https://warontherocks.com/episode/th...ensive-begins/
Overview
Russian forces have made it 5km or more inland, taken several villages.
This was a heavily anticipated offensive.
Kofman believes the purpose of this is to draw units to Kharkiv in order to enable the primary Russian advances in Chasiv Yar and beyond Avdiivka. The primary goal is still to take Donetsk.
There is still considerable risk for Kharkiv. Even though Russia doesn't appear to have the forces to take Kharkiv, Russia does not have to advance far in order to bring artillery close enough to force evacuation from Ukraine's second largest city which would be awful for Ukraine's economy.
Forces have already been shifted off the line to go defend Kharkiv.
The attack itself has mostly been infantry with very little mechanized support. Most of the forces are in reserve.
The border was not the defensive line. It was already a grey zone covered by drones and artillery, it was not possible to create and defend positions there. We do not know Ukraine's ability to defend their defensive line however.
It's unlikely Kharkiv will see a major breakthrough, but if Russia managed one they would try to exploit it.
This offensive will play out over the course of a few weeks. We will likely see complementary pushes in Chasiv Yar and west of Avdiivka soon.
Russia military understands Ukraine has a manpower issue which will not be resolved for months.
First Kharkiv offensive
First offensive consisted of a large artillery barrage followed by a peace time force which was expecting to isolate and blockade cities and that the Ukrainians would quickly surrender.
Some national guard units attempted to blockade Kharkiv followed by Spetsnaz that went in and suffered a significant defeat from unexpected resistance. This offensive is one of the defeats that highlights the lack of planning and poor intel regarding Russia's initial invasion. Clearly Russia thought the Ukrainian military would not be a major threat, and Russia would mostly be dealing with protestors and riots after the government collapsed.
By Spring of 2022 Russia was stalled and unable to complete their plan to take Donetsk by first capturing Kharkiv and Mariupol since resistance was so strong. They have stayed consistent with this strategy though: trying to break through to the main logistics hubs in Kherson such as Pokrovsk.
Shoigu
"Shoigu was dismissed by virtue of promotion which is a fairly common form of dismissal in Russia." In practice this is a demotion.
It was long overdue. Shoigu was incompetent and stole way too much (the issue here isn't that he was corrupt, that's expected, but specifically that he stole too much). Shoigu has been there forever and people wanted him to go. Belousov is likely going to be far more competent.
The Russian army was a "halfway house" between a modern army and a Soviet army. Shoigu and Gerasimov thought the army wasn't soviet enough and the best way to fix it was to make a "cosplay" Soviet military, but Russia does not have the manpower, resources, or defense industrial base. Belousov is going to be better at things like defense procurement and does not need to run the actual war. Kofman believes Gerasimov will be removed by Belousov.
This change shows that Putin recognizes that this is going to be a long war. The state will be spending money differently and funneling it to the defense industry.
Russian anecdote/joke being said on telegram: "If Shoigu was in charge of the central bank and the head of central bank was the head of the army then the Russian people would be eating rats but the Russian army would be approaching Berlin." (Purpose is to show how competent the head of the central bank is compared to Shoigu's incompetence.)
Next 6 to 12 months
Doesn't expect a lot to change. Russia will likely retain strategic initiative through 2024. Ukraine is in a state of great vulnerability right now. The supplemental is not a magic wand and there are a number of issues still.
Ukraine needs to stabilize the front line. They need to fix the manpower issues and establish fortifications.
Best case scenario: Ukraine holds Russia to small gains and Russia's relative advantage will decline as they are unlikely to be able to spend as much or have as much equipment in 2025. Even if Ukraine cannot form an offensive in 2025, they could at least threaten one and see how that changes things.
Worst case scenario: There is a collapse on one or several parts of the front line. Reserves are stretched thin. Russian military can break through to one or several of the transit hubs, collapsing the defense of Donetsk. (Kofman doesn't think the loss of Donetsk is a gigantic deal, although clearly still awful.) Ukraine is then consistently pressured so that it cannot maintain defensive lines.
Very little suggests that Russia can accomplish this because they are unlikely to achieve a strategic breakthrough. It seems that Russia will likely be pushing Ukraine out of defensive positions, but at high cost and unable to exploit fully, resulting in Ukraine retreating back to the next defensive position and no breakthrough.
Questions
State of Russian reserves
Russia is not fully committed, they have reserves still. Kofman believes the regeneration rate is not such that they can make a huge force though. Russia's ability to employ the forces is likely not good.
Does Ukraine have the reserves to hold Kharkiv without significant weakening the front line?
No one knows. Manpower is a problem, and will take months to solve. Really need to just see how things play out.
Why did Russia choose Kharkiv instead of strengthening Donbas.
Russia has additional forces for other sectors. The pattern has been to conduct multiple offenses at the same time with several fixing efforts and a main effort. Kharkiv is designed to really strain Ukrainian forces.
