It would seem that Mason is saying that the keeping size of the pot smaller preflop is what made the whole hand (as played) postflop +EV versus taking a standard line preflop and inflating the pot with another 7 (or more) small bets.

Lets just talk about the flop and the math on the flop. I think we all agree that 3b on the flop would be more correct, and Mason says he would not fault either play (3b or not 3b). Then we can put together some math and see if this is all plausible. We can treat Mason's line as conjectured optimal and see if it stacks up.

These particular flop cards are in all scenarios. Once we determine the advantage (if any) of Mason's lines against a flop of 644, then we can compare that to other kinds of flops and see if we think Mason is giving up too much EV in general versus other less favorable flop scenarios.

I believe the whole pot size question boils down to whether or not the overly loose and aggressive player to Mason's left will raise with his two overs ON THIS FLOP regardless of pot size. I think several posters have questioned this, so I will make that a scenario as well.

1)Mason instead raises preflop and gets a flop with these exact flop cards:

In this scenario Mason would have taken a more standard line and raised pre and was called by 6 players. This scenario involves c-betting flop and having Pinocchio raise to clear the field. If Mason could raise pre, get this flop, still c-bet flop, STILL have Pinochio raise and THAT still clear the field then raising pre would still earn more money as a pure strategy. The odds presented to the other 5 players MUST be too good for them to fold certain holdings such as any two suited overcards, any overpair, or especially any suited straight draw like 75suited, or maybe even AKo. If we think Mason's exploit of the player to his left would work, even in a bloated pot, then the whole discussion is irrelevant.


2) Mason keeps the pot smaller

2a) As played preflop, limp the sb, and flat the raise from BB. So here must be some math on the flop that justifies the exploit of the player to his left. Now we must entertain the possibility of Mason's line being optimal, given this exact flop.


2b) Mason keeps the pot smaller and gets this flop but his donk bet is flatted by the "overly loose" player to his left. Entirely plausible. Same math but Pinocchio has cut the strings.


Now we put the math of each situation together and look at the hands from the perspective of the odds given to the other 5 players:

Scenario 1)
Pot contains 21 small bets. Mason c-bets the flop. Now everyone has at least 22:1 odds to call a single bet, and at least 12:1 to flat if there is raise. Of course there can be 3 bets and that is the "shootout" that Mason was trying to avoid. What are some hands that should call or raise on this flop with these odds? There must be ranges of continuation hands here other than trips or an overpair, for the other 5 opponents besides Mason and the player to his left.

Scenario 2a) As Played...

Pot is 14 small bets, Mason donks the flop, Pinocchio raises and the other 5 players are presented with odds of 17:2 on flatting the raise from Mason's left. Given this exact flop, what are some hands that would flat with these odds. What about reraise? Would anything other than trips or a full house reraise here? Also, would anyone be holding AA and not capped it pre? Will JJ or QQ fold here, such that Mason's play forced a better hand to fold? Or would a shootout be likely with these holdings, anyway?

2b) Mason's ploy fails, and overly loose player to his left flats instead of raises.
Now, the other 5 players are presented with 16:1 odds to call the bet. Given this exact flop there should be a range of holdings that can call correctly BUT WOULD HAVE TO FOLD CORRECTLY in the alternate scenario 2a above. Otherwise, once again there is no point to having this play anyway.

Actually lets give one of the other 5 players JJ and see how it looks in this scenario as well as all the scenarios. JJ is a hand that Mason should get to fold out, otherwise he is only talking about folding out overs that missed, on a very specific flop, with a very specifically exploitable player to his immediate left.

Scenario 1) Mason bets (or checks) and an opponent with JJ bets and everyone (including Mason) has at least 22:1 odds on that bet. This should be a shootout and anyone with an overpair is going to showdown.

Scenario 2a) Mason donks and Pinocchio raises. For Mason's ploy to be viable, I think the JJ must be assumed to fold his JJ when presented with 17:2 odds. Idunno, what do you guys/gals think, would you fold your JJ here? I think a calldown might be in order. But I think Mason should need to show the a hand slightly better than his TT should fall victim to his strategy, otherwise just raise pre.

Scenario 2b) Mason donks, Pinocchio flats, and JJ gets 16:1 to call and will probably raise and start a shootout anyway. Oh well!

From what I can see in these scenarios, it is questionable that an opponent holding JJ will fold in any of these flop scenarios. Mason's version does present a player holding JJ with the worst odds to continue with, but if JJ does not fold there, then there is not much going on here.

Actually, I think Mason's strategy could work better with pocket 88 and have a better chance of folding out 99 or TT. Also Mason's strategy could work great on a flop with more draws, even if one card was above a ten. This precise scenario of a 644r flop should make his opponents play pretty straightforward, even if the player to his left raises.

If we are trying to induce a mistake from an exploitable player to our immediate left, that very same mistake could cost us money if one of the other 5 players would have made an even bigger mistake (such as calling with 77 or 88 or 99). We make more money from 77 88 and 99 than we do from KJ.

I see where Mason is going, I just don't know if enough opponents are still headed there as well for it to be overall +EV.

There is certainly quite a lot to talk about in this "Hand to Talk About"!

While I still do think expecting one of the other five players to fold JJ is speculative, especially since they also know the player to Mason's left is "too loose and too agressive", that much is all debatable. However, there is quite a lot going on here that is more interesting possibly than just using an opponent as a unwitting cooperator.

If a player is "too loose" and simply plays more hands from more positions than can reasonably be assumed to belong in a sophisticated range from those positions, such a player is really displaying a sort of starting-hand range confusion. Experiencing enough live hands against such a player to be able to predict what hands they are playing would be a monumental effort, and totally unnecessary anyway.

This is because being "too loose" is an entirely dominated strategy versus playing proper ranges, especially in limit poker.

There is no alternate strategy required to play against such a player. They will lose money with those extra hands they are playing. Trying to counter this by altering our ranges would likely be a fools errand.

The unwitting accomplice was in the BB and Mason limped and then flatted from the SB, so in fact the designation of "too loose" never applied in this hand. He or She was simply "too aggressive".

Really?

Now we get to the real conjectured exploit. Mason predicted the likelihood that a player will take a future action that is not necessarily a mistake, but a choice.

Rather than being "too loose and too aggressive" the player was in fact too predictable. This player is not balanced.

Bigggg difference.

Mason predicted that the player, based on past hands and the preflop action in this hand, would likely limit his/her choices when presented with these three options:

1) Be the preflop raiser AND fold outright to my first bet on this flop.

2) Be the preflop raiser AND flat call my first bet on this flop.

3) Be the preflop raiser AND RAISE my first bet on this flop.

Mason knew ahead of time that the player to his left would be highly likely to take curtain number three.

Now when a player that should have multiple choices instead can be reasonably predicted to take a single choice, we can alter our strategy for pure profit above what profit we normally would make with our previous strategy.

The way we do this is to switch our full poker strategy (which allows them all choices) to a strategy that REQUIRES them to take that choice.

When one player has only one choice but the other player has all choices (here Mason could choose to check or bet the flop), this is a toy poker game. Toy poker games are rigged. Usually a player with more choices and the opportunity to act first will always profit in the long run.

This also illustrates how Mason will regain his lost bet prefop with more money after the flop. Mason gets to combine different portions of his value range, not just this specific hand of pocket tens, but lots of different holdings that could work on lots of different flops.

If the player to Mason's left was not required to raise in our toy game exploit, then Mason would arrive at the flop with the following several sections of his range of possible hands. Note that every section of range is defined by the options Mason has to choose from, and bounded by indifference to taking an alternate action.

Bet and re-raise value range (May include draws and may include capping)...
Bet and call value range (May include draws)...
Check and call value range (may include weaker value and weaker draws)...
Bet and fold bluff range (may also include certain specific value hands)...
Check and fold range...
Check-raise bluff range (may include back door draws)...
Bet and Re-raise bluff range (pure air)...

The frequency that Mason chooses each action is defined by the location of his hand in these ranges, plus other complicated considerations. To make a profit, Mason must have arrived at the flop with the right hands to put into these ranges. Then he must know which hands belong where. This is, I believe, a (0,1) game theory beauty contest.

Each range has a different expected payoff, some ranges are more profitable than others. Obviously the cap range will earn more money than the check call range. The check fold range could only ever earn a pot if everyone else checks back. So on and so forth.

All of these ranges have expectation value and that value depends on knowing what hands belong where, and finishing the hand without a future mistake that gives away profit.

Now comes the exploit of Mason's new adjusted strategy.

The player to his left is required to raise....

Now he can move hands up in his range from less profitable to more profitable locations. This is purely +EV even when Mason does not wind up winning the hand. So long as the player to his left is highly likely to choose curtain number three, he will earn more from the times it works than the times it does not work. He can still win or lose the hand with his pocket tens (and many similarly valued hands in his overall range).

If I were Mason, I would watch for a tell that this player likes his/her hand and then keep the pot size smaller preflop with the portion of my range that would likely reside in either a check-call or belt-fold range on most flops. This situation could happen not infrequently. Pocket tens might be *too good* for me to choose that option, but 66 77 88 JTs QJs sure might be!