Formalization, Mechanization and Automation of Gödel's Proof of God's Existence (From Arvix):

Aaron, Uke, get in here and explain what that means.

Did you glance at the "paper"? If you haven't I know more than you, but if you have I have no relevant expertise.

It doesn't do much. First it states (in plain english any here can read and comment on) an ontological argument by Dana Scott. It then restates each statement in the plain english versions of this ontological argument in the symbology of logic. This is just like how on the forum we would often restate someones argument as "P, P->Q, therefore Q" or something like this to make the underlying logic clear. Then the paper states that they have done the following but doesn't show any of it here: they state that they restated again this argument into some higher order logical language I know nothing about but appears to be amenable to various computer programs which are able to parse arguments and make various claims about what things do or do not follow and what things are or are not needed to get to claims. And the compute program tells you things like that the definitions and axioms are inconsistent (it obviously being a problem if they are not). I suspect it is largely a garbage in garbage out situation, in that it is quite possible to come up with any number of valid but clearly not sound arguments and checking using highly sophisticated methods that the definitions and axioms of such an argument are indeed inconsistent doesn't help you.

First and foremost, there is no new 'proof' here. The conclusions about the proof made by the computer were already known and this was mainly an exercise to demonstrate that as long as the statements are properly translated, the computer arrives at the correct conclusions, which in this example, means it agreed with the known limitations of Godel's argument.

This was probably a precursor work to establish credibility, with their intention being to approach more complex logical arguments in the future, specifically ones that aren't as well understood and could benefit from automation.

What are the limitations of Gödels argument? Wiki doesn't offer much... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6...6del.27s_proof

re: limitations, I just meant the axioms. sort of an 'even if all logical steps are correct, the conclusions are only true if the initial axioms are true'. So by limitations, I just meant that they identified which conclusions were reliant on which axioms. If somebody rejects an axiom, it almost certainly discredits the final conclusion - but there may still be correct intermediate conclusions that didn't rely on that particular axiom.

Someone like Original Position may be able to comment on the value philosophers place on this specific ontological argument relative to the general class of such ontological arguments, but I Rollwave's comments should be taken generally in the sense of limitations that philosophical ontological arguments generally typically have.

On casual inspection, I have a problem with axiom 1 that every property is either positive of its negation is but not both. I don't know what "positive" means but is "round" positive? Is "not round" positive?

It’s more the limitations, or misuse, of symbolic logic in syllogisms:

Man is mammal.
Fretelöo is man.
Therefore, Fretelöo is mammal.

Man is the most intelligent mammal.
Fretelöo is man.
Therefore, Fretelöo is the most intelligent mammal.

I don't think there's anything new here. It looks like it's an exercise in artificial intelligence, comparing what these various computer programs say relative to what philosophers have already figured out on their own.

I'm gonna be mad if some computer gets into heaven and I don't

don't worry zumby, you can be my +1

I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me [a]

[a] (one guest allowed)


John 14, New Atheist-Friendly Annotated Bible

I don't think you've correnctly rephrased axiom 1 (or 2, for that matter).

As far as I can see, neither axiom 1 or 2 state that all properties needs to be either positive or negative?

Obv. I only got general scepticism here, but I would've expected that he was somewhat familiar with Anselm and the like and therefore knew of the limitations of the general version of the ontological argument.

Sorry, we're finishing up an election here in NYC so I've been pretty busy over the last few days. I'll be back in a few more days.

Ok. Now what...

well now I am more interested in a post about your involvement in the election!

"Sorry mate, them shoes are f-king casual"

they get more casual than sandals?

Are they Jesus sandals, or just regular flip flops?

I appeared in a play called a pair of Jesus boots a long time ago, I always thought the title a little confusing

it reads "either a property or its negation is positive, but not both". Is this not saying that precisely one (no more no less) of every property and its negation is positive? I would be much happier if it was just excluding both cases and not also excluding zero cases because of my round example.

I suspect that the word "property" refers to a different class of objects than the sorts of things we would call a property of an object (like "roundness").

Nvm. I thought you were going by the wiki-list of axioms. There, axiom 1 reads "Any property entailed by—i.e., strictly implied by—a positive property is positive" and axiom 2 "If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive", which leaves open whether there are properties which are neither positive or negative.

Seems like the same sort of problem to me:

1. A being that possesses the property of necessary existence necessarily exists.
2. A God-like being is a being that possesses the property of necessary existence.
Therefore,
3. A God-like being necessarily exists.
Therefore,
4. Necessarily, God exists.

Stated like such, it is easy to see how this argument goes wrong. Look at (2). If we interpret it like this:If there is a God-like being, that being possesses the property of necessary existence, then (3) would not follow.* Alternately, if I am saying, there is a God-like being, and it has the property of necessary existence, then I am clearly begging the question--my premise includes the claim that there is a God.


*Essentialy, this is because (2) doesn't assert that there is a God-like being, it only states what would be true if there were a God-like being. For example, I can say this: If there is water, then there exists at least one oxygen molecule. It doesn't follow from this that there is at least one oxygen molecule because I am not asserting in this statement that there is water.