US v. DiCristina update
12-21-2013
, 08:34 AM
12-21-2013
, 12:31 PM
Quote:
Can anybody help me understand why the non-superfulity argument of statutory construction did not succeed in Us v DiCristina in appeals court?
A well-recognized canon of construction requires courts to read statutory provisions so that, when possible, no part of the statute is superfluous. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 876 (4th Cir.1996) ("A court should not — and we will not — construe a statute in a manner that reduces some of its terms to mere surplusage."); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 582 F.2d 834, 841 (4th Cir. 1978) ("traditional axiom that courts should not interpret statutes in a manner that renders terms of the statute superfluous"). (U.S. v. CHILDRESSNo. 96-4122. 104 F.3d 47 (1996))
The appeals court opinion essentially rendered Section 2 of the act surplusage & superfluous. Its strange because this argument was made in the Applicable Law discussion section but I do not see any point else in the opinion where it was addressed
A well-recognized canon of construction requires courts to read statutory provisions so that, when possible, no part of the statute is superfluous. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 876 (4th Cir.1996) ("A court should not — and we will not — construe a statute in a manner that reduces some of its terms to mere surplusage."); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 582 F.2d 834, 841 (4th Cir. 1978) ("traditional axiom that courts should not interpret statutes in a manner that renders terms of the statute superfluous"). (U.S. v. CHILDRESSNo. 96-4122. 104 F.3d 47 (1996))
The appeals court opinion essentially rendered Section 2 of the act surplusage & superfluous. Its strange because this argument was made in the Applicable Law discussion section but I do not see any point else in the opinion where it was addressed
Beyond the cynical observation that Federal Appeals Courts (especially the 2nd Circuit) these days rarely interpret Federal criminal statutes in a way that limits Federal authority or benefits a criminal defendant, there is not much else to say. You are absolutely right that the 2nd Circuit completely avoided addressing this basic principle of statutory interpretation as it relates to section 2 of IGBA. Being cynical once again I could speculate that this is because there is no logical way to square this principle with the ultimate decision. Apparently to the 2nd Circuit, a list of examples is nothing more than a helpful hint, and helpful hints are, also apparently to the 2nd Circuit, not "superfluous" even if they have no relevance to a statute's interpretation.
Mr. DiCristina has asked the US Supreme Court to accept an appeal of the 2nd Circuit's decision. The PPA and others have filed briefs in support of this request (the briefs are available for reading at the PPA website http://theppa.org/special/dicristina-legal-documents/). Unfortunately it is well know that the US Supreme Court takes less than 10% of the cases requesting a hearing before it, so the odds are against us. But since Justice Sotomayor (at least) is well known to be a poker aficionado, maybe we can beat the odds this time.
Skallagrim
