Some of each. The moral choice for me may not be the moral choice for everyone - though I certainly want substantial agreement on most issues of consequence. And when society enacts views contrary to mine - I have to deal with that whether it is a moral issue or not.

Take out the bolded part, and we're in complete agrement.

Maybe more than you think? Bunny as the arbiter of objective morality. Works for me!

this sounds like answer by rote. It does not follow that one needs a god to have "shoulds." People can develop systems of right or wrong simply because they see that it helps everyone. I can see that we have a better chance of surviving if we don't all constantly try to kill each other. It doesn't take a god telling you not to kill to see that we're better off without everyone just killing each other. Developing a conscience is a survival mechanism.

This is hardly new ground and isn't really all that provocative. I would wonder if you've even looked into the question outside of this forum because I'm betting there's literature addressing this subject that's been around for decades if not centuries.

I'm getting close to an epiphany here (of understanding, anyhow)...

Originally Posted by bunny:
"Because i think, when we differ, there is a chance you could be right and closer to this ideal than me. In which case, clearly I should abandon my view and adopt yours."

Can you explain? If you believe a set of moral principles ABC and I believe ABD - in what sense do you think I can possibly be right? Isnt the standard you use to judge such a claim ABC? (In which case I am mistakenly choosing D instead of C).

Do you mean something along the lines of "It's possible that, at some future time, I will adopt a different moral framework which agrees with bunny on this issue and disagrees with the view I currently hold"?

To me this doesnt mean you think you could be mistaken so much as you think you may change your mind. I'm talking in circles now, but it seems to me that if ABC is the set of beliefs by which you subjectively judge the worth or "correctness" of a moral system then there is no consistent way to declare that ABC might be incorrect...

hey bunny...coming in a bit late...

do you think its possible that a utilitarian (consequence) could become a kantian (duty > consequence)?

it seems like you don't think this would be possible...

My philosophical training was predominantly logic and metaphysics (religion and the mind). Ethics was a real blind spot for me so it may be best if you spell out exactly what you mean by these terms. I have an answer, but it may not be answering your actual question.. :/

it just seems odd to me that you dont see how one could change their minds about morals...

if someone believes the outcome of an act is the most important thing when making a moral choice do you think that they can't become someone that thinks intent/duty is the most important thing?

for instance...im pretty utilitarian at the moment, but im reading kant...so its possible i will decide that a duty based moral system is superior...do you see any problem with this?

or, i previously ate meat, but after becoming educated on farming/ethics i've decided to be a vegetarian...clearly my morals have changed in this regard...

or am i misunderstanding?

No I understand that you may and probably will change your mind. From my perspective I think that sort of thing happens all the time - we realise we're wrong (in the sense that a newly discovered moral principle or amendment to our moral code/system will make the new one closer to the ideal "true morality". It is likely that my current model is not a faithful reproduction of the objective morality I strive to emulate, so it is likely I am currently mistaken in my moral views). What I struggle to make sense of is how someone who disagrees with the claim that such an objective thing exists can use the phrase "My moral code is wrong" or "I am mistaken". Doesnt this imply measuring your code against something else?

Considering your views now aren't they correct in your opinion now? If you entertain the possibility that you might be wrong, are you just saying "I may change my mind" because I dont see that as a question of right or wrong so much as a choice of preference. If you think your current views "may be wrong" what are you holding them up against in principle in order to make that relative claim?

Science is provisional though...science just might change it's mind.

GGK

We may change our models if they prove more useful in doing so. To my mind, the only sense science can be said to be "wrong" is if it doesnt mirror what's happening in reality. Without a realist view, I think one is left saying scientific theories are more or less useful.

(On a practical note - it makes next to no difference. I suspect someone like Tame Deuces (for example) couldnt care less about whether science is "right" or "wrong" - usefulness is all we can reliably speak about anyhow).

thanks bunny...

when i speak of my morals...the best i can say is "I think they are the best I can do given my current knowledge/ideas/understanding/etc" this doesn't mean i won't change my morals in the future based on new insight...

No I understand this position. I get confused when subjectivists say they might currently be wrong, that's all.

I don't know how they're using the word "wrong" since it's not the way I use it and I can't make sense of it, nor see the advantage in not just saying "I might change my mind".

Why? If morality IS absolute or universal, subjectivists are wrong.

Because they don't think morality is universal...

I'm not confused by the idea they may be wrong (I suspect they are). I'm confused by what they mean when they say their current moral views may be wrong.

This really isnt complicated - nor is it an attack. I'm just asking what you mean when you say someone's moral viewpoint is "wrong".

I know what I mean by it - but I also know you don't think it's possible to do what I think I'm doing when I make that claim, even in principle.

I haven't read everything in this thread, so I apologize if my post doesn't address the issue at hand.

Let's say I'm a rule utilitarian. That is, I believe that the right action is the action in accordance with rules that maximize happiness in society. Let's say I believe rules ABC maximize happiness in society. Then, after talking with you, I realize that actually, rules ABD maximize happiness in society. So, I change my mind on which moral rules to accept because I realized I was mistaken about how best to maximize happiness. Now, typically utilitarianism is taken as an objective theory of morality. But it doesn't have to be. If you want you can substitute anything else (e.g. the glory of god) for happiness here and come out with the same result. Nothing here turns on whether the goal you are trying to achieve here is objectively or subjectively good.

Perhaps what you mean to say is that if morality is subjective, then the goal that your actions (e.g. happiness or the glory of god) are meant to produce is arbitrarily chosen. So there is no way to compare these goals without assuming some criteria by which to judge them--that is, which would lead to better outcomes if you accepted them. And then you have to assume some way of determining "better outcomes, which implies some further higher goal, which, by hypothesis, we don't have. I more or less agree with this second argument.

More to the point, science deals in objective truth.

I think those who hold to a subjective view of morality are thinking I'm making an argument along these lines. I'm not though - I dont understand morality well enough to mount any kind of argument. I'm curious as to how one would view the world as a moral subjectivist and I'm asking how someone, who considers that morality is purely subjective, can consistently make the claim:

"My current moral framework is probably wrong".

I dont see what they mean by "wrong" - since that seems to imply "compared with some correct answer" and the only thing close to a "correct answer" would be their current moral viewpoint which they are claiming to evaluate as wrong.

I suspect they mean "I may change my current moral framework". Which is, of course, perfectly reasonable - I just don't think "wrong" is a good word - why not say "I may make a different decision in the future" or "I may decide that a different moral framework is superior" or similar?

Well I agree, but surely this can be consistently denied?

Isn't it fairly clear what they mean? They mean that those other moral views are morally wrong. You are interpreting this to mean those other views are false. But since it is very likely that moral relativists don't believe that moral claims can be true or false, they probably mean that they don't like the consequences of those actions--or that in some other way according to the moral code they currently hold those actions are immoral.

Possibly, though I doubt you can get to realism on an empirical basis.

I don't understand what you are saying here.

No, not at all.

No, I'm trying to understand it from their perspective - where it is not a matter of true or false.

I'm speaking of when they judge their own, currently held moral code to be probably wrong. What does this mean?

That it's possible to consistently hold that science doesnt deal in "truths" and doesnt make true statements. It makes models we subjectively judge as useful. No matter how far we advance scientifically - we have no justification for declaring that any scientific claim is "true".

Again - I dont subscribe to this view, but I'm sure Madnak persuaded me this was consistent and even plausible.

Subjectivist #1: To me it feels that rape is immoral and morality is not universal. However, it's possible that morality is universal AND rape is really moral.

Subjectivist #2: To me it feels that this situation calls for me to terminate the old guy's life and morality is not absolute. However, it's possible that morality is absolute AND terminating that old guy's life is immoral in this situation.

Bunny: Ah, I see.

Ah. Fair enough. Yeah, I would say that this claim is inconsistent with moral relativism. But then, I also think most self-proclaimed moral relativists actually believe in objective morality.

I do...sort of, since I'm not sure that's the sense it's always used. To paraphrase (tell me if I'm wrong). You say your morality may be wrong because you may be wrong about moral subjectivism. Is that right? That makes perfect sense.


However:

If you happen to be right about moral subjectivism, the concept of anyone deeming their current moral viewpoint incorrect is meaningless. Yes?