Of course he should be left alone in the sense that he shouldn't be arrested/physically harmed in any way, but this idea people have that privately owned entities have an obligation to employ people who hurt their brand is about the dumbest thing I've ever heard of.

But, as always, the people screaming for the constitution the loudest understand it the least.

Well, the distinction would be whether God was just following the moral code or making the moral code. If there exists a moral code and God simply follows it, then yeah, there would still be objective morality if you remove God, I agree with that. If God determined what it was, and you remove God, then it's a blank slate. If there is no God, I have no reason to believe anything is inherently moral, things just are.

In the absence of God there are no intentions. So everything would just be a preference since there is no rule to live by, since there is no one to set the measure.

I'm not suggesting that everything that is subjective if necessarily false, but that the lack of agreement on this arises out of subjectivity. But maybe the whole subjective argument is overrated, I'm going to think about it.

Well, I'm not saying it's absolutely relative, I think it could still be objective but I'm not sure, I'm leaning towards relative.

I do think it's confusing to take God in and out of the equation and still look at things the same way. I would rather look at the scenarios as completely different. One in which there was never any God, things just are, and I don't see a reason to believe there are laws to follow. The other, God exists and he has some moral code which He endorses, presumably based on His character.

I agree with you here, there are not many arguments to be made for God, besides something along the "ex-nihilo" line of thinking which nobody takes seriously. I'm the first one to admit I can't prove God, and I may even give you that the argument for an objective morality is more seductive than theism, but I equally believe that it's not possible to prove objective morality outright. I'm not saying you have to reject the view because you can't write it on paper, nor would I go around killing people if I became an atheist, we can all agree on basic rules for living. All that aside, subjective morality is appealing to me from a purely nihilistic perspective. Again, I'm not saying we shouldn't condone seemingly moral behaviour, only that you can't prove morality.

I can't defend God, I'm only really suggesting that without a God, you eliminate the possibility for moral objectivity. What I'm not suggesting is that you are forced to act a certain way, or that God even exists. Surely I've made it clear that my belief in God is not logically coherent in any scientific way. I can plainly say that I believe in God and can't prove it, but I think this is a different case when it comes to morality, because it follows a logical order: I believe that if there is no God, then things just are. That to me is logically coherent.

I would have no problem if someone were to say that they believe in a moral code without the existence of God without proof, simply because it makes sense to them, that's much different than saying there is evidence for it, as I think there is more evidence for subjectivity.

I'm just discussing things here, I didn't even bring this up. I think it is good to look at all sides regardless of your views on homosexuality. For instance, you said "privately owned entities have an obligation to employ people who hurt their brand is the dumbest...", but do they have an obligation to those they serve? Remember how this thread began and the owners didn't agree with the gay couple and didn't let them in? What if a gay clientele would hurt their brand? Would they then have the right to refuse them? It's not exactly the same, but it's not that different either.

No, it's not the same at all. Phil Robertson got fired for what he did, not what he was.

Its not a free speech issue since its A&E. But id rather not seem him fired for them just criticized.

You're either lying or you're not, there's nothing subjective about that part and I doubt any of us would disagree that honesty is a 'good' quality in a person, and so it's a virtue. Don't be confused by the fact that there may occasionally be compelling reasons for being dishonest, or that dishonest behaviour might be more common amongst some groups than others (which are always 'fringe', usually criminal in nature), that doesn't make dishonesty a virtue nor honesty not a virtue.

Can you give me an example of, or explain, how honesty is not a virtue? How it could be subjective that it be considered a virtue?

Because they are common to, and valued by, the majority of (if not all) human cultures. To quote Aristotle, 'there are some virtues that will be needed by all people in all times', that 'we have a great deal in common despite our differences', and that some virtues 'link very human being to every other human being'.

This is as close to objective as I think it's possible to get without an omnipotent, omniscient divine law giver to point to, and so I don't think I can be really wrong in using the word objective to describe them. They're the same everywhere.

Is there anything that you don't think is subjective?

I don't think it's getting ahead of myself to consider honesty a virtue. If I asked you to list behaviours that are considered virtuous amongst Christians, I'm sure honesty would be on the list, and that's a great example of how it's common to all human cultures and supports my considering it 'objective'.

How is it not a virtue? I've given my argument (well, it's not really mine...) for why it is, can you show me how it could be subjective?

By the way, this is a great chance, in this new conversation, for me to work out where I stand on this stuff, which is all pretty new to me. I'm basically using Neeel and yourself as a sounding board to help me figure it all out, hope that's ok!


We are social animals and our socialising is facilitated by honesty (amongst other things). That's not how it ought to be, or not, it's just how it is. This is what I like about Virtue theory, it goes a long way to explaining what we observe in a way that most theological and the modern secular moral theories don't.

I don't agree here. As I said, they may be expressed differently in different societies, or may be satisfied by different requirements but they exist in all human cultures. They are objective standards of desirable behavior and qualities in humans. Who would disagree that they contribute toward what makes a person 'good'?

I'm not sure how something can be a 'fact' (a thing that is known or proved to be true) and still be subjective though, that seems contradictory.

Morality does not need to imply a law, that's exactly where Virtue Theory parts company with both the mono-theistic view on morality and the modern secular moral theories.

Rather than appealing to some abstract law (Elizabeth Anscombe saying 'that modern moral philosophy is misguided because it rests on the incoherent notion of a law, without a law giver'), or a divine law giver (as per Christianity and Islam for example) as a source of objective moral rules, Virtue theory asks 'What traits of character makes one a good person', and proceeds from there.

I think your focus on 'law' is evidence of the 'obedient' attitude that divine moral theories have inculcated in the religious. It's a way of thinking that has been encouraged over the centuries but why look for an external source for moral 'law' (using your word there) when the answer to what makes us good is actually within us?

I think Zumby has me on ignore.

It seems like you are using a strange definition of objective. Objective doesnt mean "something that most people agree on"

Objective means "not dependent on the mind for existence; actual:".

Honesty is generally considered a virtue, yes. That still doesnt make it objectively true.

your original question was

And I answered yes because there are people who dont call honesty a virtue, or situations where honesty isnt a virtue. So it is subjective to people and situations.

Also, in order to show that it was objectively true that honesty is a virtue, you would have to show that there existed , mind independently, such a thing as virtue , and that honesty also existed, and fell into the category of virtue.


Objective doesnt mean "the same everywhere"

There is a concept of honesty, that is generally agreed upon wherever you go. It doesnt exist outside of the mind.

There is a concept of Santa Claus, that is generally agreed upon wherever you go. Santa Claus doesnt exist outside of the mind.


If you want to go with "Most people agree that honesty is a good thing( or virtue) " then I have no problem with that. I dont think there is a need to bring subjective or objective into it. We can acknowledge that we are making stuff up, and that, under the definitions we have made up, our statements hold together.

Ok I'll try to pare down some of the points before I present my own view.

1. You are misusing the terms subjective and objective. Objective means "mind-independent" and subjective means "mind-dependent". So if morality is brought about by the mind of God then it is subjective. If it is brought about by facts about the world then it is objective.

2. I prefer not to use the terms subjective and objective, mostly because people seem to have very different understandings of what it means than the dictionary does. I prefer arbitrary and non-arbitrary respectively, as these seem to capture the essence of what we are trying to get at, without the confusion.

3. The is-ought problem is not such a big problem actually, but before I explain why you should understand that Hume was bringing it up to criticize the moral logic of priests. Here's an example:

P1) God loves compassion ("is" statement)
C1) Therefore we ought to be compassionate ("ought" statement)

Presented in this way we can see that the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises. You seem to be keen to invoke the is-ought problem for atheists, but don't seem concerned about it's argumentative force towards God-based morality. So here's my challenge: present your logical argument that (on the assumption God exists) we ought to be compassionate. Please present it as a syllogism (like my example) so that it is easy to follow the logic.

4. You came very close to recognising the problem with MBs purported "third option" in the dilemma. It is not a real third option at all, just a vapid attempt to construct a grammatically correct third answer. But it collapses into a restatement of the starting premises: that there is a God, who is good, and loves compassion. What we want to know is why a good God would love compassion? What is the property that compassion has that would make a good God love it?

I lean more infralapsarion (sublapsarian) than supralapsarian.

The term God's "will" is a very multifaceted one, and can't even really
be described in one English word.

I would argue that everything that happens is God's will.

From the Westminster Confession:

God from all eternity did by the most and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

keep in mind though, that God has his will of command, will of decree, his secret will and revealed will - at least these are theological terms that men use to describe the multifacets of God's will...

Okay. But again, I'll say that "You're sinning if you're wrong" isn't a particularly strong way of making this point.

I think that by introducing the accusation that Christians are sinning if they are wrong is more likely to cause a strong negative reaction than any positive reaction that you hope to cause. I understand what you're trying to accomplish, but I think the way you're going about it is incredibly ineffective.

But do you not see how it undermines your argument?

I can hold that "gays go to hell" while consenting with all of your claims 1-6. But that claim does not fit within a secular argument. So this argument is simply blind to that understanding.

If you're working under the assumption that homosexuality is not counter to the law, then you picked a poor passage to support your claim. Here is what you quoted:

I do not see how you can use this argument that includes "without neglecting the [other laws]" when trying to make an argument under the assumption that "the other laws" don't even include a prohibition on homosexuality. Thus, your explication of the passage is simply wrong.

--

I think you ought to reread the chapter. I don't think you've interpreted it very well.

What does it take to be compatible? There must be an alignment of assumptions. But a Christian-based theory necessarily comes with Christian-based assumptions that must be held for compatibility. It's not good enough to have an overlap of assumptions, but it must be a sufficient overlap.

I've noted a specific claim that would undermine an argument from a "Christian perspective" (assuming that "gays go to hell" is an acceptable Christian perspective), and would cause an incompatibility in the argument while still maintaining the soundness validity of each statement. So I don't believe that what you've presented is actually compatible, and you've made no argument to try to convince me that it is.

I'll come back to this in time.

From the Matthew Henry Commentary (~1700)

http://www.studylight.org/com/mhm/vi...ge&chapter=019

I see no reason for this to be treated as a theological innovation. We know that the etymology of the word Sodomy dates back to the 1300s and is apparently a fairly stable word.

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=sodomy

Maybe I should have said a few more words. If Christians believe that homosexual actions are against God's will, then doesn't it follow that expression disagreement with homosexual activity falls under obeying God's will? Now, you reject that claim, and that's fine. But if you accept it, then when you read what you wrote:

God's message of obedience to his will INCLUDES the prohibition of homosexual acts. So, as I said, what you're saying is not far removed from what Christians do, but there's just a different baggage associated with the words you're using. To speak out against the things counter to God's will falls naturally under what you're attempting to describe.

I only brought it up because you said the following:

I do not see this as fitting within your broader argument of Christians claiming that homosexuality is a sin. It is possible to claim that homosexuality is a sin while still allowing homosexuals the opportunity to live as homosexuals, open and free to love and marry whom they will.

Obviously, the minute you appeal to a metaphysical entity as the premise for what is morally right then nobody will ever be able to prove you wrong.

Which, by the way, isn't a strength. Rather the opposite.

It's not mine, it's WLC's as you well know, so there's no need to use words like 'purported'... that's just unnecessary.

NR, did you see this short thread about the Euthyphro dilemma. Clearly I came out of it with the wrong understanding about the 3rd option, perhaps you'll do better.

I think focusing a little less on the subjective/objective argument may be helpful to advance the conversation. I'd like to focus on what morality is to begin with, I think you're using it as a different concept than I'm envisioning.

I'm not confident in my views about this either, I really just have a concept of how I think it should work, but I guarantee I'm missing a lot.

I agree that it's just how it is.

I'm going to skip the objective/subjective stuff for now, but my question here is on your usage of "good." If we are talking about honesty say, all we can say is what honesty is, and what it does. To say it's "good", you're adding a virtue that doesn't necessarily exist. If you mean "good" in that it's a benefit, then yes, it's perhaps a benefit, but why does something that is a benefit need to be moral?

Morality in my definition is more than just a better or worse option reflected by the outcome of an action, there is a driving ethical force behind it that insists that this action should be done. To say something is better, or beneficial, doesn't imply that it should be done, and that it is moral. Like my example of adding salt to improve taste. It doesn't imply morality.

The facts here would be what the act is and what is accomplished by the act. If you are honest, you relay the truth. (Whether society functions better or not is subjective on how you view society and what your status is in the society, but I'm trying to omit this line of reasoning for now.)

If I understand this view correctly, then it is very appealing, and pretty much what I'm going for. I believe that they reject, at least in some sense, a "moral law" and focus on what makes a person "good", good being defined as admirable traits for a more pleasant society. Am I understanding this correctly?

I'm inevitably influenced by my beliefs, no doubt, but to use the term morality in it's intended sense to me means having a "law" which isn't logically coherent to me, since things just are what they are, there are no rules. If you follow the law you are moral and if you don't you are immoral, that to me is arbitrary and not based on anything more than perceptions. To say, however, that things work better in this system is perfectly fine, knowing that it may work different in other systems, and that the notion of "ought to do" is not present.

Anyone using the word "prove" when discussing "morally right" is has a good number of battles to fight themselves.

You could be right about my term usages, I'm sure I muddled them up, but I'd like to skip this at least for now and tackle the rest.

I would like to treat and solve these issues separately, as I think they are entirely different scenarios. Maybe God-based morality has problems too, but I'd like to solve one first then the other.

I wouldn't argue that we "ought to" in a mandatory sense, only that God would be pleased with us if we do, and unpleased if we do not. If you don't care to please God for instance, you ought not to do X. God loves/is pleased/wants us to do X. If we do X, God is pleased. The law arises from God's intention, so we "ought to" do X in that God prefers X. Without God, presuming God isn't just borrowing His views from an existing moral standard, there is no "ought to", things just are. X is X. We can say if we do X then Y, if we do not do X, then Z, but there is no moral imperative for either, despite the results. I'm not saying there are no imperatives, just not moral ones.

Yes, this is somewhat of a problem, and perhaps unanswerable. At least in this view we can acknowledge that God prefers one thing over another, and can derive a system which is better than another, based on God's intention, a rule of sorts. Why does God prefer one over another? I can't answer that because it's seemingly arbitrary. Is it good because God said, or did God say it because it's good? I'm leaning toward the first, it's good because God said, based on who God is, what He's like. Obviously we can't answer this question.

Is it subjective because God says it and we can disagree? I guess technically it's subjective in the sense that I can disagree, but we can at least know that there is a rule to begin with, only one which I disagree with. So there is a law, I just don't agree with it. In the other view, there would never be any law, so agreeing and disagreeing doesn't apply. Presumably though, if God set up the universe and He has intentions, that would supersede our own understanding, so it's not subjective as much as we don't understand it. Like OrP's example of counting the stars in the universe. Just because we don't know doesn't imply it's subjective, only that we are limited in our understanding.

Maybe it's more efficient if you don't answer point for point, but to just reply as you see fit, do as you like, I would like to hear your opinions on the "ought to" argument, especially for the atheist view.

I prefer to think of it as God uses everything that happens for His will, but it's close.

This is a good point, it's a bit simple minded to just sum up God's will into one notion.

I'm happy to skip this part of the discussion (since I don't feel the terms are very helpful) if you are going to stop using the terms.

If the is-ought problem is really a problem, then it is a global problem with justifying oughts in light of is'. The problem I have with the line you are taking is that you evidently don't consider the is-ought problem a problem for God-based morality but DO consider it a problem for secular morality. You can't have your cake and eat it. So I'm not keen to skip this and take all the argumentative burden. You have made a lotof unjustified assertions ITT so far and you kinda need to make good on some of them.

I'm actually OK with you making this move (for reasons I'll reveal when you have attempted to deal with the argument above) but this move is just as available to secular ethics. Why is it ok to say "well, you don't HAVE to obey God's moral imperatives, but He likes it if you do" but it is not ok for a secular morality to say something like "Well, you don't HAVE to maximise happiness, but it's better if you do". Again, you want to have your cake and eat it.

I'm not sure I follow this, but I'm going to skip it as I think it's just a restatement of your previous points.

Well... you aren't alone in this view, but I have to say I find it bewildering. What is so objectionable about the idea that God e.g. loves compassion for reasons, rather than on a whim? Are you aware that an implication of your view is that if God had (counterfactually) loved bigotry and rape, then bigotry and rape would be morally good?

I don't know why you are talking about subjectivity here. The quote you are responding to doesn't mention that word at all.

Since you obviously haven't been paying attention this is a debate with arguments. Arguments have premises that lead to conclusions. When those premises are metaphysical, there is by implication no way to show that these arguments are wrong.

But by all means. Who cares that people are being held morally hostage by premises that can't be proven wrong. That's just how morals work; now shoo back to the cotton fields etc.

Okay. If you think there is a stronger way of making this point, feel free to share it.

Meh. This is easily fixed.

(3*) These kinds of homosexual relationships do not have significant outside negative effects on others or on those involved.

Anyway, you continue to ignore the actual purpose of this argument. It is a way of showing that if you don't think that gays go to hell that it is sinful to condemn homosexuality. Thus, it just doesn't matter whether or how it applies to those who who do think homosexuality is sinful. So if you want to show that it fails, show this on grounds that are applicable to the former Christians.

Nope, I think my interpretation is spot-on and you are bringing up an element that isn't relevant to my point. Why does it matter whether the things they are practicing actually are part of the law or are only an interpretation of how to live out the law? Jesus' point is clear: focus on the weightier matters of the law and avoid letting the minor stuff interfere with that focus. I'll note that almost all of Jesus' examples are things that Christians generally reject as requirements, such as wearing phylacteries and fringed clothing, tithing.

This is incorrect. To say that an argument is compatible is only to say that it is not inconsistent with assumptions of that other view. For instance, if I say that the theory of evolution is compatible with Christianity I am not saying that evolution is based on explicitly Christian assumptions, but rather that the assumptions on which it is based are consistent with Christianity.

The frustrating thing is that as far as I can tell, at this point you have acknowledged that you actually agree with my conclusion. However, you keep on attacking irrelevancies of my presentation rather than focusing on the main issue. So I have presented two arguments for my claim. One argument focuses on the harm that results from Christian condemnation of homosexuality, and how this contradicts the Christian edict to love their neighbors. You have not showed how this condemnation is not harmful, nor how it is loving to cause this harm.

The other argument draws a lesson from Jesus' condemnation of the Jewish religious leaders who focused on outward manifestation of law rather than its internal purpose. Sure, some of those outward manifestations, at some times should still be practiced. Other times not. However, if you ever practice them solely as a point of law rather than as a way of being just and merciful and faithful, then you have lost the entire point. The continuing condemnation of homosexuality by Christians today is an example of this: no one can say why or how it exemplifies these virtues--rather they continue to condemn homosexuals purely by rote, as a way of fulfilling a rule rather than living a Godly life.

Okay.

Lol. I'll assume you aren't serious as you know how actual scholarship works. Quoting a single Christian devotional commentary doesn't show that "both Jewish and Catholic readings of the passage...both have a long history of reading it the same way."

I am not denying that this is an old interpretation of this story. What I'm looking for is evidence that it has always been considered the primary one.

I'm a bit confused here. I've been arguing that God's message of obedience to his will does not include the prohibition of homosexual acts.

Anyway, here I am describing a different way of approaching the Bible. It is quite far from the common practice of evangelicals who decide God's wills on matters like homosexuality and slavery by appealing to a few unclear passages in the Bible rather than the core of Jesus's teaching. If I want to know what God thinks about homosexuality, I won't focus most of my energies on a single verse in Leviticus, but on the overarching themes of Jesus in the gospels.

I also find it difficult to justify the claim that it is loving to claim that Christian homosexuals should stop living as homosexuals, openly and freely loving and marrying whom they will.

This is a perfect illustration of my point. You say here that you are not attempting to show that God exists. Rather, you are trying to defend two claims:
1) if theism is true, then morality is objective and
2) if theism is not true, then morality is not objective.

Let's grant (1) for now. Does that mean it is true that morality is objective? No, because God might not exist. But you say that you aren't trying to show that God exists, only that if God exists then morality is objective. Okay, fine. So you're not trying to show that it is true that morality is objective.

However, what about (2)? Earlier, I pointed out that there are many moral theories that posited moral objectivity. In other words, I claimed that these claims were also true:

3) If Kantian is true, then morality is objective.
4) If Platonism is true, then morality is objective.
5) If Cornell Realism is true, then morality is objective

and so on. Now, these claims are exactly parallel to (1). I am not here trying to show that the moral theories involved are true, only that if they are true, then morality is objective. Now, I take it that (3)-(5) are uncontroversially true. Thus, unless you disagree, then (2) is false.*

And this is the point I was making earlier about using an epistemic double standard. In defending your claim, you don't try to show that it is true that morality is objective, just that it follows from your beliefs. But in criticizing these other theories, you object that they are unable to show that it is true that morality is objective.

*Assuming a couple of other claims, e.g. that these moral theories are compatible with non-theism and are possibly true.

Do you think that the evidence for subjectivity is evidence against the existence of God?

Firstly, Im sure I've made assertions that are unjustified, I threw out a lot of ideas trying to get somewhere, thanks for taking many of these things lightly.

Now, would it be simpler if I just suggest the claim "morality only exists if God exists", because as you guys pointed out, I guess that's really what I'm arguing. (Only where morality is defined and upheld by an ethical component, not a general better world.) MB had earlier suggested (I think) a slightly less rigid definition of morality, which I can get behind.

My basic premise is that the "ought to" where a God exists, is that there is a way of conduct which is endorsed. God created the universe with these sets of conduct in mind, whereas without God, there is no outlined principles except that which we ourselves suggest, which are made in the absence of a general rule.

I believe you can say "don't have to" to either scenario, only that in one you're denying a rule, and the other you're denying something else, happiness or whatever else. I'm saying that morality is not inherent, and whatever we call morality is actually something else, not that we can only deny one ideal.
You don't have to obey God's imperatives, but they are just that, imperatives. On the other hand, you don't have to obey secular morality either, but there is no set of rules behind it to make it moral in the "ought to" sense. I don't believe there is a double standard here, I'm not trying to be biased, I think this is logical, so please bear with me if you disagree.

That does seem strange. Although, I can imagine a world where bigotry was accepted as the standard and someone would question a world where compassion was accepted. Presumably we would feel the same about those concepts if they were "moral", but that's not really what I was going for, more that God has a certain character of love, compassion, etc. and the rules are made from this.

So this is equivalent to

P1) God endorses compassion
C1) Therefore we ought to be compassionate.

Now solve the is-ought problem.

OK.

OK.

Well you say we "ought to" obey God's imperatives, but you haven't solved the is-ought problem that you believe scuppers secular morality. Do you not think this is a bit of a problem for your argument.

If you accept that, counterfactually, God could be both good AND love hatred, murder, bigotry etc, then isn't your claim that (your) God is good just a tautology? i.e. you don't believe that there is any valid independent metric by which we could say "Well a God that loved murder would be a bad god", so your claim boils down to a simple tautology of "God=God".