Kind of odd that you say I don't understand the experiments and then just rephrase my last sentence.

The point is that we don't KNOW the laws of physics that make a particle go where it goes. Only describe the probability of it happening. You claimed we can't do anything in a controlled setting that's not in accord with the laws of physics (I assume you mean the known laws of physics, or the statement is too vague to have meaning).

the point of uncertainty principle and the like is that under the assumptions of these laws it isn't just that we don't the rules describing the motion, it is that it is fundamentally impossible to know which path it will take. it isn't saying "we don't know how this works so we are gonna assign probability" it is to say that the events are truly probabilistic and without interfering with the experiment there is no way to predict where it will go, even with perfect knowledge of the situation. this is a cornerstone of quantum mechanics.

Ugh. I'm trying to respond to your points, but to do so I must clarify what you mean by some crucial terms. So...pretty please, sugar on top, explain:

(1) What are the quotes doing in your sentence: "I doubt we understand enough about 'understanding'... "? (How do they modify your intended use of the word 'understand'?)
(2) How would you describe the normal meaning of 'understand', as people use it in day-to-day life?

Seriously. How can I "describe [a] specific program for understanding...consciousness" if I don't know what you mean by "understanding consciousness"?

There's no such evidence, because there's no such argument. But we'll get to that later.

Exactly. Kinda like inexplicable phenomenon.

You perfectly illustrated why your argument against the existence of such phenomenon based on controlled lab situations falls flat.

it is not inexplicable, we have a way of explaining, it is called quantum mechanics. just because it isn't intuitive doesn't mean we don't have well defined laws for it. we have extremely well defined explanations of why this stuff happens.

Are you sure that's what you mean?

here is another semantic debate, we can make predictions to 9 decimal places using quantum mechanics, this is equivalent to launching a golf ball from the earth to the moon and hitting a bull's eye on a dart board if i recall what feynman said in QED correctly. the point of the matter is that it isn't like we are making educated guesses because we don't actually know what is going on, we have really really really good laws, they just happen to be probabilistic in nature. is that better?

If it turns out that there is an underlying non-probabilistically deterministic mechanism that underlies QM, would you still feel that QM is a well-defined explanation of why stuff happens?

yes, there would just happen to be a better one, though i have no reason to believe that would happen. quantum mechanics makes really good predictions, therefore we have to at least admit that QM has something going for it and can't dismiss the implications offhand without a better theory.

So to be clear, you're treating QM as an answer to the "why" question, not just the predictive "what will happen if..." question. It's not a semantic deal, it's really about what you are claiming the laws of physics to say about the universe.

I fully agree. I just don't think that making good predictions imply the types of positions you're promoting in this thread.

Simply describe the program you have in mind for understanding consciousness according to your concept of "understanding". Then I'll have have an idea of what you're talking about and something concrete to comment on. I'm not getting involved in an abstract investigation of your idea for some kind of general epistemological formula. If you can't get specific I"m done with this line of discussion.

I've already characterized what I anticipate your program will amount to. I've repeated the characterization. Yet you refuse to either specifically describe your program or comment on my characterization of what I anticipate it amounts to. I think I've answered enough of your questions. If you don't like the answers that's just too bad. I suggest you go back, reread my posts, and think about them for a while before responding futher. It's time you respond to my points and answer some of my questions.



Well, here's the argument by madnak. As far as I can tell the argument is, "madnak says so".

Why don't you ask him a few dozen questions or explain to him why he's wrong. That is, if you're capable of explaining. Or maybe the two of you can have a match of dueling authorities without having to explain anything.

PairTheBoard

Consciousness is the sum of the behavioral dispositions learned by Somebody very like a human brain in a human body in a human society. To understand consciousness, we need a theory that defines sufficient causes of these dispositions. We may establish the correctness of such a theory by the Turing Test. So my program for understanding consciousness is...build Somebody who passes the Turing Test.

I've been trying! Just please clarify your use of 'understand' per above, and I'll continue.

His word choice of "illusion" confuses me. But I read him as saying, "When people try to think about consciousness, they usually get a naive picture that can't be cashed out as a usable theory."

Assuming he means that, I agree with him.

Goodness, I'm sorry if scientific consensus offends you so badly. I won't mention it again, I promise.

Let me emphasize: a 'conscious' AI must be very like a human. If Ada's thoughts are 1000x faster than mine, there's no point in calling her 'conscious', since her behavioral dispositions will be completely impenetrable to me.

If that's the consensus view of the top cognitive scientists then you can just ignore me. Otherwise, thank's for revealing your ideas. I'm suprised you go further than the intention to classify those conditions (sum of behavioral dispositions) under which you believe consciousness happens. You intend to actually define consciousness to be those conditions. That just seems obviously wrong to me but if that's the consensus of the top cognitive scientists what can I say.

That being said, my previous remarks characterizing what I anticipated your program would amount to still apply.

PairTheBoard

The Turing Test seems far too simple to reach final conclusions on consciousness. In fact it seems to limit itself to the mind only.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

That, but also that assuming the context of a physical world and simultaneously assuming the context of a "special" consciousness leads to a quick unraveling of meaning.

If we want to stand on an external, physical world we can do that. And if we want to explore consciousness, we can do that. But trying to combine the two is futile.

PairTheBoard -

There really is no alternative theory. Everything else leads to a "quick unravelling of meaning", as madnak clarified.

Splendour -

I'll let Turing speak for himself on the virtues of his test. (Link is to his original proposal of the Test, it's a fun read.)

I think it's a perfectly fine theory for studying the "sum of behavioral dispositions" for which you believe consciousness happens. It gives you something objective to work on. But I think it's artificial to actually define consciousness to be that sum of behavioural dispositions. You are defining the subjective experience of consciousness to be the conditions you believe necessary for the experience to take place. You can identify the two by fiat but we all know that you're not really talking about the subjective experience when you talk about the conditions. If that's the best theory available it's an artificial one concocted to convert a subjective experience into something objective that can be studied. It's hard to tell what madnak is saying but to my mind, this is a futility.

If you were just honest and admit that the sum of behavioural dispositions is a classification of conditions for which you believe the subjective experience of consciousness happens then I've already said your results would be interesting and provide us with a greater understanding of consciousness. But I can't go along with the artifice of identifying the subjective experience with the objective conditions just because you are desperate for such a theory. An honest theory without the identification, although weaker, is much better in my opinion than an artificial theory that allows you to make stronger statements.

PairTheBoard

That's fine if you want to think that way. But in reality, we have no reason to believe that subjective experience is or could be something other than behavioral dispositions. ("PairTheBoard feels we're being dishonest" is not a reason.)

Edit - if you do have arguments more concrete than your feelings, please put them in a book. It would be a landmark treatise.

I don't see that you've offered any reason to believe that subjective experience Is behavioral dispositions. That cognitive scientists are desperate for a theory by which they might study the subjective experience objectively is not a reason to believe the subjective experience Is the object. Definition by fiat is not a reason. That there's no other object you can think of to use by force of definition by fiat is not a reason to accept the defintion. Especially since it flies against common sense.

You can study the subjective experience from the inside. And you can stand on your external platform and study the objective conditions from which you believe the subjective experience emerges. But as madnak points out, mixing the two is futile.

PairTheBoard

As I said earlier, a full theory of mind such as Dennett's is extremely nuanced. We have to work very hard to avoid naive category mistakes and failures of imagination. Dennett's project is nothing like "definition by fiat."

Seriously, please read The Intentional Stance and Consciousness Explained. You're an extremely sharp guy, and I respect your opinion. If you seriously engage Dennett and still think he's being dishonest, I would be fascinated to hear your reasons. No sarcasm at all, I would love to have that conversation with you.

His point is that separating the two is futile.

PairTheBoard -
"You can study the subjective experience from the inside. And you can stand on your external platform and study the objective conditions from which you believe the subjective experience emerges. But as madnak points out, mixing the two is futile."

This is what he said,



I'm not up to such projects these days. On forums like this, the customary thing is for the person representing the expert theory to at least provide some pertinent quotes to support his representation. Considering how you refuse to do this and Considering what you say about how easy it is to make mistakes interpreting his theory and Considering how often people here in general misrepresent things, and Considering how your representation just makes no common sense, I have to conclude there's a strong chance your representation is inaccurate and your persistent appeal to authority dubious.


PairTheBoard

Sometimes combine means separate. What can I say?

"There is no way to isolate the properties presented in consciousness from the brain's multiple reactions to its discriminations, because there is no such additional presentation process." (Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p 393).

I mean, WTF do you want?! Any theory held by experts must get its meaning from a substantial body of argument and evidence. (Otherwise they wouldn't be experts.) But here's one guarantee I can make you:
* Any way you try to clarify your "understand 'understanding'" clause, I can provide quotes that explicitly reject your position.

I don't even know how to respond to that.

So you've finally provided a quote. Now can you explain it? Can you explain what you think it means and how it relates to this discussion? And provide additional quotes to support your explanation? How do you get from that quote to your definition of conscioussnes as being a sum of behavioural dispositions?

PairTheBoard

The reason we don't often offer evidence that the brain is physical and that consciousness arises from the brain is the same as the reason that we don't often offer evidence that evolution is valid. It's exhausting to present a full case, and I don't know of a neuroscience.talkorigins.com to reference you to. The fact that physical damage to the cerebral cortex affects awareness doesn't prove that awareness is a product of the physical brain. The fact that thousands of brains have been cut apart and examined and no evidence of a non-physical pathway has ever been discovered doesn't prove that awareness is a product of the physical brain. The fact that disabling and re-enabling areas of the brain with TMS has impact on awareness doesn't prove that awareness is a product of the physical brain. The fact that different states and experiences of awareness have strong correlates in brain electrical activity and metabolism doesn't prove that awareness is a product of the physical brain.

But to deny it is akin to looking at a car engine and claiming that there must be a spirit inside that turns the gasoline into rotational energy.