hmmm ok that's interesting, the reason i ask is because I'm at 25NL and i get told all the time i should "defend enough" against 3 bets. I don't know exactly how much I'm supposed to defend, somewhere around 40%? but a the micros where people don't 3 bet with much of a bluff range surely defending so much would be really bad?

Sorry if I seem dense but I really need you to explain what you're asking as clearly as possible. Make a post and read it out loud twice so it's as clear as possible then I'll do my best to answer it. Right now I think I might understand what you're asking but I'm still not sure.

Also please make sure you're not confusing equity and EV. I don't see how betting increases his equity but again I'm pretty confused.

Also, if someone else does understand this question and can answer it please do.

I can't likely explain it now any clearer than is already in the book, but I think all of your arguments can just be classified as "Advantages of being in position," "Advantages of having the stronger range," or "Advantages of betting." None of them are arguments for why initiative matter as it has no intrinsic value, but that said the player with initiative often does have the stronger range so it makes it seem like initiative is very useful when in reality just having the better range is useful (the better range allows you to make profitable bluffs with weak hands, something you can't usually do with weak hands in a weak range).

Most of the people I know defend around 60% of the time when facing a 3-bet.

I unfortunately don't really talk poker with anyone who plays NL$25 or lower so it's hard for me to give feedback. I would say the following though:

#1) If people 3-bet too strong of range, you will be exploitating them if you fold a bit more often than you would against an aggressive 3-bettor.

#2) If people don't 3-bet often enough, you can open a bit wider (especially in the button) which makes your opening range weaker and this also encourages you to fold more often to a 3-bet.

#3) Do ***NOT*** call with a hand just because you think it's +EV in theory or you've seen a better player than you recommend calling. You are probably now folding some hands that are +EV calls for better players (even at your limit), but that's fine. Your calling range will slowly get wider and wider as you get better and move up stakes, both because you're more comfortable playing weaker hands when getting a good price and because your opponents will 3-bet more aggressively.

Hope that helps.

I suspect your confusion stems from the mistaken belief that a bluff being "break even" means it should not be profitable. This is wrong. To say that a bluff is "break even" means that it does no better or worse than checking - but because checking is an inherently profitable activity, a player's "break even"/threshold bluffs should be profitable as well.

Also, based on your earlier post in the thread, it seems like you think that when bluff-catching out of position, we should call with a frequency that prevents the in-position player from profitably bluffing with any two cards. This is wrong. It is often possible for an in-position player to profitably bluff with any two cards at equilibrium.

Great post mate, basically goes against a lot of advice ive been getting from better players than me.

Ha well for sure you aren't dense pretty clear I stink at asking questions. Anyway last shot. Villain pots the turn with a range that is 60% nuts and 40% air and we have a bluff catcher. If this were the river we would have a profitable call. But since there isn't enough "air" in his turn range, and he can continue with 90% of his range on the river while remaining balanced, we have to fold the turn, correct?

Since real ranges aren't made up of nuts and air, I just want to get a sense for how knowing we will again be in a bluff catching spot on the river affects our turn decisions. So when Im looking at a turn decision, and I think I have the best hand roughly 30% of the time, ignoring either hand improving, I have to consider that he is going to be able to make me indifferent 45% of the time on the river as well correct? I think that is what I meant by the bettor increasing his equity. I should have said EV.

Yes.

If you only have the best hand 30% of the time and no hand can improve (so your opponent's range is polarized) then by definition your opponent will have the best hand 70% of the time. So he can clearly bet the river with a balanced range on the river much more than 70% of the time, much less 45%.

Sorry, I meant that if villain has the best hand 30% of the time, but my example wasn't a good one. I do think I understand now tho. It's the fact that he is basically forcing us to call 50% of the time VS his value range on the river if we play GTO, that gets him to an EV of .45 even tho he only has the best hand on the turn 30% of the time? Or we could fold everything 45% of the time on the river and it works out the same? In live poker even at high stakes, most players don't have nearly enough bluffs on the turn. I always just sort of relied on my own intuition in these spots, and I just wanted to make sure I was understanding the concept the right way. Thanks for bearing with me.

Steve

Amazing post! Thank´s Matt!

I am trying to figure out spots where opponent can bet any two. Section is "How profitable should our opponent's bluffs be in position on the flop?"

For a simple example, raising the button, bb calls, pot is $4.50. He checks, button bets $3. Button paid $2 to see the flop, and for his cbet to have an EV of at least $2 with his worst hands, he needs the big blind to fold 67% of the time.



However this doesn't seem right. The flop isn't always seen, sometimes he gets 3bet and loses right away. Say he's holding his worst hand, 20% he gets 3bet and folds, 30% of the time he steals the blinds, and 50% of the time, he sees a flop.

How much is he actually paying to get to the opportunity of cbetting?

20% of the time he folds to a 3bet, if I multiply the $2 he pays to see the flop by 120%, it goes to $2.40. However, he wins $1.50 30% of the time stealing blinds, so he wins back $0.45. Which isn't a big difference, it only adds up to him needing to win back $1.95 the 50% of the time he sees the flop. All assuming SB folds, BB checks 100% postflop, ranges of BB is bluffcatchers, button is polarized.

Something seems missing with this model.

I have very little idea what's going on here or where the 120% comes from.

With the math you gave it looks like the EV of the button's worse opening hand needs to be (on average) about $1.95 on the flop. Since the button has the (much) stronger range, this should be pretty easy to do as he'll have many profitable bluff opportunities even if he doesn't flop a strong hand.

Since it's pretty easy to have an EV of $1.95 in position with the stronger range in a $4.50 pot, it's probably safe to say the blinds aren't 3-betting aggressively enough.

I'm not sure how to approach this really.

For example, I noticed when OOP vs delay cbets, some really good MSNL+ players fold > 65% or so. So IP could autobet all air vs this player and make a profit. However, is this really a leak?

To get to the opportunity to have an autoprofit delay cbet bluff, IP would have to have his bluff hand not get 3bet, not cbet the flop, and then hope that OOP bets turn.

Intuitively, its not a leak, but trying to quantify it somehow.

How well do you think a player would fare if he were to always bluffcatch barely enough to prevent an opponent from autoprofiting on his bluffs? This is assuming not sacrificing your betting/raising strategies with your strong value hands, and also in tough lineups.

This isn't aimed at you specifically, but it'd help me a ton if people would start reading their posts out loud (preferably twice) before posting them. I learned this the hard way and still regret a few posts I incorrectly made over the years from having not read stuff out loud.

It's fine for delayed CB's to show an auto-profit just like it's profitable for a non-delayed CB to show an auto-profit. For example, if I can make an auto profit CB on the flop but instead choose to check, then my check must be +EV by some combination of me sometimes improving and/or me getting the chance to make a +EV bluff later **IF** I'm giving the opportunity (which isn't a guarantee as my opponent may bet the turn).

Hopefully this isnt too offtopic since most people seem to be talking directly Matthew Janda getting him too answers specific questions.

Im thinking of buying the book, but Im a little worried that Matthew writes about theory and hasn't played online poker since black friday is that correct?

Just wondering if anyone else thought that the book material may be good theory but not necessarily a winning strategy in todays online games?

no disrespect meant at all too the author, Matthew Janda.

sounds like a good book besides my stated concerns.

This is the best poker book I've ever read and I have an extensive collection. I have read my copy so many times, I have had to sellotape the cover to stop it falling apart.

If you read this book and understand the concepts, it can't help but improve your game. Whether or not Matthew has continued to play is irrelevant and in no way detracts from the currency of the content.

Buy the book.

Pretty much spot on.

It's a common thing to see people say "is this relevant to my games?" or "is this for online or live?" and other variations in the books section of this forum, but they're missing the point.

Besides, if you look back in the thread, his results are shown AND Galfond amongst other top pro's advocate the book.

Thanks for the reply guys,

Just bought the book only a few pages in and loving it already.

Should we be striving for a general flop c-betting frequency when in position (blind calls and checks to us or opener checks to us)?

Ed Millers book is saying 70% flop, 70% turn, 70% river....of those bets, the flop should be approximately 2 to 1 bluff/value, Turn 1 to 1 bluff/value, river 2 to 1 value/bluff....is looking to c-bet 70% of our pre-flop combos on the flop correct?

Applications states we should have approximately 2.5 to 3 bluffs per one value bet on the flop (pg. 148) (Which I'm guessing is more accurate than Millers 2 to 1 flop bluff /Value ratio) ....also that we should bet the turn 70% after betting flop, then river 70% after betting flop (pg. 145) so I'm on the right track, but I don't see any guidelines on flop c-betting frequency which may not matter.

My process for looking at c-betting in position right now is saying "Hey, I have xx value combos, so now I need 2.5-3x that amount in "bluffs". That may or may not add up to c-betting approximately 70% on the flop.....for instance, on page 174 "Example of Balancing a Flop Bet in Position" our c-betting frequency is 56%.....this is leading me to believe we do not have a target flop c-betting frequency....

-Thanks.

Your right. When I think about having the intiative I'm really thinking about the items you mention
PTBob

I believe in ranges and range building. Not that ranges have to be followed to the letter but rather a good understanding and ability to use ranges to calculate where you are in the hand is important. I might just be behind everyone here but the example range guide in the book doesn't compute for me. My number are wrong when I calculate % of starting hands and/or total combinations. Please help me understand.

Button Flat vs MP: - Cold Calling
JJ-33, KQs-54s, AKo, AQs-ATs, KTs, QTs, J9s, AQo
P: 9 x 6= 54
SC: 9 x 4= 36
OC: 1 x 12= 12
SUC: 6 x 4= 24
USUC: 1 x 12= 12
Total: 138 <<<<<<

Thanks to all the people who said nice things about the book.

Do NOT!! think you need to bet 70% of the time on the flop. There are probably some situations where that may be correct (if you min-raise the button and the big blind calls), but a 70% CB is going to be very high in other spots.

Since Applications usually deals with models you don't want to go overboard. No one knows what the optimal betting % are in 6-max, but you probably do want to have some sense of what your value betting to bluffing ratio is on the flop, turn, and river. You also want to understand which hands can be bet now for value and checked later and which hands should be checked now but can be bet later if the opponent does not.


In general I would cold call less in position now than I recommended in the book (which surprises me, as at the time of writing the book I would have imagined if anything it'd be the opposite) and I would call 3-bets and 4-bets much more aggressively.

For your range I would drop out most of the low suited connectors (I'd fold 87s and lower, but meh) and fold pocket pairs worse than 55. The rest look good to me but I'm not passionate about this either way (sometimes calling 55 will be good, other times 3-betting rather than calling KTs is good, etc).

Oh yeah, and I'd definitely 3-bet AKo more often than I would not (and quite possibly I'd always 3-bet it). I expect middle position to call 3-bets much more often now than they did a few years ago, and if you get 4-bet you can just call the 4-bet. Your calling range will be relative to squeezes but you still have some pretty good hands and the MP opener will defend against the squeeze as well. Also, even if you do defend against a squeeze with a weaker than ideal range, you're getting a good price and position is a helluvathing.

Ok thanks Matt, I just want to double check one more thing....before I start hours of analysis on my c-betting in position just to find out I'm screwing it all up :-)

1. No matter what our flop c-betting frequency is in position, we should usually strive for a 1 to 1 value/bluff ratio on the turn for 75% pot AND a 70% turn double barrel frequency, and then going to the river, 2 to 1 value/bluffs and a 70% betting frequency....right? This is assuming 2/3 pot c-bets and barrels....

I know I may not be understanding everything which may show in my questions, but I'm sold on trying to take my hh's and start working this stuff out myself....

-Thanks

Matt, I was really surprised to see your comment that you believe an equilibrium strategy is hands down better then exploitive regardless of your opponent. I cant agree with that, because some opponents are SO profitable to exploit that playing optimally against them would be throwing money away. For example, somebody who calls ALL regular sized pf raises from any hand from any position, then bets/raises half pot with every one pair, pot with two pair and sets, and slowplays made straights+. Let's say he also does X in particular with every draw, but the point is he never deviates. I know this example is unrealistic, but Ive played people who come close, and I'm sure a very meaningful chunk of my hourly comes from properly adjusting to maximize against their patterns.

You'd reallly, really play optimally against players like this?

Did Janda really say that? Surely this must be false by definition since GTO play is maximally exploitative against an opponent who also plays GTO. If Villain deviates from equilibrium (as always is the case with real Villains) then playing maximally exploitatively against his actual strategy can't possibly be any worse than sticking with the equilibrium strategy.

It may be, though, that perfect GTO play (which we could only truly implement if NLH was solved) performs better than our current imperfect implementation of maximally exploitative play against Villain's on the basis of our imperfect reads. But that's consistent with the previous claim.