This is, surely, a definitive feature of the white-collar Evangelical subculture. If it's not by C.S. Lewis or one of his clones, they haven't read it, they won't read it, and **** you for asking. Otherwise, of course they own a copy!

Yes, I wrote that random = no free will.

AaronW later informed me that his definition of free will explicitly includes 'something described by a probability distribution', for which meaning of 'free will' I obviously do not imply that random = no free will.

Yes, I think a random system means causation can not occur in the system, for all reasonable definitions of the term 'random system'.

Ideally, it isn't stochastic. The whole idea is having control, and the property of chance removes that element of control. Such considerations are taken into account only so that contrasts can be drawn between the different philosophies e.g., arguments for and against free will in determinism vs. indeterminism. There's a rather large crossover when there are overlaps like this one involving the discussion of chance, as is made evident by your confusion.

I didn't ascribe any notion of justice/injustice to a probability space. Here is what I wrote:

"How can we hold people morally responsible if they dont have free will"? Well, if you can't, then why is it okay to hold people morally responsible whose actions are the result of a random process? That doesn't seem any 'fairer' to me.

The 'fairness' here clearly (to me anyway) relates to the idea of holding people morally responsible for their actions, if their actions are random.

Let me give a concrete example. I roll a dice. I roll a six. You hold me *morally* responsible for rolling a six. That is, to me, unfair. If you disagree then 'fair' enough. Note that this is different from holding me responsible in some other way unrelated to morality, if we had agreed to some wager on the outcome of the roll for example.

Do you enjoy making false claims about those who are different from you? The recent uptick in the level of condescension from you is surprising.

Um...it's not false? And do you disagree with any of the bullet points in that OP?

Okay, then your definition of randomness is pointless for discussing this because you have already assumed the conclusion you are making.

Randomness as I always use it (and as used in mathematics, statistics and computer science) means lack of discernable pattern and lack of predictability, none of of these imply lack of cause, causability or intent. It doesn't even imply lack of deterministic process.

Sorry for misunderstanding.

You're deviating from the accepted definition. You have once again set the random model to be the actual decision.

Yes. Understanding is not linear. It is entirely possible for two people to understand the same idea in ways that are not comparable.

Seems that way.
Then I think we're done arguing. I hold that there is nothing in neuroscience nor my personal experience even mildly suggesting that all things going on in our 'mind' are not in our body. Do you understand that in the previous way of talking of making a decision, you effectively deny your cause-effect pain example? There you talk of a process, of what happens to produce a 'feeling', of determinism. Later you talk of the same mental processes (things going on in the brain) and deny causation, deny determinism.
As for the Y, I do not understand this. I think we need better definitions of what you mean by all that.
I am glad you see that it is is a false comparison. As for misalignment of beliefs, I feel you use the word belief in a way that does not match my use of the word belief.

In fairness to me, I did link to the definition of randomness I was using several pages back, w.r.t. stochastic processes. This is not assuming my conclusion.

The only known 'stochastic processes' occuring outside of pure mathematics are in quantum mechanics, and if people posit a free will that has some determinacy, and some indeterminacy as a result of quantum physics then fine.

Alternatively, people can posit an unknown 'stochastic process' which is not quantum physics, whether that be a 'soul', 'god', or some phenomena which physics can explain in the future but is not yet known.

Again, fine, if your definition of free will involves these stochastic processes, known or unknown, then there is nothing to argue about.

I have no definition of free will, because it isn't possible to make one based on random outcomes. I would never claim it exists.

In one setting, there is a clear causal link. Finger poked -> pain in finger.

In the decision-making process, the causal link is unclear. Where is the stimulus in favor of Y coming from? My hands? My feet? My spirit? It's not clear at all.

Riigght. And what does this have to do with the post you linked?

Do you mean that when Jibninjas drags out his nonsensical 'free will' hobbyhorse, he's just "understanding" what Chomksy does, but in a different way? And although Chomsky says he doesn't know what 'God' means, he still "understands"---in a different way---that humans are spiritual beings fallen out of union with God?

As I understood it, we had agreed that our decision *if it is the case that we have free-will* was the result of a combination of both determinacy, and non-determinacy? Is this correct?

Either we do not have free will and our actions are wholly deterministic, or we do have free will and our actions are part deterministic, part random process. Is that a fair statement?

My comment regarding fairness related to the argument that I have often seen posted that 'if we don't have free will, then we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions'. I guess you have seen similar comments around the forums? Let's assume that statement is true.

If we do not have free will, then our actions are purely deterministic. If we cannot be held morally responsible for deterministic actions, then it would make sense to me that one of the following two things is true:

a) We can only be held responsible for the non-deterministic parts of our actions; or
b) We cannot be held responsible either deterministic or non-deterministic actions.

If a) is the case, then we are being held morally responsible for a purely random element of our actions. This seemed to me, unjust.

If b) is the case then the statement 'if we don't have free will, then we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions' is neither here nor there, because we cannot be held morally responsible for our actions whether we have free will or not, or the statement is simply false, in which case it is also neither here nor there.

That's all I was getting at.

Here is the exact quote:

I agree that this is true. A probability distribution describes free will in that "I might do this" and "I might do that" are both possible outcomes for a particular situation. Therefore, there exists in that particular moment a probability distribution that describes the potential outcomes.

You are using "random process" in a way that is not consistent with your previous definitions. The link to stochastic process that you used before equates stochastic process with random process, and therefore a random process is a probability space. What does it mean that my actions are part probability space?

This is what I mean when I'm saying you're equivocating on the definition. You are intending "random process" not to mean the same thing that you linked, but instead an arbitrary process (such as rolling a die) which can be modeled in a certain way. The underlying theme here is that you can't get yourself away from the "arbitrary" nature of your position because you can't see how you're mixing up the two ideas.

Again, see "random != arbitrary" What does it mean that our actions are the result of a "purely random element"? You're using it in the sense of it being arbitrary. This is the same sense in which you used the dice rolling analogy.

If my interpretation of your statement is wrong, please fill in some details.

You clearly don't understand my comment. I'll use a strictly mathematical analogy.

Let U = {a, b, c, d, e}. There are times when we can use the comparing "is a subset of" regarding subsets. For example, {a, b} is a subset of {a, b, c}. This comparison "is a subset of" can only work in one direction. It is false to say that {a, b, c} is a subset of {a, b}. However, this comparison does not always hold between two arbitrary subsets. {a} is not a subset of {b} but also {b} is not a subset of {a}. This is what it means that the two subsets are not comparable. They might even overlap and be not comparable: {a, b} is not a subset of {a, c} and {a, c} is not a subset of {a, b}.

If you take by this analogy U = the set of all true statements regarding "human nature" (crossing our fingers and hoping that this is a well-defined set), where the statements you gave above would be represented by the a, b, c, etc in the analogy. I expect you will find that the subset of statements that Chomsky understands and the subset of statements that Jib understands to be incomparable. Now it may turn out that one holds all of the statements of the other, PLUS a few more, in which case they are in fact comparable. However, I think this is extremely unlikely. So I leave them as simply incomparable sets of knowledge.

Why?

Also, please define "free will" as precisely as you can.

You might say it's a purely probabilistic conjecture. All it takes it for Jib to have one piece of knowledge that Chomsky does not and for Chomsky to have one piece of knowledge that Jib does not for the two sets to be incomparable.

The process by which moral decisions are made.

Piece of knowledge regarding human nature. I don't know what makes you think that Jib has that one piece of knowledge that Chomsky doesn't.


I don't understand this. What's "moral decisions"?

And I don't know what makes you think he doesn't. I believe that the set of true statements about human nature is quite vast.

A moral decision is a decision which pertains to right and wrong in the eyes of God.

Pope John Paul II once stated "Each individual in fact has moral has responsibility for the acts he personally performs; no one can be exempted from the responsibility, and on the basis of it everyone will be judged by god himself." It is my understanding that this is basic Catholic and christian doctrine as well. I am not religious but I do believe man is a moral agent and I am rather confused by the arguments that I have read by many on this forum regarding free will. I will stick with one question for now. When are you attributing moral agency to a person's decision. Even the most basic decisions require some motivation or intention. I am so confused by the deterministic explanation or position on choices and decision making that I don't know where to start. I am merely looking for clarity, rather than an argument!

It doesn't matter. If you use either positon (free will or unfree will) in order to claim a person can't be held liable for his actions, then this will also be true to you the observer...thus you would not be liable for holding someone liable for their actions.

And so the spinning loop goes. In short; it doesn't matter.

Of course it matters! It matters if one chooses to marry somebody or endless other important and trivial decisions. It is of vital importance if someone decides to commit murder or suicide. Putting the law aside, it is a moral necessity to attribute culpability to a murderer, or if the person had no choice, it would be absurd not to.

In other words, you agree with the OP of that thread. (Since Jibninjas' "knowledge" of immortal souls surely outranks Chomksy's mere grasp of human systems and geopolitical realities.)