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Originally Posted by well named
doesn't the dispute about the 'hard problem' more or less boil down to whether or not you accept the intuition that there is something about conscious experience (qualia or the like) that is ineffable?
If you accept it, there is a hard problem
If you deny it, there is no hard problem
Yes, more or less. The HPoC asks "how and why does subjective experience (qualia) arise from sensory input". But we know, for example, the condition of blindsight is linked to (carefully avoiding "caused by", for the nits
) damage to the left V1 visual cortex. Patients with blindsight have no quale associated with vision - they consider themselves blind - but perform way way above chance when asked to 'guess' where an object is, or identify it's colour. Conditions like these suggest that qualia are reducible to, or caused by, or emerge from the physical structures of the brain. That doesn't really get us closer to explaining 'why' we have qualia, but should not give any comfort to mind/body dualists either. VS Ramachandran's "
The Tell Tale Brain" is a good, readable book for the layperson on this sort of thing.
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The basis of the intuition itself is just that it feels like the "transcendental unity of self-perception" (I always liked this phrase in Kant) is something real, and the difference in opinion on it is just how much weight you put on that intuition.
Every time Kant comes up I wish I'd read up on him, but my reading list for this year is already unmanageable. Can you (or anyone) recommend a sub-200 page introductory book on Kant?