Thanks duffee
Am I right in assuming that on the topics of meaning or purpose in life, atheists who disagree with Rosenberg would mostly be emergentists? Or to quote a commenter:
Quote:
First, consider this. I have a car made of many different parts. None of them can “go fast”; they’re just parts. Does it follow that my car cannot go fast? Obviously not. Thinking otherwise involves a simple fallacy of composition. Professor Rosenberg, in my estimation, is committing a similar fallacy, not a simple and obvious one, but a fallacy all the same. The core thought is that if the rudiments of our physical nature and our causal history do not have purpose, then no purpose can arise. From ingredients entirely lacking in purpose, nothing can emerge that has purpose. But that seems plainly false. As a naturalist, I agree, I am wholly constituted of fermions and bosons—entities lacking in purpose. But I do things intentionally. So do all of you.
That seems reasonable enough to me, but it does seem to me that Rosenberg's nihilism with regard to free will or morality is not quite escapable in the same way, or at least not without changing the understanding of those concepts quite drastically. i.e in terms of morality it seems to me that Rosenberg must be correct that physicalism is incompatible with the idea of an absolute notion of morality. And it seems to me that compatibilist explanations of free will don't really have much in common with naive psychological notions of "free will". The compatibilist description is so different that it's not really the same thing, it seems.