Quote:
Originally Posted by BAIDS
imo the correct play is to vote against the unstable reality tv show host that doesnt know anything
thats what i am thinking.
thoughts on this??
On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:
>>
Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
in the region.
1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage
ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
real defeat on ISIL.
2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be
seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air
support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
ISIL.
3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The
current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be
airlifted directly into the KRG zone.
4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to
provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving
forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by
the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put
in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By
the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.
6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are
important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the
potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.
7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
support for moderate government forces.)
8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our
security policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of
ISIL veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by
Islamist forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where
fighters are returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only
the latest and most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to
defeat them in Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will
develop. Successful military operations against these very irregular but
determined forces can only be accomplished by making proper use of
clandestine/special operations resources, in coordination with airpower,
and established local allies. There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of
opportunity on this issue, as we need to act before an ISIL state becomes
better organized and reaches into Lebanon and Jordan.
9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result
of this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq
and the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG
controlled territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can
reassure the concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the
KRG will not exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the
management of the oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric
facility. At the same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as
they pursue ISIL into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with
FSA troops who can move against ISIL from the North. This will make
certain Basher al Assad does not gain an advantage from these operations.
Finally, as it now appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer
contractors as advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a
position to coordinate more effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi
Army.)
