Warren argues convincingly that today’s thinking about macroeconomics, especially by non-specialists such as journalists and politicians, tends to be a muddled mix of economic wisdom today’s era of fiat currencies and flexible exchange rates and from yesterday’s era (pre-1971) era of gold-backed currency regimes. Warren believes that we pretend that governments that have fiat currencies and flexible exchange rates have constraints –such as the need to balance budgets and current accounts over time — that in fact they don’t have.
Warren is fond of noting that the US government, as the issuer of currency, can spend without limit. He favors government spending at times when such spending can lift the economy towards full employment. His thinking fits broadly under the New Keynesian rubric. Warren’s writings maintain the assumption that the Federal Reserve (as the only branch that can issue currency) and the Treasury (which spends) are independent in name only, and that institutional restrictions such as debt ceilings and no overdraft provisions can be safely ignored. I see no reason to disagree with Warren, though he should point out that, at least in theory, the Treasury can go broke.
Warren assumes that the government can invest effectively. This is no doubt true in theory, but, in my view, the evidence doesn’t support it. In my view, there is nothing correlated with high inflation rates so well as high budget deficits. There are a number of possible reasons for this, but the most compelling to me is that government tends not to spend money effectively.
Warren has a level of optimism about the United States that I don’t share. He is not particularly worried about the dollar. He thinks that the world demand for dollar assets is firmly grounded. By contrast, I think the dollar could tank at any time and, if that happened, I think it would be very damaging for the typical American and I don’t think there would be any countervailing forces pushing towards dollar strength. The US economy is unviable in the realm of international trade and a big decline in the dollar (let’s say 50% over two years) would not make it substantially more viable. The only immediate consequence would be a huge increase in the dollar price of oil, and our demand for oil is mostly inelastic. Warren underplays the oil/commodities angle, in my view, but he does recognize that the true costs of perceived budget irresponsibility would be a run-up of oil and commodity prices, and he favors pursuing an aggressive energy policy.
I’m beginning to have doubts on the wisdom of running large deficits for extended periods. I will have a blog about this in the next couple of weeks. Essentially, my thinking is that the economic case for running very high deficits in the US over the next seven years or so is weakly better than the economic case for running moderate deficits. There are also, however, political risks to running high deficits for extended periods, and I think these move the pendulum away from the “very high deficit” policy. I’ll have more on this in a later blog. For his part, Warren does seem to recognize the dangers of big governments — he notes that, too often, governments equate “very high deficit spending” with “big expansion of government”, when in fact aggressive tax breaks (like his plan to temporarily kill the payroll tax) work at least as well.
Fisher Black encouraged students to “imagine a world without money”. Money often clouds thinking and prevents people from seeing through to the underlying reality. At the end of the day, an economy is only as good as its underlying production functions. Warren, I think, believes that improving an economy’s long-term levels of human capital, physical capital, and technology are the really important things, and we often lose sight of these calls by introducing somewhat muddled thinking about money and government finance.
Warren says that we “don’t owe China anything more than a bank statement.” He thinks default to foreign lenders unlikely and unnecessary, and argues that these debts are mostly numbers in an account until foreigners convert them into real assets or real goods and services, which requires a willing seller. Warren implies that the debt to the Chinese will be inflated away to some extent, but he underplays the cost of this inflation to the rest of the economy. I find his attitudes here, as in many other areas, a bit too cavalier. For example, he implies that the entitlement crisis is overstated because, when push comes to shove, the government can always fund Social Security or Medicare at any level it desires just by printing a check. The problem, though, is that entitlement benefits can’t be inflated away — they require a real transfer in purchasing power. Warren recognizes this fact, but underplays it to support his broader argument that there is no use pretending that we have to pay for things like entitlement programs with taxes or borrowing, when in fact we have many more degrees of freedom than that. We can choose to pay for programs with any combination of an inflation tax, a real tax, or borrowing, and the exact amount that we “pay” for the programs will in reality be determined by how much that add to or subtract from our broader societal capabilities.