Is a belief in god(s) Irrational?
Other than that, falsifiability does not "resolve the problem of induction" - as the only possible way we have of concluding that falsifiability works is through induction.
That you can construct perfectly falsifiable models that are nonsense is completely trivial. Falsifiability is not a good criterion for validity
The fact that you can come up with a hypothesis that is complete nonsense but can be falsified doesn't make falsifiability any less useful. It's not a stand-alone criteria.
Look, this is all very simple. You don't know what science is. You think you know, but you don't. Nor do you understand the more complex epistemological issues behind the various scientific methods. Your understanding is far below even that of a basic Method101 course in university. You should do yourself a favor and learn more instead of making a near identical post 40 times in a single thread.
Out of us two it's extremely likely that I'm the only one who has a) Published a scientific paper b) Conducted actual research (using empirical method I might add). c) Studied scientific method. The only advice I can give you is to learn more about the issue and be humble. All scientific methods have weaknesses, but they often complement each-other excellently.
Firstly, I haven't said anything about scientific validity so I don't know why you're saying "Falsifiability is not a good criterion for validity.", yeah I agree but to quote you "This has no relevance to anything I said". Second, falsifiability does resolve the problem of induction, in that if you can't falsify an idea then you can't ever know if it's wrong and any scientific result becomes that much less reliable. A hypothesis that can't be proven wrong isn't very Useful is it (Capitalised because Useful is another scientific criteria) Of all the underlying principles that inform the scientific method, falsifiability is one the most important because of this, but a theory that can't be falsified is probably going to fail to meet other criteria too.
I agree that falsifying theories make them more reliable, but that is not really the issue. The issue is that falsifability isn't the end-all of science or a completely necessary criterion.
If I sit with other researchers and discuss potential ways of modelling or understanding a subject, I'm doing science. If I collect data to further our understanding, I'm doing science. If we use those data to make conjecture, we're doing science. If we do a literary study on a subject we're doing science. If we do a quantitative study to broaden our understanding of a subject, we're doing science. If we build a simulation to test a model or potential variables, we're doing science. If we do observations to see if our variables seem valid, we're doing science.
None of those things are based on falsifiability, most of them are not even empirical. They're all still important parts of the scientific progress.
And in some cases empirical studies are less useful than other approaches. In pain research for example, phenomenology (basically asking people how things are) generates more useful data than measuring bodily responses, but it is impossible to falsify phenomenological method. In other cases falsifying the theory is not yet a possibility, that doesn't make it unscientific. Biology, in its infancy, was very difficult to test in experiment and in many cases still is. It's still was and is one of the most useful fields in science.
I wrote the reply on validity in response to Neel, who brought up the term. Albeit in quotation marks, so he didn't necessarily mean scientific validity, but I responded as if he did.
I agree that falsifying theories make them more reliable, but that is not really the issue. The issue is that falsifability isn't the end-all of science or a completely necessary criterion.
If I sit with other researchers and discuss potential ways of modelling or understanding a subject, I'm doing science. If I collect data to further our understanding, I'm doing science. If we use those data to make conjecture, we're doing science. If we do a literary study on a subject we're doing science. If we do a quantitative study to broaden our understanding of a subject, we're doing science. If we build a simulation to test a model or potential variables, we're doing science. If we do observations to see if our variables seem valid, we're doing science.
None of those things are based on falsifiability, most of them are not even empirical. They're all still important parts of the scientific progress.
And in some cases empirical studies are less useful than other approaches. In pain research for example, phenomenology (basically asking people how things are) generates more useful data than measuring bodily responses, but it is impossible to falsify phenomenological method. In other cases falsifying the theory is not yet a possibility, that doesn't make it unscientific. Biology, in its infancy, was very difficult to test in experiment and in many cases still is. It's still was and is one of the most useful fields in science.
I agree that falsifying theories make them more reliable, but that is not really the issue. The issue is that falsifability isn't the end-all of science or a completely necessary criterion.
If I sit with other researchers and discuss potential ways of modelling or understanding a subject, I'm doing science. If I collect data to further our understanding, I'm doing science. If we use those data to make conjecture, we're doing science. If we do a literary study on a subject we're doing science. If we do a quantitative study to broaden our understanding of a subject, we're doing science. If we build a simulation to test a model or potential variables, we're doing science. If we do observations to see if our variables seem valid, we're doing science.
None of those things are based on falsifiability, most of them are not even empirical. They're all still important parts of the scientific progress.
And in some cases empirical studies are less useful than other approaches. In pain research for example, phenomenology (basically asking people how things are) generates more useful data than measuring bodily responses, but it is impossible to falsify phenomenological method. In other cases falsifying the theory is not yet a possibility, that doesn't make it unscientific. Biology, in its infancy, was very difficult to test in experiment and in many cases still is. It's still was and is one of the most useful fields in science.
I really don't know if we're even disagreeing. I never said that falsifiabiility is the end-all of science or a completely necessary criterion", I said that a hypothesis cannot graduate to the level of 'theory' without being falsifiable. I did ask earlier ITT if we are using the word 'theory' in the same way.
And there are in-betweens. String theory, as an example, contain many elements that are falsifiable but those tests can't tell us if the universe is made of strings. Then you have hypotheses that are hypothetically falsifiable, which are "merely" awaiting the technology or advances that makes the experiments possible, but they're so heavily supported by evidence that it's still unproblematic to call them theories. And then you have other theories that are based on elements that are solidly falsified, but which ultimately are based on standing on the shoulders of those theories to jump to the final conclusion - cosmology and astrophysics contain a fair bit of those (as far as I know).
And your view does have some other issues. I have no issue declaring evolutionary biology a scientific discipline, but much of it is not falsifiable. Indeed, inductive reasoning is a big part of it (meaning you look for supporting evidence / lack of evidence instead of experimental tests to falsify your hypothesis). That doesn't mean it lacks rigor or is a weak field. Its contributions to science have been close to invaluable.
And maybe most importantly on all. Any scientific theory, law or hypothesis can be reduced to components where some are not falsifiable. Nothing survives philosophical skepticism.
I should point out that I'm aware that there are many different scientific standards, but wouldn't you agree that the vast majority of scientists adhere to a 'true' version of Philosophical Naturalism, and by that I mean that although some try to include a supernatural element, most don't. And, interestingly, the number of theist scientists isn't consistent across the sciences. The more a science explains our origins and how things work, such as Physics, Geology and Biology, the fewer theists there are, and theist scientists are in a minority to start with.
My view is that Science that adheres to a hard naturalism is the most effective precisely because of it's limits. The supernatural can't be falsified, so what use are conclusions that include a supernatural element? Surely, and now I am introducing into my argument the question of scientific validity, what use is a conclusion that can't easily be demonstrated to correspond to what we observe, as something like Gravity or ToE can?
Confused here. If something has actually been falsified, then it's wrong and will never be accepted as a theory. Falsifiability is identifying a way that could falsify something, not actually doing it.
ToE meets all the criteria AND has ample evidence to support it. That's why it's called a theory and not a hypothesis. Which parts of it are not falsifiable? The first time you find any fossil in a place it shouldn't be and in a way that can't be explained consistent with ToE, you totally falsified ToE.
And regarding 'Philosophical skepticism', I haven't claimed that science can provide absolute truths.
My view is that Science that adheres to a hard naturalism is the most effective precisely because of it's limits. The supernatural can't be falsified, so what use are conclusions that include a supernatural element? Surely, and now I am introducing into my argument the question of scientific validity, what use is a conclusion that can't easily be demonstrated to correspond to what we observe, as something like Gravity or ToE can?
Confused here. If something has actually been falsified, then it's wrong and will never be accepted as a theory. Falsifiability is identifying a way that could falsify something, not actually doing it.
And there are in-betweens. String theory, as an example, contain many elements that are falsifiable but those tests can't tell us if the universe is made of strings. Then you have hypotheses that are hypothetically falsifiable, which are "merely" awaiting the technology or advances that makes the experiments possible, but they're so heavily supported by evidence that it's still unproblematic to call them theories. And then you have other theories that are based on elements that are solidly falsified, but which ultimately are based on standing on the shoulders of those theories to jump to the final conclusion - cosmology and astrophysics contain a fair bit of those (as far as I know).
And your view does have some other issues. I have no issue declaring evolutionary biology a scientific discipline, but much of it is not falsifiable. Indeed, inductive reasoning is a big part of it (meaning you look for supporting evidence / lack of evidence instead of experimental tests to falsify your hypothesis). That doesn't mean it lacks rigor or is a weak field. Its contributions to science have been close to invaluable.
And maybe most importantly on all. Any scientific theory, law or hypothesis can be reduced to components where some are not falsifiable. Nothing survives philosophical skepticism.
And your view does have some other issues. I have no issue declaring evolutionary biology a scientific discipline, but much of it is not falsifiable. Indeed, inductive reasoning is a big part of it (meaning you look for supporting evidence / lack of evidence instead of experimental tests to falsify your hypothesis). That doesn't mean it lacks rigor or is a weak field. Its contributions to science have been close to invaluable.
And maybe most importantly on all. Any scientific theory, law or hypothesis can be reduced to components where some are not falsifiable. Nothing survives philosophical skepticism.
And regarding 'Philosophical skepticism', I haven't claimed that science can provide absolute truths.
I should point out that I'm aware that there are many different scientific standards, but wouldn't you agree that the vast majority of scientists adhere to a 'true' version of Philosophical Naturalism, and by that I mean that although some try to include a supernatural element, most don't. And, interestingly, the number of theist scientists isn't consistent across the sciences. The more a science explains our origins and how things work, such as Physics, Geology and Biology, the fewer theists there are, and theist scientists are in a minority to start with.
My view is that Science that adheres to a hard naturalism is the most effective precisely because of it's limits. The supernatural can't be falsified, so what use are conclusions that include a supernatural element? Surely, and now I am introducing into my argument the question of scientific validity, what use is a conclusion that can't easily be demonstrated to correspond to what we observe, as something like Gravity or ToE can?
My view is that Science that adheres to a hard naturalism is the most effective precisely because of it's limits. The supernatural can't be falsified, so what use are conclusions that include a supernatural element? Surely, and now I am introducing into my argument the question of scientific validity, what use is a conclusion that can't easily be demonstrated to correspond to what we observe, as something like Gravity or ToE can?
Personally I hold that naturalism is simply unnecessary. Sure you can tip-toe around it and claim it holds merit as methodology and method, but the fact of the matter is that it isn't needed. Empiricism covers all the bases of naturalism with none of the baggage.
ToE meets all the criteria AND has ample evidence to support it. That's why it's called a theory and not a hypothesis. Which parts of it are not falsifiable? The first time you find any fossil in a place it shouldn't be and in a way that can't be explained consistent with ToE, you totally falsified ToE.
And regarding 'Philosophical skepticism', I haven't claimed that science can provide absolute truths.
And regarding 'Philosophical skepticism', I haven't claimed that science can provide absolute truths.
And I didn't talk about "absolute truths". I said you can reduce them to pieces which can't be falsified.
A suggested "study" I can give you (and anyone else interested) is to read about the Raven paradox, which very elegantly shows the limitations of both inductive reasoning and falsifiability in one small example.
It's not an assumption, it's a paradigm, no different in that respect to 'god exists'. Science is simply one of many of the epistemic standards that are used for acquiring and understanding knowledge, and within science itself there are different standards by which that is done.
Can we falsify the Naturalistic paradigm? No we can't, but that's ok because it's just a container for scientific theories, and it's the theories themselves that need to be falsifiable, they need to play by the rules, not the paradigm itself.
If, however, ToE wasn't falsifiable, among other things, then it couldn't be considered a reliable explanation and no matter how much evidence was offered, it wouldn't be called a theory.
It's not an assumption, it's a paradigm, no different in that respect to 'god exists'. Science is simply one of many of the epistemic standards that are used for acquiring and understanding knowledge, and within science itself there are different standards by which that is done.
Can we falsify the Naturalistic paradigm? No we can't, but that's ok because it's just a container for scientific theories, and it's the theories themselves that need to be falsifiable, they need to play by the rules, not the paradigm itself.
Can we falsify the Naturalistic paradigm? No we can't, but that's ok because it's just a container for scientific theories, and it's the theories themselves that need to be falsifiable, they need to play by the rules, not the paradigm itself.
Totally disagree. It's my view that we didn't start to make true progress in understanding what we observe until we engaged the Naturalistic paradigm through Methodological Naturalism. Once we moved from the 'god' paradigm, which fails most scientific criteria and is mostly Useless for explaining anything, we started to become more knowledgeable.
'Corrective' is another scientific criterion, so ToE having been partially corrected doesn't make it non-scientific, it's exactly the opposite, it's just another reason why it's solid science. One of the many reasons that the god paradigm isn't scientific is that it's not corrective. How would you correct the god paradigm?
I'm just pointing out that I am healthily skeptical, in fact, I lean towards deep skepticism as my general epistemic outlook.
Already aware of it thanks. I think you're making some incorrect assumptions about my knowledge of Epistemology. It's a good example to mention but all it demonstrates is the limitations of both [simple] inductive reasoning and falsifiability when performed from an armchair, but ToE wasn't devised from an armchair, or in a void, hence my constant mention of also requiring evidence (and there is a very large body of evidence to support ToE) to support a hypothesis.
If, however, ToE wasn't falsifiable, among other things, then it couldn't be considered a reliable explanation and no matter how much evidence was offered, it wouldn't be called a theory.
I'm just pointing out that I am healthily skeptical, in fact, I lean towards deep skepticism as my general epistemic outlook.
Already aware of it thanks. I think you're making some incorrect assumptions about my knowledge of Epistemology. It's a good example to mention but all it demonstrates is the limitations of both [simple] inductive reasoning and falsifiability when performed from an armchair, but ToE wasn't devised from an armchair, or in a void, hence my constant mention of also requiring evidence (and there is a very large body of evidence to support ToE) to support a hypothesis.
If, however, ToE wasn't falsifiable, among other things, then it couldn't be considered a reliable explanation and no matter how much evidence was offered, it wouldn't be called a theory.
So according to you ToE is not scientific and not a theory.
This is simply the price for being bombastic and dealing in absolutes. If you're not willing to pay it, you're not being honest.
I did?
Large swaths of ToE is inductive and not falsifiable.
How most current species evolved is not falsifiable, it's induced from fossil records and supporting evidence in biology. Here is one example: You can't falsify how whales evolved. It's history. Maybe in a million year life-span you'll be able to falsify how they evolve, but that's something else entirely.
So according to you ToE is not scientific and not a theory.
This is simply the price for being bombastic and dealing in absolutes. If you're not willing to pay it, you're not being honest.
How most current species evolved is not falsifiable, it's induced from fossil records and supporting evidence in biology. Here is one example: You can't falsify how whales evolved. It's history. Maybe in a million year life-span you'll be able to falsify how they evolve, but that's something else entirely.
So according to you ToE is not scientific and not a theory.
This is simply the price for being bombastic and dealing in absolutes. If you're not willing to pay it, you're not being honest.
But no one is dealing in absolutes here, certainly not me.
I gave you a method for wholly falsifying ToE. As I already said, the fact that some elements of ToE have been corrected isn't a fault, it's how science improves through being corrective. If it wasn't corrective, it wouldn't be labelled as a theory.
But no one is dealing in absolutes here, certainly not me.
But no one is dealing in absolutes here, certainly not me.
For something to count as falsifiable, you have to be able to setup a suitable test. This is the absolute mainstay of established empirical method.
Most elements of ToE certainly stands on the shoulders of falsifiable claims, but the main conclusion of ToE is not one. I know you can find blogposts, speeches and essays that beg to differ, but they're simply not correct. It's the same limitation that makes history essentially a non-empirical discipline.
These people, like you, want both worlds. They want falsifiability and empirical method to be the end-all and be-all of scientific endeavors, and they want their favorite theories to qualify. In doing that, you are contradicting yourselves and opening the doors for anti-science nuts to crush you in debates.
Inductive reasoning is an integral part of science. Without it you'll pretty much be unable to say anything. Failure to admit this or to look at it as "weakness" is just folly. Accept it and the limitations it brings and move on.
If it could be shown that organisms with identical DNA have different genetic traits.
If it could be shown that mutations do not occur.
If it could be shown that when mutations do occur, they are not passed down through the generations.
If it could be shown that although mutations are passed down, no mutation could produce the sort of phenotypic changes that drive natural selection.
If it could be shown that selection or environmental pressures do not favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals.
If it could be shown that even though selection or environmental pressures favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals, "better adapted individuals" (at any one time) are not shown to change into other species.
(Source: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Falsif...y_of_evolution)
Also, we've witnessed evolution occurring, both macro and micro, and in all cases it has followed predictions.
Most elements of ToE certainly stands on the shoulders of falsifiable claims, but the main conclusion of ToE is not one. I know you can find blogposts, speeches and essays that beg to differ, but they're simply not correct. It's the same limitation that makes history essentially a non-empirical discipline.
These people, like you, want both worlds. They want falsifiability and empirical method to be the end-all and be-all of scientific endeavors, and they want their favorite theories to qualify. In doing that, you are contradicting yourselves and opening the doors for anti-science nuts to crush you in debates.
Inductive reasoning is an integral part of science. Without it you'll pretty much be unable to say anything. Failure to admit this or to look at it as "weakness" is just folly. Accept it and the limitations it brings and move on.
This is factually incorrect, and you're distinguishing between ToE's 'main' conclusion and specifics, and that's just a distraction. Evolution has three main principles, variation, heritability and selection, and any of the following circumstances would falsify ToE:
If it could be shown that organisms with identical DNA have different genetic traits.
If it could be shown that mutations do not occur.
If it could be shown that when mutations do occur, they are not passed down through the generations.
If it could be shown that although mutations are passed down, no mutation could produce the sort of phenotypic changes that drive natural selection.
If it could be shown that selection or environmental pressures do not favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals.
If it could be shown that even though selection or environmental pressures favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals, "better adapted individuals" (at any one time) are not shown to change into other species.
(Source: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Falsif...y_of_evolution)
Also, we've witnessed evolution occurring, both macro and micro, and in all cases it has followed predictions.
No you don't, you simply have to identify something, even just an idea or an argument, that would prove your hypothesis wrong.
This is wrong, see above.
Nope, you're still just failing to understand the role of falsifiability and all the other criteria that I haven't really gone into detail about. Eg. a theory must be `Predictive, Corrective, Internally and externally consistent, Useful (this one's a biggy), Testable, Repeatable.
If it could be shown that organisms with identical DNA have different genetic traits.
If it could be shown that mutations do not occur.
If it could be shown that when mutations do occur, they are not passed down through the generations.
If it could be shown that although mutations are passed down, no mutation could produce the sort of phenotypic changes that drive natural selection.
If it could be shown that selection or environmental pressures do not favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals.
If it could be shown that even though selection or environmental pressures favor the reproductive success of better adapted individuals, "better adapted individuals" (at any one time) are not shown to change into other species.
(Source: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Falsif...y_of_evolution)
Also, we've witnessed evolution occurring, both macro and micro, and in all cases it has followed predictions.
No you don't, you simply have to identify something, even just an idea or an argument, that would prove your hypothesis wrong.
This is wrong, see above.
Nope, you're still just failing to understand the role of falsifiability and all the other criteria that I haven't really gone into detail about. Eg. a theory must be `Predictive, Corrective, Internally and externally consistent, Useful (this one's a biggy), Testable, Repeatable.
You think induction is "problematic" and however much you object, this makes it impossible for you to defend science. If we can't induce, we can't do science.
I've also said multiple times that ToE meets every criterion to be called a theory and you haven't demonstrated a single instance of it not doing except your repeated and totally incorrect claim that it can't be falsified. Of course it can.
I think induction, even inference to best explanations is problematic if you need a reliable conclusion. A scientific hypothesis may start with an inductive conclusion, but it can never become a theory unless it can be falsified, to protect against an inductive conclusion that could be right or wrong to the point of being useless, or to quote Popper "it makes no difference whether it is true either way.".
I've shown you how the idea of ToE can be falsified multiple times now. You're disagreeing with every Evolutionary scientist on the planet, and yes I know that's basically an appeal to authority, but it's ok to do that sometimes.
I've also said multiple times that ToE meets every criterion to be called a theory and you haven't demonstrated a single instance of it not doing except your repeated and totally incorrect claim that it can't be falsified. Of course it can.
I think induction, even inference to best explanations is problematic if you need a reliable conclusion. A scientific hypothesis may start with an inductive conclusion, but it can never become a theory unless it can be falsified, to protect against an inductive conclusion that could be right or wrong to the point of being useless, or to quote Popper "it makes no difference whether it is true either way.".
I've also said multiple times that ToE meets every criterion to be called a theory and you haven't demonstrated a single instance of it not doing except your repeated and totally incorrect claim that it can't be falsified. Of course it can.
I think induction, even inference to best explanations is problematic if you need a reliable conclusion. A scientific hypothesis may start with an inductive conclusion, but it can never become a theory unless it can be falsified, to protect against an inductive conclusion that could be right or wrong to the point of being useless, or to quote Popper "it makes no difference whether it is true either way.".
I have never said ToE is not a theory. It's one of the most solid and valuable theories in science. I'm pointing out that according to your criteria, it is not.
I've already agreed that induction pays a part in science, but, again, a theory isn't a theory if it can't be falsified.
Popper: Scientific theories cannot be proven outright – they can only fail to be disproven, and this means pointing out what evidence could disprove the theory. If a theory cannot be disproven, such as with Russell's Teapot, it makes no difference whether it is true either way.
No, 'my' criteria are what make it a theory. Your understanding of my argument is completely the reverse of what I've been saying, consistently, throughout the entire conversation.
Induction isn't a problem, if it's a problem you should probably stop debating right away since it's pretty much impossible say anything without it. The mere view that something can be true or false (the absolute minimal requirement for falsifiability) is in itself induced, perhaps even abduced.
I think this is fairly uncomplicated. Your arguments on this issue aren't consistent. You see inductive reasoning as "problematic" and you want falsifiability as the end-all criterion of science, and this leaves you unable to adequately a) justify science b) defend how science can actually say anything.
This includes your multiple references to "the problem of induction"?
Induction isn't a problem, if it's a problem you should probably stop debating right away since it's pretty much impossible say anything without it. The mere view that something can be true or false (the absolute minimal requirement for falsifiability) is in itself induced, perhaps even abduced.
I think this is fairly uncomplicated. Your arguments on this issue aren't consistent. You see inductive reasoning as "problematic" and you want falsifiability as the end-all criterion of science, and this leaves you unable to adequately a) justify science b) defend how science can actually say anything.
Induction isn't a problem, if it's a problem you should probably stop debating right away since it's pretty much impossible say anything without it. The mere view that something can be true or false (the absolute minimal requirement for falsifiability) is in itself induced, perhaps even abduced.
I think this is fairly uncomplicated. Your arguments on this issue aren't consistent. You see inductive reasoning as "problematic" and you want falsifiability as the end-all criterion of science, and this leaves you unable to adequately a) justify science b) defend how science can actually say anything.
I even quoted Popper explaining why falsification is so important, and even that hasn't moved you. Do you disagree with him?
My argument has been consistent all the way through. You have to agree that an inductive conclusion can never be logically valid, where a deductive conclusion can be. Right there is a problem caused by inductive conclusions.
I even quoted Popper explaining why falsification is so important, and even that hasn't moved you. Do you disagree with him?
I even quoted Popper explaining why falsification is so important, and even that hasn't moved you. Do you disagree with him?
I think Popper makes a good case for how empirical method should look , but he overstates it as the only viable method in science. But for the record, you are on several key issues contradicting Popper. Popper doesn't mind unfalsifiable statements and admits that these has to be part of most scientific theory, for example.
For more overarching views on science I'm much more partial to Thomas Kuhn, who is more interested in admitting the epistemological weaknesses of any scientific method or paradigm. That approach lays the groundwork for a much more solid and honest approach to methodology.
I think Popper makes a good case for how empirical method should look , but he overstates it as the only viable method in science. But for the record, you are on several key issues contradicting Popper. Popper doesn't mind unfalsifiable statements and admits that these has to be part of most scientific theory, for example.
For more overarching views on science I'm much more partial to Thomas Kuhn, who is more interested in admitting the epistemological weaknesses of any scientific method or paradigm. That approach lays the groundwork for a much more solid and honest approach to methodology.
He's well worth getting into, one of the most referenced academic authors in existence and for good reason. I think few people can read Kuhn and not approach science a bit more humbly afterwards, which is a good thing.
I think "it's importance can't be overstated" is mostly rhetoric. I agree that empirical method it is extremely important and a very valuable tool, but it is not the end of all things. A case study wouldn't qualify as science according to Popper, but few would disagree that case studies are an extremely important part of medical research. Generalizable? No, but they can steer research based on actual evidence, which can be just as important.
Then it'll be interesting to see if my view changes but I haven't come to this discussion in a vacuum with no previous knowledge.
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