Quote:
Originally Posted by Original Position
Your view (correct me if I am wrong), is that in each of these criterion, the "I" doesn't refer to anything real. So sure, thoughts happen, memories happen, presentness happens, etc., but they are not related in an important way to an "I."
Correct.
Quote:
My view is that the "I" does refer to something real--it refers to the relations between the thoughts, memories, presentness (which are grounded in a physical brain) and so on such that they are experienced as connected. The most obvious manifestation of this is in memory, where I experience past thoughts in my brain as having been thought by the same mind as the one having the memory, or past events in my life as having happened to me.
But that's not an "I", it's simply the experience of a pattern that suggests a relation between thoughts, memories etc. In the selfing process we relate these memories and patterns to an I in a way such that we say "I am present, I remember this event, I experience the memory, etc."
Quote:
However, the crucial point is that the reference of the "I" is not part of the intuition that you think is relevant. If I think it refers, then I have to point to something that can sustain the actions you think our intuitions associate with it.
Yes, it's circular. An experience that appears and disappears and contains the pointing to an I, and the I exists only in and as that pointing. So there is an incessant movement that is never fulfilled (the I can never find itself). When we actually witness the appearance of that context, then we witness that it's literally like a story is being written anew spontaneously and instantenously each time it reappears.
Quote:
It seems to me that I am just not getting what you mean by the "intimate intuition self." Here's one stab, is it the sense of "I" that Descartes was concerned with in the cogito?
I've never read Descartes except in interpretations, but the way I understand "cogito ergo sum" is that yes, he commited the fallacy because he was held hostage by the intuition. If he weren't then I think he would have concluded that there is "just thinking."
Quote:
I'm not really sure how these other uses of the word "self" differ from the intimate intuition. They seem to me much the same--although obviously they offer different accounts of how to make sense of this intuition.
According to you, I don't actually believe in the intimate intuition self.
The other uses are ideas that make sense relative to practical purposes. Whether you believe them or not is irrelevant to the intimate intuition, which is believed regardless of your intellectual inclinations. For example you can have the intellectual understanding that there is no free will, but still you will experience life as though you do.
You do believe in the intimate intuition, but it's unreflected, you're viewing the world from within the sense of self and because you're too close to it it appears like it is essential to existence and you can't differentiate sufficiently to see that it is actually just another experience. Instead of relating the investigation towards yourself in the most intimate sense possible, you think about what it means to be a self from within intellectual models and thus don't address the intuition in an intimate sense. This is what I meant in saying that the intellect deflects you from the actual looking.
Quote:
People have offered various thought experiments meant to convince us that we are really immaterial souls or physical bodies. Others have claimed that the definition I am offering doesn't do justice to our intuitions about the permanence of the self.
You lost me here. I don't see how you answered my question: "If you define self as a variable collection of events, things and experiences, then I wonder how there can be a way to falsify the claim that you are a self." In other words, if you say that self is about a variable collection of things, and that even if one thing goes out of existence, the self remains and can even expand towards other things that come into existence (I lose a part of my self when my milk teeth fall out, and gain a part of my self when new teeth grow) then it seems that I can't really ever falsify the claim that I exist.
Quote:
I disagree. I think I can experience fear without being aware that I'm experiencing fear. Thus, I think that using subjective introspection about our mind is a limited methodology. Furthermore, the discovery of the unconscious and the role of pharmacology in therapy have both shown the limitations of introspection as a method of discovery about the nature of the mind.
There is awareness of fear, but the experience is so subtle that you don't notice it and thus can't articulate it. I'm not sure what the unconscious has to do with the topic. Are you saying that the "real self" might be hiding in there?
Quote:
Well, when I said that it was a simplistic form of empiricism I wasn't really thinking about it not including objective evidence (although that is a legitimate point). Mainly I meant that as a method of subjective investigation (what philosophers call phenomenological research) it is extremely naive to think that all you do is just pay attention to what is going on in your mind. Just as in regular science we develop hypotheses and then use experiments to test them, you should do the same with your subjective investigation. Thinking that instead you just "pay attention" to your mind is like people who think that science is done by just "looking" at the world.
For phenomenological research it is required that we approach subjective contents without an agenda and let the content show itself without us imposing a premature interpretation. The task at hand is extremely simple. If anything, the goal should be to make it as simple as possible.
As a hypothesis you can try "the subjectively experienced self is an illusion created by a biological organism" and see if it's consistent with reality. But the thing is that this strategy will in itself not facilitate no-self realization. You might be able to convince yourself of the truth of the hypothesis, but the problem will remain, because this strategy is limited to the intellect.
I recommend Metzinger's work, which I think will satisfy your desire for a non-simplistic empiricism. His no-self is the same thing as I explain, but unfortunately it's not within his focus to point toward a realization of no-self that goes beyond an intellectual representation.