I never really felt I understood the WoW analogy, as I said in that thread. But here it is in its entirety for the benefit of others:

You're right and I'm familiar with the legal concept of diminished responsibility so that helps. I'm using ultimately as finally so that I can understand where the moral responsibility stops but then I think that's now a mistake.

Here's one of my problems though, if I accept that moral responsibility can be mitigated by the sequence of events that caused the agent to act then I'm subjectively judging that sequence of events. I guess that's what a society has to do but I'm not sure how just it is.

It means we have to think carefully about moral responsibility but the alternatives are far more unjust imo. For example, in scenario 1, imagine you are taking money from the company you work for to the bank. On the way, a mugger appears, holds a gun to your head and demands the money. You hand it over. Are you morally responsible? In scenario 2, you decide that you would like to buy a sportscar with the company money and keep it. Are you morally responsible?

Both flavours of incompatibilists agree that there is no morally relevant difference between these scenarios. A true libertarian will claim that you acted of your own free will in both scenarios (in case you think I exaggerate, here is Jibninjas defending a very similar position). A true hard determinist claims that neither were made of your own free will, therefore Scenario A and Scenario B are morally equivalent.

So I think that compatibilism fits better with our intuitions* about moral responsibility. There's a reason that when a judge asks a defendant "Did you sign that document of your own free will?" she is not asking "Is determinism true?" We could modify scenario 1 above to make it trickier to establish moral responsibility — perhaps you are being blackmailed with nudie photos rather than robbed at gunpoint — but a framework that allows for such distinctions seems better than frameworks that don't.

* Not that I think our intuitions about anything are infallible, but incompatibilists tend to claim that their view is intuitive so it is relevant, especially as hard determinists are often not actually in disagreement with compatibilists about any empirical fact of the matter.

I disagree that a libertarian should say that there is no "morally relevant difference" between the scenarios presented

There is no metaphysically relevant difference, i.e in both cases one chooses to act and could have chosen otherwise, in a metaphysical sense

But in the case of the mugger, I don't think most (any?) proponents of libertarian free will actually argue that the guy who gives the money to the mugger is morally responsible for that choice.

Basically, because you think the juridical understanding of free will makes the more sense (and perhaps it does), you're making the mistake of assuming that jibninjas is using the term the same way, i.e the way you would in a court room, but I'm fairly sure he's not, and neither was I when I said that I agreed with him.

The linking of free will and moral responsibility goes back at least as far as Aristotle and is pretty central to Christian theologians use of free will as a response to the Problem of Evil.

E.g. from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

In other words, the central concern of free will is about moral responsibility. OrP touched on this in his first post.

And from Plantinga:

If you and Jibs are separating out libertarian free will from moral responsibility that's cool with me but it's atypical, to say the least. I guess we can clarify by asking if you think that Plantinga's defense of the Logical Problem of Evil fails? If you grant that one can be (sometimes) metaphysically free but not morally responsible then the LPoE appears to remain unrefuted...

Similar to the above, but the typical libertarian view is still juridical, it just assumes God is the specific judge in question. Essentially no-one outside theology defends libertarian free will, and the reason it gets defended is to explain why God is such a hardass about our moral responsibility.

edit: I suspect the difficulty you are having reconciling the idea of contra-causal free will and common-sense notions of moral responsibility is precisely why the majority of philosophers consider libertarian free will to be incoherent. Notice that philosophers do not level the same charge at e.g. the argument from design, so it's not like any theistic concept is just labelled incoherent on principle...

I think you're overstating the libertarian position here. While free will and moral responsibility are linked (ie, free will is required for moral responsibility), it does not imply that all acts of free wil entail moral responsibility (I can freely chose between toast and bagels), nor do all acts of free will require the same level of moral culpability (I freely chose to hand over the money because I decided I wanted to live).

Looking at the statement from Jibninjas, I wouldn't conclude on that basis alone that since he believes that giving the money over is an act of free will that it implies that there is a moral equivalence between that and the other scenario.

I won't dispute that free will and moral responsibility are closely linked, and I probably shouldn't even try to speak for what libertarians actually think, since I'm not even sure I am one and am woefully undereducated to boot. However, I am fairly sure that when jibninjas said that the man acted with free will in handing over the wallet, he was separating the idea of moral responsibility from contra-causal free will. Or at least, I know I was, and it reads to me that he was doing the same. Despite whatever problems such a view might actually hold, which I'll have to follow up on after I have a chance to read through your post again and go do some learnin'

I had to do a little reading on both the LPoE and Plantinga's view but I don't follow this yet

I was looking at this article

It defines Libertarianism as "the view that a person is free with respect to a given action if and only if that person is both free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing that action; in other words, that person is not determined to perform or refrain from that action by any prior causal forces." That definition seems to me to fit what I said about it being separable from moral responsibility. The definition is purely metaphysical.

Plantinga's argument, as I understand it, is that the capacity for libertarian free will is morally valuable enough to justify God preferring a state of affairs in which people acting freely make immoral decisions. I think you could approach what it means for it to be morally valuable enough in two ways: One would be utilitarian-ish: i.e since God is taken to be omniscient that he simply knows the "sum" of the amount of evil that will actually occur from free will and weights it against the good that will come about. The other would be to say that the capacity itself is valuable without regard to the kinds of moral decisions that agents with the capacity will make at all. The former seems better just in that it's not clear otherwise what it would mean for that capacity to be something good, unless it's goodness is just assumed in some existential way. But it's clear at least that Plantinga is talking about libertarian free will as a generalized capacity that exists, rather than talking about the moral value of any specific free choice.

So it's not clear to me how denying that every metaphysically free choice is morally consequential undermines that kind of argument at all. The argument only seems to depend on libertarian free will actually existing and that God is constrained by an inability to do the logically impossible, which I suppose, depending on your view, also amount to some kind of denial of God's omnipotence, so may be consequential in terms of how the LPoE is framed.

I've not suggested that every free will act entails moral responsibility.

The problem I have with continuing this digression is that I'm facing responses that are very similar to the p-zombie argument: it's easy to say "I can conceive of a libertarian account of free will that is coherent and grounds moral responsibility" but the devil is in the details and until you guys provide such an account its impossible for me to second-guess where the logic will break down. It also doesn't help that the sort of things you and Aaron don't want to attribute to libertarian free will really are considered the defining features of the philosophy. E.g. if you think that antecedent events affect our decisions then you are making a compatibilist argument. If you think antecedent events can grant and/or diminish moral responsibility you are making a compatibilist argument. Libertarian freedom denies the role of reasons, motives and other antecedent events. For example, here's part of a Christian criticism of libertarian free will (emphasis mine):

Obviously I don't particular care for the scriptural parts of the argument, but perhaps a Christian characterising contra-causal libertarian free will in the same way I have will help show that I'm not strawmanning the requirements of contra-causal free will because I'm atheist. After all, I'm not actually a determinist, so in theory a sensible libertarian model is open to me. Happy to continue this digression if a decent working model of libertarian free will is forthcoming.

That's what it sounds like you're saying when you say this:

If you meant something else, I invite you to rephrase it.

I think this standard is bizarre and unwarranted. It sounds like you're asking for a proof that libertarianism is true. That goes far beyond constructing a model.

I still claim that you're overstating libertarian position. The claim is that future events are not SOLELY determined by antecedent events. It does not need to negate absolutely everything that came before it.

I think the article is stuck in the same place you're at. And even theologically, it seems to be a very weak way of constructing an argument.

We have phrases taken from the Bible such as "We love because God first loved us" and "How, then, can they call on the one they have not believed in? And how can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without someone preaching to them? And how can anyone preach unless they are sent? As it is written: 'How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news!'"

I'm not that impressed with the article.

If the mistake is the same, then I don't know how it helps.

The first place to start is the following:

1) Determinism is the claim that all future states of the universe are fully determined by the present state of the universe. That is, given that the universe is in state U now and state U' later, then any other universe in state U will be in state U' later.

2) Libertarian free will is the negation of determinism. That is, given that the universe in in state U now and state U' later, then in some other universe that is in state U, it will NOT be in state U' later.

Do you consent to these definitions?

Zumby, not to pile on, but here was your sentence that I wasn't following:

That was what I was attempting to address, without attempting to argue for the validity of Plantinga's argument or libertarianism more generally, which I'm not really prepared to do at all. From what I understand of Plantinga's argument, I just don't understand how his argument depends on one never being "metaphysically free but not morally responsible"

Yeah, OK, I see how that was confusing. What I mean is, if you think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, but free will is not compatible with determinism then theodicy defenses (where moral responsibility generally IS tied to free will) become problematic. Essentially, that doesn't rest on the assumption that 'any free will act is a morally responsible act', but that 'every morally responsible act is a free will act'. I think there might be some mileage in making the move Aaron appears to want to make, and say that it is only if an act is WHOLLY determined that it isn't free, but any close examination reveals this is a bit of a fudge i.e. exactly what percentage contribution can deterministic antecedents make before it tips over God's scales?

@Aaron, as I say, I have no interest in arguing against libertarian free will at length, as it is soundly refuted by more or less the entire contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. And, like Creationism, it is a view only held by (a subset of) theists, held for theological reasons, and I'm not likely going to change anyone's mind. I do think that I can change hard determinists minds though, hence the thread topic.

Besides, you are stuck in a dualist mindset which means you are unable to entertain alternative views. It would be like explaining colour to a blind man.

I doubt the truth of this statement and welcome you to elaborate on the claim. (I think you're confusing an absence of contemporary interest in libertrianism for a refutation of it.)

Are you even willing to address whether you agree to the definitions put forth? I really think you've got this part of the debate confused in your head.

Edit: If your conception of libertarian free will is not consistent with what my conception is, then we need to settle that understanding before anything even has the remotest chance of making sense. I don't think you're taking libertarianism to be the negation of determinism. It looks like you're meaning it to be something else.

LOL -- I'll entertain it with you if there's something you want to discuss from within that framework.

change their minds regarding what? that people are morally responsible for their actions? Only if you re-define morally, responsible, and actions, free, and will, as far as I can see.

Part of my understanding of your view is tied back to this:

You seem to be holding a view that necessarily puts theism and libertarianism into the same bucket. I'll note that durkadurka from SMP was a libertarian and not a theist.

There are two binary considerations:
* Determinism/Libertarianism
* Compatibilism/Incompatibilism

The first is strictly about future states of the universe. Are they fully determined or not?

The second is about the relationship between moral responsibility and determinism. Are the two theses compatible or not?

It is possible to be a libertarian AND be a compatibilist. That is, one can hold the claim that free will exists, but that moral responsibilty still makes sense in a deterministic universe.

After looking at your view again, I'm starting to wonder if you see this as a trichotomy instead: Determinist, compatibilist, libertarian.

Uhhh...I think it would be exceedingly nonstandard to suggest that libertarian free will is nothing but the negation of determinism. Surely you also want to have some notion of agency in your definition? Indeed, earlier in this thread you were explicitly talking about how free will was some category that was NOT just defined by not(determinism).

I had removed a portion of what I typed, and ended up removing too much.

Determinism taken broadly includes things such as inherent randomness in the universe, so long as that randomness is mechanistically defined. For example, there are things like the many worlds interpretation of QM which can be used to encompass a broad range of inherently random behaviors.

So if take randomness that coheres to fixed physical laws, we include that in the category of determinism.

And if you want to create some other category of randomness that does not cohere with fixed physical laws but is also not the result of some form of agency, then we can go ahead and create another category. But that category will be unknown to basically everyone in the conversation. (It would be some sort of random-random... or something.)

You'll notice when I was talking about not(determined) = random and whatnot that I talked about random and willed as if those were the only alternatives to determined. Again, that's not necessarily a strict division, but if you want to create other categories, I'm pretty sure that nobody will know what you're talking about until you elaborate on what you mean.

Even in that bolstered notion of determinism, I don't think this would be considered a standard definition of libertarian free will. Namely, LFW is not just the assertion that determinism is false. It also makes a positive assertion that free will - defined usually with some notion of agency - is true. It seems that what you are effectively doing is saying there is a trichotomy (random, determined, willed) where you only have definitions for the first two and define the third as being neither of the first two. I thought it was standard*, and would like to see it even if it is not, to see one try to define the free will that LFW asserts is true in a way that describes what it is, not just says it isn't these other things.

*note that I don't really want to try to claim any shred of expertise on what philosophers consider to be standard definitions, even if yours sames very much at odds with my naive observations.

I went back and looked up the language Durka used:

http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/sh...40&postcount=7

It does appear that the names of the categories in mind did in fact get muddled.

Edit: My position of calling myself a Libertarian is still true under this framework.

Part of the issue here is the question "What else is there?" After you take care of the intrinsically random behaviors, the determined behaviors, and the willed behaviors, what else could there be?

Insofar as the free will conversation goes, the implicit assumption is that there's nothing else. There's no room in the conversation (at this point) for some sort of pseudo-random-will thing, or even for something completely different.

I suppose it's possible that if someone creates another type of behavior that doesn't fit either category (maybe a form of random-random behaviors) that it may become necessary to construct further conditions. But until then, there's no value in pushing the categories further than they need to by creating more conditions than necessary.

Fair enough. Note that assenting to the incompatibility thesis (that precisely one of determinism and free will is true) gives what I thought was missing from your definition (the assertion that free will is true). Agreeing to durkadurkas definition does that is just buries it under another term.

Suppoise a criminal robs a little old lady because he really likes robbing little old ladies - to the point a determinist would say his desire determines his action. Then I think a compatibilist would say he's morally responsible for the immoral act because being determined by his desire is not a legitmate, "gun to his head" kind of coercion that would relieve him of responsibility.

I think the libertarian would hold him morally responsible in two ways. First, he could freely decide to change his ways at this moment, turn over a new leaf, and stop acting on his previously formed desire to rob old ladies - thus nuturing a new desire to act morally instead. And secondly, he is responsible for whatever free choices he has made in the past which have contributed to the development of this desire to rob little old ladies.

On the other hand, suppose an honest man is forced, by a gun to his head, to rob a little old lady. Then I think a compatibablist would say his act was not freely done in the sense it was coerced in a way that did legitimately relieve him of responsibiliy.

On the other hand, while the libertarian would say the man freely chose to comply rather than take a bullet in his brain, I think the libertarian would say the coercion, in this case, mitigates his moral responsibility. I think the libertarian would say that the moral responsibility for robbing the little old lady lies with the guy holding the gun to the man's head rather than the man put in fear of his life.

So I don't think there's much practical difference between compatibalists and libertarians in how they assign moral responsibility in the above cases. Where I think they may have a difference in attitude is in how developmental environmental factors mitigate moral responsbility. This was the point madnak emphasized in his debate with durkadurka on SMP. I believe madnak thought the compatibalist postition allows for a more humane and reasonable view toward developmental environment as mitigating moral responsibility. While the libertarian's position tends more toward the view that since some people overcome difficult developmental environments, those who don't exercise their free will to do so are therefore not excused from moral responsibility because of their developmental environment.

I tend to think that these underdetermined metaphysical questions are for now really beyond our reach and the best we can do is exercise our intuition to find some balance between a humane judgment of mitigating environmental factors while still holding people accountable to some reasonable extent for their own development.




PairTheBoard

roflcopters

You say that you accidentally edited too much out of your post when defining libertarianism as:

But you've been doing it in multiple posts:

I'll be charitable and allow that you have repeatedly mistyped rather than just not understood the philosophical position you argue for. But then you say things like this:

Lol, no. Just no.

And then this:

Again, no, lol. Many Worlds doesn't allow for true indeterminism, it essentially suggests a framework that stops quantum events being genuinely random; things might appear random, but are actually deterministic at bottom.

And wait, doesn't this conflict with your earlier definition of determinism?
If determinism allowed for true randomness then the future universe is not fully determined by the present state of the universe as the random affects will mean it can be different. If we combine this with your definition of libertarian free will "Libertarian free will is the negation of determinism. That is, given that the universe in in state U now and state U' later, then in some other universe that is in state U, it will NOT be in state U' later." then you are claiming that determinism is compatible with it's contradiction!

I give up. You seem pretty confused about virtually every aspect of the debate. This is why actually presenting your argument/model would have been helpful.

As long as the randomness is tied to a fixed physical law, you can use a many-worlds-like interpretation. If you have "true indeterminism" (what I was referring to as random-random), that's fine. But good luck making sense of what that could possibly be.

Eh? In the many worlds interpretation, we expand the concept of universe to include all possible universes. So U no longer refers to *THIS* universe, but the multiverse.

Why should I not believe that reductionism can "account for" every substance/process/phenomenon in the universe? Why should I believe that something operates outside of the process of "physical" "laws"?

Illusion of free will appears to be the most resilient illusion in existence