're talking about here is an empirical position. If you want me to boil it down to philosophy, I suppose it goes "it is irrational to accept an empirical proposition for which there is no empirical evidence." We don't know that human action isn't indeterministic, and neither do we know that there isn't a teapot orbiting Saturn. However, in both cases there exists no evidence for the (unfalsifiable) proposition, and in both cases it's hard to even imagine a possible mechanism or explanation. In other words, both are supernatural and irrational claims.

To reiterate. It is possible that there is an indeterministic element to human behavior, in the same sense and to the same degree that it is possible that there is a teapot orbiting Saturn. It's a bizarre claim, and it's an extreme claim that can be safely rejected until equally extreme evidence is available to support it.

In terms of call/fold decisions, using an external randomizing device does not suggest a random element to human decision making. The decision arrived at in this case is the decision to use the randomizing device. A computer might have such a device as an internal mechanism, but in humans this is not possible. The human decision-making mechanism is known, it is neural functioning. Nerve cells, glial cells, synapses, and every other component of the human decision-making apparatus show every indication of behaving in classically deterministic ways. We have dissected every region of the brain, there are no randomizing devices in there, just neurons.

In the first place, that's not true. If my evaluative process had resulted in the selection of cherry, then cherry would have been chosen.

In the second place, I considered cherry as an option. The computer did not consider 5 as an option. This isn't that complicated.

"Calculating" is performing a linear series of steps that alter the objects of analysis in order to achieve the desired result. "Deliberating" involves evaluating each of a series of options, assigning values to each option, and then selecting the option with the highest assigned value. The processes are quite different.

And you have not specified a meaningful sense in which only one option "could" be chosen. All the available options are accessible to the decision-making algorithm, thus the decision-making algorithm can make any of the choices.

"the act of choosing : selection"

Sounds good to me. Choice is the process of selection - are you claiming that computers do not select chess moves? Are you claiming that

Your bolded line does say that choice suggests (not implies) choosing "freely," without elaborating on what "freely" means. Answers.com actually says: "Choice implies broadly the freedom to choose from a set." This is compatible with determinism. Nowhere is free will, much less libertarian free will, mentioned - and nowhere is indeterminacy referenced. A solid argument could be made here for a compatibilistic free will (defined as "the capacity to make a choice," forming a closed loop with the definition of choice and admitting no further attempts to introduce anything about indeterminism into the picture), but even there the entry is explicit that "freedom" is here interpreted in broadly, which would hardly make sense even if such a narrow definition of freedom were intended.

Regardless, none of any of this suggests indeterminism, it only goes to support my point.

I defined deliberation above, but here's answers for you:

Nothing about indeterminism here. On the contrary, the implication of a systematic process of weighing alternatives.

That's not true, at least not in the way that you are presenting it. Cherry is no more of an option then 5, in order for you to have chosen cherry there would have had to of been something different in the past. Meaning that the equation would have changed. And if the equation of 2+2 would have changed the another number would have been picked.

In order for you to say that cherry was just as viable of a choice you would have to be saying that in another world with the exact same history you could have chosen cherry. But I do not believe that you are saying this. Given the set of variables vanilla was the only possible outcome. In the same way that a computer calculates.

The result of 5 can never come from the process of calculating 2+2. The result of cherry can come from the process of choosing an ice cream flavor.

Could a computer solve a calculation and get the result of 5? Yes.
Could I choose cherry as an ice cream flavor? Yes.

So yes, in both cases we could have done otherwise given the appropriate conditions.

Could a computer solve a calculation and get the result of 5, given that the calculation is 2+2? No.
Could I choose cherry as an ice cream flavor, given that I have a categorical preference for vanilla over cherry? No.

Naturally, when the conditions are rigidly defined, so are the outcomes. The only strange thing is that you view the first answer here as tautological but not the second. It should go without saying that if I have a categorical preference for vanilla ice cream, I will not choose cherry over vanilla.

Now you've defined your terms. Which is good. But you won't find any dictionary definition that mentions any "with the exact same history, etc etc..."

And you will never find any use of the word "choice" that is any more functional based on these considerations, nor any use that benefits in any functional way from such considerations. They have no bearing whatever on the word "choice" as it is used, nor on the term "could have done" as it is used.

That's your clarification of your position on determinism? It's no clarification at all. What is your position on determinism - philosophical, empirical, or whatever. What is it? All you seem able to do is express your opinion about how the human brain works. Forget about human behavior for a moment and simply describe your position on determinism in general. Please.



PairTheBoard

I've already explained that. I believe that in the physical world, interactions are reducible to quantum events, and that in many cases the sum total of these quantum events has a sufficiently high statistical probability of resulting in particular patterns (laws of motions, laws of thermodynamics, etc) at the macro level that such patterns can be assumed (and taken as "reality," despite being emergent properties of quantum interactions). These patterns are typically deterministic. In other cases, such as chaotic systems perhaps, quantum indeterminacy may result in observable effects at the macro changes.

Thank you.

In a world full of poker players using quantum randomization devices for their probabilistic decisions, do you think the details of the days following play for these players are theoretically predictable?

PairTheBoard

No.

Actually, you're wrong about this.

Originally Posted by madnak
"I've already explained that. I believe that in the physical world, interactions are reducible to quantum events, and that in many cases the sum total of these quantum events has a sufficiently high statistical probability of resulting in particular patterns (laws of motions, laws of thermodynamics, etc) at the macro level that such patterns can be assumed (and taken as "reality," despite being emergent properties of quantum interactions). These patterns are typically deterministic. In other cases, such as chaotic systems perhaps, quantum indeterminacy may result in observable effects at the macro changes."




Please explain.


PairTheBoard

Originally Posted by PairTheBoard
"In a world full of poker players using quantum randomization devices for their probabilistic decisions, do you think the details of the days following play for these players are theoretically predictable? "



Well.... ok then.


PairTheBoard

+1

Just making sure Durkadurka comes back.

It's not clear that macro events are reducible to quantum events. That's the "reductionist" argument. It's not an a priori truth and there are many people who don't take that position. There is a growing popularity in the philosophy of physics and physics itself that there are merely different levels of description...but not that there is a reductionism of macro events to quantum events.

The actions taken by the individuals on the days following play are chose independantly of the actions taken during play for most individuals.

I thought the "please explain" referred to this -
If he is wrong, show how he is wrong. "growing popularity" only works for rock bands.

I did respond...to the "interactions are reducible to quantum events"

Why can't people read?

But you didnt show it was wrong, just that there are a growing number of people who maybe might be starting to think it might not be true. So you showed it wasnt a 100% lead pipe consensus opinion, basically.

The request wasn't that you respond, it was that you explain where he is wrong. That some undefined growing number may have different views doesn't make him wrong anymore than Dawkins is wrong because Gould went nutso. I'll help frame it --
" He is wrong because ......... "

What physical event occurs that does not show up at the quantum level? That we can look at reality at different levels does not mean reality cares about it, it's just doing it's thing. "X happened and nothing relative occurred at the quantum level" is what I'd like to hear about.

I'm hoping you can provide a clear answer because it would really change my worldview. At present, I essentially take the approach that if nothing happened at the quantum level, nothing happened. I don't mind being wrong, rather enjoy it actually, so let's hear it.

It isn't worth my time to bring people up to speed on the physics arguments about quantum mechanics and the macro/micro distinction and the different theories on interaction between them.

The lack of understanding in other threads makes quantum arguments utterly out of grasp for most people without a background in physics.