Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis Cyphre
I disagree with those rulings, too. Free speech is very important but should not trump all and devolve into a anything-anytime-anywhere-free-for-all.
Has the SC addressed this inconsistency? I can imagine that they value more the unhindered and unthreatened work of congress and the SC because their decisions have more far-reaching consequences.
My sense is that the court understands the supreme importance of our right to freedom of expression, and they want to be very careful allowing new restrictions on it and setting precedents for any future restrictions. You can see their thought process in the majority opinion from the Snyder vs Westboro Baptist ruling, which was actually a tort case, as Westboro had broken no laws. The last part of the opinion is quoted below:
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Quote:
Snyder argues that even assuming Westboro’s speech is entitled to First Amendment protection generally, the church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audience at his son’s funeral. Brief for Petitioner 45–46. We do not agree. In most circumstances, “the Constitution does not permit the government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.” Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210–211 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[t]he ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971).
As a general matter, we have applied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from protected speech. For example, we have upheld a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict the delivery of offensive mail to his home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 736–738 (1970), and an ordinance prohibiting picketing “before or about” any individual’s residence, Frisby, 487 U. S., at 484–485.
Here, Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service. Snyder could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral. And there is no indica- tion that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself. We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the circumstances presented here.
Because we find that the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional dis- tress or intrusion upon seclusion—the alleged unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish—we must likewise hold that Snyder cannot recover for civil conspir- acy based on those torts.
Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about Westboro. West- boro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its con- tribution to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro’s choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Trolly McTrollson
I thought we explained time and place restrictions to him the other day, but I guess it didn't take.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul D
Not to mention he skips the part where you have to get permits to protest. Westboro is even smart enough to go through that process. LOL FoldN
Sure Westboro gets permits, and they generally break no laws. Yet, as you can see, there are a number of ways their rights can be challenged and protected by the courts. The man arrested for protesting excessive police violence against the African American comminity had no permit, because protesting on the SCOTUS steps is not permitted by law. And the law is not supposed to infringe on his right to peacefully assemble!
Yes, this is due to time and place restrictions, which are allowed; however, what is perplexing, and why there is push back against the ruling (and gentle chiding about SCOTUS needing a "safe space") is that peaceful protesting has always been
allowed by law on
courthouse steps across the nation.
Considering that,
the opinion by Judge Srinivasan seems pretty lame to me,
Quote:
The statute also promotes the understanding that the Court resolves the matters before it without regard to political pressure or public opinion. Allowing demonstrations directed at the Court, on the Court’s own front terrace, would tend to yield the opposite impression: that of a Court engaged with— and potentially vulnerable to—outside entreaties by the public. At the least, the appearance of a Court subject to political pressure might gain increasing hold.
He goes on to explain that the court grounds are large and gated, and so protesting inside them is different than outside another courthouse, and again stresses avoiding the "appearance" of the court being subject to political pressure. I find that claim to be a pretty tenuous reason to prevent freedom of expression on their steps like any other courthouse, but whatever, it's something to argue about.
Last edited by FoldnDark; 06-02-2016 at 04:32 PM.