Quote:
Originally Posted by Yowserrrs
More to something relevant, can either of you two help me understand as simply as possible how Japan has managed to continue a deflationary environemnt for years with an interest rate set to almost 0.
If I can borrow in Japan and invest somewhere else at a higher rate, how does that not eventaully bring the two to equilbrium?
Well "eventually" is a long time.
This is not a particularly well-researched view - I spent zero time specifically looking into this topic, but rather came to this view through observations in many different areas - but this is I think what's been going on. First, Japan started the deflationary spiral with all assets at extremely high valuation and extremely high prices for everyday goods and services. Thus there hasn't been any valuation floor effect that cushions the crash. Wat we would expect in that case is the correction happening as a combination of yen weakness and deflation. The main apparent reason why it's taken this long for the prices to correct (and we may not be done yet) is that the yen has not really weakened during this time! The reasons for this are not clear but there are a few clear implications. Despite the yen being extremely overvalued, Japan remained competitive in the global markets. To me this is the real puzzle. A lot of people wonder, why are the Japanese saving money when the interest rates are low but I think that's the wrong question to ask, because the entire world is saving money at the same rate. Because of interest rate parity, the only real choice you're making is one of currency. So if the rest of the world isn't abandoning yen, why should the Japanese?
That takes us to, why has demand for the yen stayed so high, when it was clearly overvalued? Well, I don't have the trade balance or net investment position but I'm pretty sure they're net positive in both over the past whatever # of years. And it's not like Japan is a tax haven or anything (again, AFAIK). What does this tell you? Something in Japan, despite the overall strength in yen, is undervalued from a global perspective. Japan has no real exportable commodities, so it comes down to labor + public infrastructure (because private capital investments are global). In solving a problem like this, where things aren't at what we consider to be an equilibrium, you need to isolate exactly which agents are acting irrationally, either in underpricing or overpricing something. Now we're down to two - Japanese workers selling their labor too cheaply and the Japanese government providing cheap public infrastructure and the combination that resulted in reduced domestic demand, but higher competitiveness abroad. The latter shouldn't be a huge factor since infrastructure expansion and deficit spending are inflationary, especially without the former.
And by the process of elimination, that's my conclusion - the prolonged period of deflation in Japan was caused by an inflexible labor market and/or the collective unwillingness of Japanese workers to demand fair pay. One prediction this view would make is that despite the recession, the unemployment rate must have stayed low, because labor is so cheap. And again, I don't have the #'s but I'm pretty sure this has been the case.