Thanks,
I'm one who thinks that Lee is on a short list of the greatest generals in history. Where he ranks, I'm not so sure because I haven't done as much digging on the matter as I want to. I also believe that I am a bit biased in my assessment. For example, Clausewitz is very popular in Europe and wrote seminal work on warfare as an extension of statecraft. But, Clausewitz is not as widely known in America as Lee or Grant or Jackson or many other military all stars because of the national folk lore that is invested in them. I do have a respect for Lee because he made prudent decisions when it came to the political ramifications of his military actions, which I believe my esteemed friend Bluffthis is overlooking in his assessment.

Now, about picketts charge.....

Accounts of the battle have 12,500 men marching off the line to cross three quarters of a mile with a fence halfway across it to attack the union center. A mile is roughly 2000 yards and the range of a civil war era rifle is about 600. So, about halfway across is the point that the confederates would be susceptable to small arms fire. Walking the distance would take roughly 8-10 minutes. Half way of that would be 4-5 minutes. Lines can fire by the rank and reload once every 20 seconds to keep up a consistent fire. That's 12 to 15 volleys per line. Lee knew this math.

Casualties of the confederates were roughly 1/2 the 12,500 or 6,250. Yet, there are reports that only 2-3,000 confederate troops reached the Union Center. That's about 3-4,000 confederate soldiers that somehow mysteriously vanish from the field.

There is a growing body of evidence in the form of eyewitness accounts in letters that about 1 in every 3 confederate soldiers abandoned the charge shortly after it began. These were seasoned troops and they knew their chances weren't very high for survival. Their commanders were aware of this, too and openly controversial about the decision. The debate survives to this day. Point is, that Lee knew the math and sent his men across the field anyway. Why?

I think that he figured on the army following orders. If the deserters had stayed with the line, there would have been 6,000 confederates to make the union center. 6,000 confederates would have overwhelmed the line and sent the Union Army into chaos. As history unfolded, only half the number showed up and were repulsed.

That is why I said that had Lee's army not deserted him, he could have carried Gettysberg. I love to ponder how a single moment like this one has impacted history since.

This thread yearns for Anacardo.

Also, where was the Confederate cavalry? They were supposed to have circled behind the Union lines and at the end of the Confederate artillery "duel" with the Federal artillery. Instead, they decided on an all out cavalry vs cavalry fight
explicitly against orders. So, instead of allowing Pickett's charge some relief from totally concentrated artillery and small arms fire, the complete Union attention was on shooting fish in a barrel. If even one cavalry brigade had made it to harass the Union position, maybe enough of your 6k estimate make it to not be cut to ribbons. What exactly promtped the massive cavalry vs. cavalry engagement I don't know. Fitz ****ing Lee and even Stuart would have embraced the "glory" of it. Hampton had already been wounded badly the day before and was in the rear of the cavalry, and if he had been at the front, perhaps he would have divided the force and gotten to the rear of the Union position at Cemetery Ridge. He was a very grim and efficient commander who saw what needed to be done. The Federals had been in a horseshoe formation to prevent that early, but had really extended the left and were very open to exactly that kind of circuitous attack.

No, the cavalry wasn't ordered to attacked the rear of Cemetery Ridge in concert with Pickets advance. Lee directed the cav to get astride Taneytown and other routes the AOTP would need to evacuate if and when the lines collapsed.

The Federal cavalry obviously had other ideas, how rude.

The northern invasion that lead up to Gettysburg was a difficult undertaking. Strategically, it was probably necessary though, and the decision may have been made by the political leadership as much as by Lee.

The battle of Gettysburg started the same day as the northern draft did. The Confederacy had to stop the draft and get the Union to agree to peace. The draft, as well as the recruitment of freed slaves gave the Union too many soldiers. If the south was defeated badly, then it would be no worse than the slow defeat that happened.

There were very serious draft riots in NYC, and riots in other cities. These were probably encouraged by Confederate agents, although the there was plenty of fear and anger that didn't need inciting.

The goal was to win the war then, and if not that, atleast produce huge casualties just as the draft started.

To a certain extent, this approach was successful in limiting the effectiveness of the northern draft.

My impression, from the little I remember on this topic, was that Jefferson Davis and others were putting a lot of political pressure on Lee to do some of the things that his army did... ?

bump

Welcome to the Politics forum!

Ultimately, the generalship on either side was not the critical factor, having the resources and will to pursue the war to its conclusion by the North was the critical factor.

George McClelland had more hope to end the war successfully for the South, (in his political role after he was finished as a General), than Lee had as a general.