My gift to you: Lawrence Krauss' head on a platter
no he couldnt
no they dont
The religions on the contrary, know there is a supersensible world
I don't think you understand his example if that's what you're concluding from it. You also still have not clarified your view of accountability.
1. You play poker, you make decisions. You might get lucky in the short run, but eventually the law of large numbers dictates that your decisions are held accountable to it. Your results approach your ev.
2. You fly in a plane. You use Bernouilles principle to fly through the air in your plane, temporarily overcoming gravity, but you don't do your due diligence to maintain the plane. The wing breaks off and you plummet to your death. You negligence is now held accountable to the law of gravity (and Bernouills principle).
3. You are driving in a car at high speed. You don't feel the speed, but you see the speedometer. You know that the icy road means you need more distance to stop, but you keep speeding. You hit a sheet of black ice, slam on the brakes, but slide into the ditch and flip. Luckily you aren't injured. Your actions are held accountable to the law of conservation of momentum.
4. You are trapped on a desert island with your neighbor and his wife. You are almost certain you will never get off the island, and you and his wife are in love with each other. She doesn't love him anymore, but feels duty bound to him until he dies. The only way you can get his wife is to murder him. He would kill you if he caught you two together, and he is much stronger than you are. You've been told your whole life that murder is wrong. You've considered that murder is objectively wrong, but in this case it's the only way to be with the woman you love. You murder your neighbor and make it look like an accident. His wife is sad for some time but eventually moves on and you and his wife live the rest of your days in relative happiness on the island. She never finds out, no one else finds out and nothing bad ever happens to you as a result. In fact it's a pretty good result for everyone except your neighbor.
Notice that in 1,2,3 these are not moral oughts. They exists dependent on your ends (you wish to win money, you wish to continue to fly safely, you wish to remain on the road) as we have defined moral oughts as "oughts that exist independent of your ends."
In example 4, the moral ought is "you ought not murder." It exists despite your end to obtain your neighbors wife by murdering him, and you go against the law when you murder him. Where is the accountability to this proposed moral law? Either the law doesn't exist, it doesn't include murder, or accountability to it doesn't happen in this life. I believe it exists and that it contains murder, so that entails I believe accountability to it happens after death. I can't think of any alternative.
To be more precise. Your example of the law of large numbers not requiring accountability is not quite true. Sure someone can run above ev for their entire life of poker with no ultimate restitution but there are certain constraints. For example, if your true Winrate is 2bb/100 it would be essentially impossible to run at 50bb/100 for 1 million hands (or whatever number satisfies). Certainly not theoretically impossible, but essentially so. To maximise results you play as if the law of large numbers were binding on you immediately despite the fact you know you will never play enough poker in your life to reach the 'long term.' You also play as if you were to play forever. However, the law of large numbers is forcing your decisions to approach your results in real life too. There is pressure on your decisions to be accountable to the law, in life.
My argument against this starts by granting your claim that objective moral laws require punishment, but challenges your assumption that this must be evaluated at the individual level. To illustrate this I use an analogy from poker. We can evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a poker decision in terms of its EV. However, EV and actual results often differ. This doesn't mean that decisions based on EV are wrong, just that they describe the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, and the specific outcome you actually get is not guaranteed. My claim is that it is conceivable that objective moral rules are the same, in that they could also be based on the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, rather than on certain punishment if broken. That is, it could be the case that cheating on your wife is immoral because the average outcome of doing so is unhappiness for you and your wife and family, but no one ever finding out (and no negative consequences) is still one of the possible outcomes. So just as you should make the poker decision with the highest EV, you should also make the moral decision with better average outcomes for yourself and others, even keeping in mind that it is possible that you wouldn't suffer any ill consequences for breaking the moral rule.
This means that it isn't sufficient to point to a few outliers like Stalin as proof that wickedness is not punished here on earth. Maybe Stalin won the jackpot, but that doesn't make it wise to play the lottery.
I'm not being clear about the point I'm trying to make with this example. Suppose that I grant you that punishment is in some way required by objective moral laws. You think this implies an afterlife and God because you think it is obvious that people who break the moral life here on earth are not always punished.
My argument against this starts by granting your claim that objective moral laws require punishment, but challenges your assumption that this must be evaluated at the individual level. To illustrate this I use an analogy from poker. We can evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a poker decision in terms of its EV. However, EV and actual results often differ. This doesn't mean that decisions based on EV are wrong, just that they describe the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, and the specific outcome you actually get is not guaranteed. My claim is that it is conceivable that objective moral rules are the same, in that they could also be based on the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, rather than on certain punishment if broken. That is, it could be the case that cheating on your wife is immoral because the average outcome of doing so is unhappiness for you and your wife and family, but no one ever finding out (and no negative consequences) is still one of the possible outcomes. So just as you should make the poker decision with the highest EV, you should also make the moral decision with better average outcomes for yourself and others, even keeping in mind that it is possible that you wouldn't suffer any ill consequences for breaking the moral rule.
This means that it isn't sufficient to point to a few outliers like Stalin as proof that wickedness is not punished here on earth. Maybe Stalin won the jackpot, but that doesn't make it wise to play the lottery.
My argument against this starts by granting your claim that objective moral laws require punishment, but challenges your assumption that this must be evaluated at the individual level. To illustrate this I use an analogy from poker. We can evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a poker decision in terms of its EV. However, EV and actual results often differ. This doesn't mean that decisions based on EV are wrong, just that they describe the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, and the specific outcome you actually get is not guaranteed. My claim is that it is conceivable that objective moral rules are the same, in that they could also be based on the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, rather than on certain punishment if broken. That is, it could be the case that cheating on your wife is immoral because the average outcome of doing so is unhappiness for you and your wife and family, but no one ever finding out (and no negative consequences) is still one of the possible outcomes. So just as you should make the poker decision with the highest EV, you should also make the moral decision with better average outcomes for yourself and others, even keeping in mind that it is possible that you wouldn't suffer any ill consequences for breaking the moral rule.
This means that it isn't sufficient to point to a few outliers like Stalin as proof that wickedness is not punished here on earth. Maybe Stalin won the jackpot, but that doesn't make it wise to play the lottery.
Oh yes he could, this is the continuation of what is called atavistic consciousness in which Man knew himself to be ensconced within a spiritual world and of course during ancient Greece this was morphing into intellectuality. Of course you could say no but its really not a debatable item.
When I say not debatable I ask you to tell me if the consciousness with respect to thinking of the ancient Greek; of Thales, Heraclitus, Plato and even up to Aristotle was the same as ours ? There is an evolution of cognition /thinking, not just feets and toes.
To the second one this "dreamy type" understanding of the religious of yesterday and even today is again consequential to this evolution of consciousness/thinking or to the point the loss thereof. The religions brought forth a consciousness of "revelation" which of course the modern age does not know nor comprehend , on the whole, but not all. Its just not believed.
Again to the second point there is an inner "longing" within mankind which in clarity is able to "know", but not in the intellectual manner expected, that there is the divine and I'll say this whether a man clings to the isms of atheism of agnosticism or of course the religions. There are some who aren't able and do not gain this inner perception and they are the real atheists in separation from this comprehension but they are few and far between.
I had hoped to lead to the point that the science of the day, in its clarity of intellectualism( not "dreamy") will because of its structured intellectuality be at the forefront of a "clear" comprehension of that world to which the religious refers. this happens as the Intellectual abilities rise to a new level or a a clear appreciation of the Divine, otr that to which the religions speak.
As an aside I use the word "Divine" in the main because the use of the "G" word has been dusted into nothingness in this nominal age of debate but a hint into the Divine can be appreciated by Dionysus the Aeropagite who speaks to the the heavenly hierarchies to which all religions were, in some form, aware of.
When I say not debatable I ask you to tell me if the consciousness with respect to thinking of the ancient Greek; of Thales, Heraclitus, Plato and even up to Aristotle was the same as ours ? There is an evolution of cognition /thinking, not just feets and toes.
To the second one this "dreamy type" understanding of the religious of yesterday and even today is again consequential to this evolution of consciousness/thinking or to the point the loss thereof. The religions brought forth a consciousness of "revelation" which of course the modern age does not know nor comprehend , on the whole, but not all. Its just not believed.
Again to the second point there is an inner "longing" within mankind which in clarity is able to "know", but not in the intellectual manner expected, that there is the divine and I'll say this whether a man clings to the isms of atheism of agnosticism or of course the religions. There are some who aren't able and do not gain this inner perception and they are the real atheists in separation from this comprehension but they are few and far between.
I had hoped to lead to the point that the science of the day, in its clarity of intellectualism( not "dreamy") will because of its structured intellectuality be at the forefront of a "clear" comprehension of that world to which the religious refers. this happens as the Intellectual abilities rise to a new level or a a clear appreciation of the Divine, otr that to which the religions speak.
As an aside I use the word "Divine" in the main because the use of the "G" word has been dusted into nothingness in this nominal age of debate but a hint into the Divine can be appreciated by Dionysus the Aeropagite who speaks to the the heavenly hierarchies to which all religions were, in some form, aware of.
It's been repeatedly explained why this is not true. No one expects you to agree, but you've shown little indication of understanding the arguments at all.
I have many times. Laws entail you being accountable to them, or they aren't laws.
1. You play poker, you make decisions. You might get lucky in the short run, but eventually the law of large numbers dictates that your decisions are held accountable to it. Your results approach your ev.
2. You fly in a plane. You use Bernouilles principle to fly through the air in your plane, temporarily overcoming gravity, but you don't do your due diligence to maintain the plane. The wing breaks off and you plummet to your death. You negligence is now held accountable to the law of gravity (and Bernouills principle).
You need to clarify your concept of accountability, otherwise nothing you say makes sense.
3. You are driving in a car at high speed. You don't feel the speed, but you see the speedometer. You know that the icy road means you need more distance to stop, but you keep speeding. You hit a sheet of black ice, slam on the brakes, but slide into the ditch and flip. Luckily you aren't injured. Your actions are held accountable to the law of conservation of momentum.
Originally Posted by Taken out of order
Notice that in 1,2,3 these are not moral oughts. They exists dependent on your ends (you wish to win money, you wish to continue to fly safely, you wish to remain on the road) as we have defined moral oughts as "oughts that exist independent of your ends."
I would also say that the "oughts" above aren't really "oughts" at all if you try to interpret it in a sense that runs parallel to the concept of a "moral ought." This is another example of the conflation of terms that I'm telling you to avoid.
4. You are trapped on a desert island with your neighbor and his wife. You are almost certain you will never get off the island, and you and his wife are in love with each other. She doesn't love him anymore, but feels duty bound to him until he dies. The only way you can get his wife is to murder him. He would kill you if he caught you two together, and he is much stronger than you are. You've been told your whole life that murder is wrong. You've considered that murder is objectively wrong, but in this case it's the only way to be with the woman you love. You murder your neighbor and make it look like an accident. His wife is sad for some time but eventually moves on and you and his wife live the rest of your days in relative happiness on the island. She never finds out, no one else finds out and nothing bad ever happens to you as a result. In fact it's a pretty good result for everyone except your neighbor.
...
In example 4, the moral ought is "you ought not murder." It exists despite your end to obtain your neighbors wife by murdering him, and you go against the law when you murder him. Where is the accountability to this proposed moral law? Either the law doesn't exist, it doesn't include murder, or accountability to it doesn't happen in this life. I believe it exists and that it contains murder, so that entails I believe accountability to it happens after death. I can't think of any alternative.
...
In example 4, the moral ought is "you ought not murder." It exists despite your end to obtain your neighbors wife by murdering him, and you go against the law when you murder him. Where is the accountability to this proposed moral law? Either the law doesn't exist, it doesn't include murder, or accountability to it doesn't happen in this life. I believe it exists and that it contains murder, so that entails I believe accountability to it happens after death. I can't think of any alternative.
Yes I understand your point. My point is that there doesn't seem to be pressure upon human behavior with respect to a moral law, especially on the macro level, at all. There doesn't seem to be any probability distribution of outcomes with regards to this moral law in the same vein as with regard to the law of large numbers. Genghis Khan, Josef Stalin, Ted Bundy, My Lai, Bhopal, the rape of Nanking, the holocaust. Had it not been for human laws (which moral laws are not contingent upon definitively), none of the evils that mankind does would ever be constrained or probabilistically 'punished' (held accountable to in the same ways as other laws) in any apparent way. Mankinds capacity for moral evil seems limitless and without constraint.
I'm not being clear about the point I'm trying to make with this example. Suppose that I grant you that punishment is in some way required by objective moral laws. You think this implies an afterlife and God because you think it is obvious that people who break the moral life here on earth are not always punished.
My argument against this starts by granting your claim that objective moral laws require punishment, but challenges your assumption that this must be evaluated at the individual level. To illustrate this I use an analogy from poker. We can evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a poker decision in terms of its EV. However, EV and actual results often differ. This doesn't mean that decisions based on EV are wrong, just that they describe the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, and the specific outcome you actually get is not guaranteed. My claim is that it is conceivable that objective moral rules are the same, in that they could also be based on the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, rather than on certain punishment if broken. That is, it could be the case that cheating on your wife is immoral because the average outcome of doing so is unhappiness for you and your wife and family, but no one ever finding out (and no negative consequences) is still one of the possible outcomes. So just as you should make the poker decision with the highest EV, you should also make the moral decision with better average outcomes for yourself and others, even keeping in mind that it is possible that you wouldn't suffer any ill consequences for breaking the moral rule.
This means that it isn't sufficient to point to a few outliers like Stalin as proof that wickedness is not punished here on earth. Maybe Stalin won the jackpot, but that doesn't make it wise to play the lottery.
My argument against this starts by granting your claim that objective moral laws require punishment, but challenges your assumption that this must be evaluated at the individual level. To illustrate this I use an analogy from poker. We can evaluate the rightness or wrongness of a poker decision in terms of its EV. However, EV and actual results often differ. This doesn't mean that decisions based on EV are wrong, just that they describe the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, and the specific outcome you actually get is not guaranteed. My claim is that it is conceivable that objective moral rules are the same, in that they could also be based on the average of a probability distribution of outcomes, rather than on certain punishment if broken. That is, it could be the case that cheating on your wife is immoral because the average outcome of doing so is unhappiness for you and your wife and family, but no one ever finding out (and no negative consequences) is still one of the possible outcomes. So just as you should make the poker decision with the highest EV, you should also make the moral decision with better average outcomes for yourself and others, even keeping in mind that it is possible that you wouldn't suffer any ill consequences for breaking the moral rule.
This means that it isn't sufficient to point to a few outliers like Stalin as proof that wickedness is not punished here on earth. Maybe Stalin won the jackpot, but that doesn't make it wise to play the lottery.
I don't see how you could justify the bolded claim. Let's suppose that Josef Stalin himself didn't face negative consequences for his actions. Fine. But how do we know that he isn't just an outlier, and that 99% of the time people who make the choices he made do face negative consequences, ending up dead, reviled, or forgotten?
There is definitely no evidence of probabilistic distribution of accountability to a moral law in the way that the other laws have. It seems to only exist in our heads. I realize I'm making a pretty good case for objective morality not actually existing here. I still think it does though.
I recall a conversation from many years ago between an agnostic and a theist in which a distinction was made between objective morality and transcendent morality. They both agreed that a non-theist could hold to an objective morality, but that only the theist could hold to a transcendent morality.
Is that a meaningful distinction, and if so, would that distinction be helpful in this discussion?
Is that a meaningful distinction, and if so, would that distinction be helpful in this discussion?
It may be a meaningful distinction if 18 pages into the thread we had a more concrete idea of what DODN means by 'objective morality'.
How are the associated concepts of accountability, enforcement and God implicated? And what do they mean? Its all left a little vague, purposely.
How are the associated concepts of accountability, enforcement and God implicated? And what do they mean? Its all left a little vague, purposely.
Also depends on what is being transcended. Human concerns by Divine Command Theory in the trivial sense?
Or is it a Kantian statement about epistemology? A certain leporidae poster here used to argue for Platonic moral realism independent of human minds and that it was possible we aren't capable of knowing it with certainty. And he was an atheist.
Or is it a Kantian statement about epistemology? A certain leporidae poster here used to argue for Platonic moral realism independent of human minds and that it was possible we aren't capable of knowing it with certainty. And he was an atheist.
There is definitely no evidence of probabilistic distribution of accountability to a moral law in the way that the other laws have. It seems to only exist in our heads. I realize I'm making a pretty good case for objective morality not actually existing here. I still think it does though.
This isn't a strong enough claim. If I believe in objective morality, but not in a god, then if punishment is implied by objective morality then I don't need any additional evidence to also believe in punishment. There is only a problem insofar as I have a reason to not believe that we are punished during our lifetime.
A moral law may be qualitatively different from a scientific one, but there should be some evidence somewhere (not mere speculation about conscience effects etc) about it's application. Since there is none (if you can provide some, please do) then we must conclude either it doesn't exist, it affects us in some non intuitive, immeasurable way, or it applies after we die. I think in lieu of the fact that pretty much everything is measurable by science the latter is much more likely.
It's interesting you mention power. It seems to me the more power you have the more evil **** you can not only do but get away with.
I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s’pose you’d done right and give Jim up, would you feel better than what you do now? No, says I, I’d feel bad – I’d feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what’s the use you learning to do right when it’s troublesome to do right and ain’t no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn’t answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn’t bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever came handiest at the time.
I feel like you're dancing around the point a bit, but perhaps better than poker would be lottery winners. Lottery tickets are a -ev bet, but the jackpot winners are massively over ev for life. A jackpot winner could continue to buy tickets at the same rate and never have it catch up with them.
I feel like you're dancing around the point a bit, but perhaps better than poker would be lottery winners. Lottery tickets are a -ev bet, but the jackpot winners are massively over ev for life. A jackpot winner could continue to buy tickets at the same rate and never have it catch up with them.
I'm not saying anything about morality. I'm only saying that jackpot winners never face the ramifications of their -ev lottery tickets.
On bladesmans line:
They say that moral behaviour and manners are priviledges of the rich and powerful. If you just so happen to be born into a good family, it's not an even playing field.
In my view, a lot of what we consider 'morality' is nothing more than a refined and sophisticated game of ego. My views are best ignored.
They say that moral behaviour and manners are priviledges of the rich and powerful. If you just so happen to be born into a good family, it's not an even playing field.
In my view, a lot of what we consider 'morality' is nothing more than a refined and sophisticated game of ego. My views are best ignored.
Not according to me. You often come across as a bit dreamy, imo, and also one of the nicest people there is. What's your secret?
I don't know about that. Your example about the law of large numbers with relation to ev is absolutely evidence that such a law exists and applies to your poker decisions. As you spoke before there is a probability distribution with respect to it and simple analysis can determine if that law is being applied. In fact, that's how they determined beyond reasonable doubt that NioNio was cheating. He simply couldn't have won as many bbs/100 as his VPIP/PFR/AF allowed. Same with every other scientific law I can think of (That's how science works). If there is no measurable evidence for how a supposed law applies then how can one say it exists/applies?
A moral law may be qualitatively different from a scientific one, but there should be some evidence somewhere (not mere speculation about conscience effects etc) about it's application. Since there is none (if you can provide some, please do) then we must conclude either it doesn't exist, it affects us in some non intuitive, immeasurable way, or it applies after we die. I think in lieu of the fact that pretty much everything is measurable by science the latter is much more likely.
Here's my general view. There is a common challenge to atheistic morality that says that moral claims don't fit into a naturalist ontology. As I said earlier, I'm agnostic about this claim - we don't know enough about what a naturalistic ontology looks like for this claim to be justified. The world given us by science is a strange place. Anyway, naturalism and atheism are correlated beliefs, but not implied by each other.
There is another problem for atheists regarding morality. Many atheists are quite skeptical and critical of religious claims based on faith. However, they also act on moral claims that they are not able to justify rationally. Aren't they being inconsistent? In my opinion, no. Moral decisions are forced decisions. We can't just abstain from deciding whether or not to steal, lie, cheat, etc. Abstention is itself a moral choice. This is why philosophy is useful in a worldview ultimately based on science. Some questions aren't answered by science (yet, perhaps, or maybe never - atheists have no guarantee that the universe is knowable by us), but we require an answer now. This is why my typical way of phrasing a moral claim is that action A is better than B, not that A is "good" or "right" full stop.
But this is congruent with the general skepticism towards religious claims held by many atheists. I don't object to people who choose to be religious on existentialist grounds (I might object to the specific form that religion takes, but that is a separate question). Rather, I object to specific claims by religious people that they can prove the existence of god or the resurrection of Jesus, or the divine inspiration of the Bible, etc.
It's interesting you mention power. It seems to me the more power you have the more evil **** you can not only do but get away with.
EDIT: I should clarify that I think some atheists are inconsistent in their criticisms of faith. Specifically, atheists who claim that all beliefs or actions should be justified on a universally applicable rational basis (eg certain kinds of strong evidentialism) are sometimes inconsistent in how they treat moral beliefs and actions.
You're focusing too much on the specifics of the example and not on the principle it was meant to illustrate. In poker a single player can be faced with the same decision thousands of times, so you are much more likely to hit the long run outcome predicted by EV calculations. In an individual life you generally don't face the same moral choice thousands of times, so you are less likely to hit the long run "EV" of your moral decisions.
I think this is much harder than you're giving credit. We don't understand human psychology or society very well at all, so it isn't surprising that we don't have much scientifically grounded knowledge about whether particular moral decisions will tend to have a better or worse effect. I also have some conservative leanings here: I think traditional ideas about morality should be given respect as ways that have worked to at least some degree in the past, but this is a diffuse kind of knowledge that doesn't neatly fit into a scientific framework.
Here's my general view. There is a common challenge to atheistic morality that says that moral claims don't fit into a naturalist ontology. As I said earlier, I'm agnostic about this claim - we don't know enough about what a naturalistic ontology looks like for this claim to be justified. The world given us by science is a strange place. Anyway, naturalism and atheism are correlated beliefs, but not implied by each other.
There is another problem for atheists regarding morality. Many atheists are quite skeptical and critical of religious claims based on faith. However, they also act on moral claims that they are not able to justify rationally. Aren't they being inconsistent? In my opinion, no. Moral decisions are forced decisions. We can't just abstain from deciding whether or not to steal, lie, cheat, etc. Abstention is itself a moral choice. This is why philosophy is useful in a worldview ultimately based on science. Some questions aren't answered by science (yet, perhaps, or maybe never - atheists have no guarantee that the universe is knowable by us), but we require an answer now. This is why my typical way of phrasing a moral claim is that action A is better than B, not that A is "good" or "right" full stop.
There is another problem for atheists regarding morality. Many atheists are quite skeptical and critical of religious claims based on faith. However, they also act on moral claims that they are not able to justify rationally. Aren't they being inconsistent? In my opinion, no. Moral decisions are forced decisions. We can't just abstain from deciding whether or not to steal, lie, cheat, etc. Abstention is itself a moral choice. This is why philosophy is useful in a worldview ultimately based on science. Some questions aren't answered by science (yet, perhaps, or maybe never - atheists have no guarantee that the universe is knowable by us), but we require an answer now. This is why my typical way of phrasing a moral claim is that action A is better than B, not that A is "good" or "right" full stop.
But this is congruent with the general skepticism towards religious claims held by many atheists. I don't object to people who choose to be religious on existentialist grounds (I might object to the specific form that religion takes, but that is a separate question). Rather, I object to specific claims by religious people that they can prove the existence of god or the resurrection of Jesus, or the divine inspiration of the Bible, etc.
It isn't enough to hold that God exists is a properly basic belief, it has to actually be a properly basic belief. This we don't know. That is, in some possible worlds theism is a warranted true belief, in some possible worlds it is not, but we don't know which of these possible worlds is the actual world and so we also don't know if theists know that God exists.
It may be a meaningful distinction if 18 pages into the thread we had a more concrete idea of what DODN means by 'objective morality'.
How are the associated concepts of accountability, enforcement and God implicated? And what do they mean? Its all left a little vague, purposely.
How are the associated concepts of accountability, enforcement and God implicated? And what do they mean? Its all left a little vague, purposely.
Most people know that to argue for revealed religion's view on morality will just shift to a discussion on evidence ("how do you know the bible is correct?"), but for non-revealed religion you can just keep it as an intellectual exercise and in thought experiments. The former is interesting to discuss in contrast to atheism, the latter not so much, because the practical difference is negligible.
I think your question is a good one. DoOrDoNot should outlay his views, definitions and evidence (if any) and explain how he supports the notion of objective morality and the grand accountant. If there is no evidence, I think his accusations fall rather flat. And of course, if there is evidence, we can have a discussion on its quality.
Of course, I am an empiricist. I like evidence and particularly evidence that can be checked. Perhaps DoOrDoNot feels that evidence is not necessary in these matters and disagrees with me that he needs to support his views. That's fine by me, as in my eyes it would be an admission of irrelevance.
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