From a previous thread deal_me_in Excellent book, well worth reading. Thanks

Clearly you're correct that Britains rearmanent was insufficient to handle the situation that arose. Also clearly in retrospect Chamberlain got that wrong and the TYM and Churchill were right.

but the book also alludes to the rearmanent that had got underway which was clearly considerable and the main criticism (apart from Munich) seems to be that post war being declared in 1939 there was insufficient acceleration of rearmanent and a most casual attitude to the fact of being at war. NC is treated as a dolt which seems largely fair especially after the Norway campaign and his 'Hitler missed the bus' speach.

Its the casual attitude to being at war that seems most extraordinary and I would have love to read more detailed analysis of how this happened. It beggers belief that the mighty British empire was literaly at war with this massive menace and carried on much as normal.

Unless maybes you consider some of the following.

1) that's how Britain worked, arrogance, complacency, incompetent and indifference. The Napoleonic wars bear an uncanny similarity to WW2.

2) concentration on domestic party politics. NC was determined to remain the boss and in that light his actions make far more sense.

3) NC seemed to genuinely believe that Britain and allies could cope with Hitler fairly easily.

4) A general support of Germany. one of the key things missed by many is that the Royal familly, the aristocracy and many of the MPs supported Hitler and the Nazis to a large extent.

5) related to 3) the news of attrocities comitted by the Nazi's didn't bother the ruling class very much. The simple sad truth is that many were in favour and certainly didn't feel threatened by it. They did feel threatened by communism.

5) Russia and communism. Huge miscalculation number 1 was that Germany would fight Russia. Britain was all in favour of this and the ruling classes felt far more threatened by communism then they did by facism. A more competent NC might have ensured this happened.

6) France. Huge miscalculation number 2.

That's enough to hopefully spark an interesting debate. Final though is that the much lauded Churchill spent much of the 30's obsessed with the end of appeasment ..... of Gandhi rather than Hitler.

chez

[Phil are you still alive?]

I'll respond to the points where I feel have relevant knowledge on the subject.

Biggest empire in the world against a Germany that was a young nation, devastated after the last war and with an economy that was basically smoke and mirrors. Even in Germany you would be hard pressed to find anyone who prior to 1939 believed Germany could take on England and France for more than 5-10 years. Also wars wasn't a horrible scenario like it is today

I think everybody thought this. Germany's full assault on France was a indeed a plan, but it was also a very desperate if-everything-goes-to-hell plan against what was believed to be the strongest military defence in the world using untested doctrines.

Europe in those days were nowhere near the fairly united continent we see today. It made the current middle-east situation look like a cozy picnic, with political situations changing per decade.

The atrocities commited by the germans were hardly unique. Even the camps that would start more fully a few years later were an old invention. Total war was still a legitimate means of war in these days.

A very costly lesson in failed military doctrines. Germany was very good at what they did. A german mechanized division in 1939 moved with a higher average speed than American contemporaries did in either Iraq war. Which considering the difference in means of communication is a spectacular feat.

ooops forgot possibly the most interesting

7) belief that Hitler didn't want to fight Britain. Most interesting because in some ways it must have been correct but its not clear how correct.

Thanks. couple of thoughts

have to disagree with this, it was a horrific prospect as WW1 had proved and was fresh in the memory. I'm sure Phil is right that a desire to avoid this horrific prospect influenced decisions although we disagree about much.

No match against the mighty Maginot line defending France

Yes, this is probably the "killing" point. I think many diplomats and politicians in Germany thought Britain would never declare war on Germany AND at the same time many diplomats in Britain thought Germany would not carry through its threat against Poland.

I guess one could say that the belief might have been a little weaker in Germany, but the authorative state system that was put in place probably also weakened the influence of the more competent members of the diplomatic corps.

You also have the 'dazed war'. The three months of no hostile actions after war was declared. I think it shows rather well how the war came as a shock to a lot of people.

I'm reminded of a scene in the Ciano diaries (italian foreign minister) where he sadly says goodbye to the British and French diplomats, which he thought hightly of.

Probably to an extent. But both England and France were now nations which had basically been in war (throughout the world) for a couple of hundred years pretty much constantly. Culturally war was still a very upstanding and "proud" thing to do, especially amongst the ruling elite. Churchill himself was a veteran from Sudan - not a mild war in modern day recognition of atrocities by any standard. He was hardly alone in this type of background.

Good posts.

I have to disagree a bit with this. France's military was still stuck in WWI, convinced that defense had a huge edge over offense, hence the Maginot line. Planes and tanks, however, had reversed this. Hitler (or his generals) developed tactics to take advantage of these weapons. Untested? Yes, but, for the most part, well thought out.

Indeed - and we know that _now_. But one has to consider the thoughts at the time. When you read material written between the wars and not after, it is clear that the maginot line is seen as an extremely potent line of defense and that the surprise is _huge_ when france falls like a deck of cards.

And it is clear that it would be. France had an enormous army, a giant reserve, was a filthy rich country compared to germany, the army was state of the art merely 20 years earlier and had indeed won a war against Germany in those days.

That the germans would simply bypass the maginot line and head for Paris was...well...shocking.

And for all the brilliance of their tactics, this kind of warfare was so new that the Germans actually did a major mistake. In hindsight the war was lost at Dunkerque. Though at the time it certainly didn't seem so.

Dunkirk is another event surrounded in mythology and its not obvious that Germany made a major mistake. Its true that with different tactics they might have had an overwhelming victory but that's with hind-sight.

The official papers released after 50 years or so show the first stirrings of competence by the British who made every effort to make the germans (and their own allies) convinced they were going to keep fighting, the RAF was also used to great effect and the germans were stretched. Apparantly the 'nice' British were ruthless, breaking the geneva convention by using dum-dum bullets and planning to abandon the French - only late pressure forcing the government to rescue 1 Frenchmen per British soldier, and encouraging Belgium to keep fighting at their side when they wre about to scarper.

Harder to fathom the German side, how deceived were they? and how true is the persistent rumour that the concern the British would escape was limited by Hitler being happy for them to escape? - this being one of the reasons to believe Hitler didn't particularly weant to fight Britain and was happy to negotiate a peace which left him a free hand to dominate Europe/Russia. It makes me wonder just what negotiations were going on at the highest levels, I find it impossible to believe there weren't any.

Also the story that civilians sailed from England in huge numbers to rescue the British in a fleet of fishing boats etc is a fabrication. (smells like one of Churchills)

Yes, I agree with this. I would also like to note that I wrote "with hindsight" in my post - I should probably have bolded it out because it is important.

In any type of war history it is extremely important to separate hindsight from "thensight".

It seems obvious that at the time it would be natural to believe that forcing treaty was now almost a done deal.