Well, the bolded part is what I think is questionable. Again, I point to the current Canadian government. The Conservatives or Liberals would also have a majority if they combined with the NDP (socialist party). However, the socialist party hasn't been able to push any significant policies. Why? Because the conservatives won't partner with them and give them "a large amount of concessions" just to win a vote on something else. In my opinion, you're point is valid but you greatly overestimate the leverage that these minority parties actually have. The near majority parties will just as often tell the minority to go **** themselves as they will accept a radical compromise with the minority parties.

Banzhaf power index

Cliffs: the power of a vote is its ability to change an outcome, not its raw numbers. (This reflects the theoretic power, which is altered by other factors. For example, The Left Party (former Communists) in Germany has very little actual power to implement its preferred policies because other parties will refuse to deal with them).

PR is not "inherently fair" unless you think representation being roughly equal to votes is intrinsically good regardless of consequences. If you think representation being equal to votes is good, why not power equal to votes? The legislature as a whole is winner take all (majority = 100% power), FPTP is simply roughly applying this on a geographic basis.

Empirically, democracies with PR have higher spending than those with FPTP (controlling for other relevant variables). This appears to because small parties make spending promises whose costs are divided amongst all voters but benefits concentrated among a smaller number of voters, who need to be bought off in post-election coalition agreements.

^^^ From the Wiki: "To calculate the power of a voter using the Banzhaf index, list all the winning coalitions, then count the critical voters. A critical voter is a voter who, if he changed his vote from yes to no, would cause the measure to fail. A voter's power is measured as the fraction of all swing votes that he could cast."

I suggest going a step further by considering your Banzhaf power to be based on the hundreds or thousands of votes you can influence by getting politically active.

Feel free to explain how I'm wrong.

Someone just rolled out with Banzhaf, so go ahead and get your Wiki on.

So basically, what you're saying, is that bills can't be passed unless a majority support it, but instead we should not allow certain people to have representation and thus make it so that many bills are passed without majority support.

And?

I'm not saying that minority parties would rule the government, and I feel like I'm getting bogged down into defending that perspective here. My contention was regarding AlexM's initial statements. These small parties end up with a disproportionate share of power.

BTW, I'd consider Canada maybe a case of one of the better functioning PR systems. More moderate "extremist" parties, etc. Countries more susceptible to extremist political parties (ahem, most of Europe) are where you're more likely to see what I'm talking about being fleshed out.

[ ] Canada has a PR system

Uh, no. What I'm saying is that you're initial statement:

is stupid.

I think that it's an assertion that they end up with a "disproportionate share of power". This requires additional assumptions, including the assumption that they will be able negotiate coalitions with near majority parties and successfully push through their minority agendas. I just don't see the evidence that this is the way it actually works.

My original statement is fact and you have done absolutely nothing to demonstrate otherwise.

wtf, isn't it mixed?

Just checked, guess not.

Outside the US party discipline tends to be much stronger. If the US adopted PR, especially a list system, it's quite likely that party discipline would increase (because the central party has more power over individual representatives).

That's cute, but your original statement is not only not a fact by any measure of the word, it's an opinion that can be dismissed more or less on its face.

I think the US has exactly as much chance to get to free market anarchism as it does a PR system.

They don't, but you can still use Canada as an example of minority government behaviour which is relevant to the PR discussion.

Well, I continue to wait for you to present any kind of position that I can actually argue with. You're making a huge assertion here, and I can't even explain why it's wrong, since you won't actually explain how you got from A to Z. Until such a time that you do explain it, I am going to have to assume that you're just trolling.

I don't think it's a large assumption if, say, there is a situation like the hypothetical I was putting forth. The larger parties would essentially be forced to work with the third party, and a consistent relationship with that party would result in that majority party being the strongest in the system.

"Successfully pushing through a minority agenda" is an ambiguous phrase, and I don't want to give the impression that I think the smaller party will run government.

A good way to look at this is to compare the difference between, for example, a 48/48/4 split and a 45/45/10 split and a 40/40/20 split. The amount of real muscle the smaller party has is generally only increasing slightly in each scenario - certainly not to scale with its numbers.

So I need to present something more tangible to dispute your dorm room guesswork. Sounds great.

Oh good, finally something I can respond to.

No, they wouldn't be forced to do any such thing.


False. It increases exactly with the numbers. Why would it not?

If the party gets to decide who represents it, you end up with the same party hacks all the time with little to no fresh blood.

Better off abolishing parties, vote for someone you want to and let them go.

They would in a situation where they are presenting legislation the other party opposes. Try reading up on the differences between PR and FPTP regarding party discipline.

Because there are many scenarios where their bargaining power not only doesn't increase proportionally, it doesn't increase at all.

So, the other party opposes it. That doesn't force them to do anything.


Explain one.

How technical are you trying to be? Obviously they aren't being physically forced, nor is there a gun to their heads. I'm not sure what you're getting at here.

Really? I think the scenario is obvious. Each party voting as unit on an issue, the two larger parties are on opposite sides.

This still doesn't mean anything unless party C can extract concessions.

Party A (47%) tables regulation 101, Party B (47%) opposes.

Party C has the "deciding vote". They tell Party A they will vote for regulation 101 if it is amended to add Party C Provision 101b. Party A says...

1) Okay - in this case Party C has successfully leveraged their power.

OR

2) Go to hell, we prefer not passing our bill to giving in to your Provision that we strongly oppose - in this case Party C's supposed deciding vote doesn't mean squat.

I think 2) happens a fair bit unless Party C is not significantly different than A or B, in which case it's all semantics anyway.