uhhh monker is a 'gto solver'

There's no multiway gto (except vs colluding opponents but that has little practical use )

ok but it uses a similar algorithm to pio. that's why i used quotes. it's pseudo-gto or ngto or whatever you wanna call it.

In any case its value is limited, especially in good games, because so much bad (passive) play has massive collusive effects. But that's not something that's well understood/documented and it's probably not a good idea to discuss it in a public forum

What is your argument against the dealer reading villains hand if hero explicitly asks?

I suspect he wants to drive anyone having fun away from the room

I guess if they explicitly ask I’m okay with it, but dealer shouldn’t automatically read first tabled hand. Reading the tucking hand is part of the game.

Are you talking about implicit collusion, a.k.a "schooling"? Andy Morton was writing about it in rec.gambling.poker twenty years ago.

Yes, but probably not the way you're thinking about it. I'm not suggesting these dummies gain an edge by playing bad, but they do gain a collective edge against a marginally profitable subset of the pseudo GTO strategy that relies on others in certain positions playing reasonably.

Eg. I had a situation the other day where someone who thinks she plays good moved to my left and started cold calling me with all kinds of trash. She's spewing money against the top 80(?)%+ of my range (and to the blinds she's letting in cheap), but with her on my left playing too much junk passively and blinds being invited in I can no longer play a part of the pseudo gto optimal range profitably despite it being great for me if I adjust and just play stronger hands.

You could argue that the impact of an opponents suboptimal decision is amplified by having more players left to act but there's nothing about the scenario that amounts to what is conventionally understood to be collusion.

I can see myself misapplying this information. I'll just stick to working on gathering and improving my reads and plugging obvious leaks.

Maybe I'll take a look at this Monker but probably not.

Thanks!

mon- stinky has a bad read here and is leading you astray.

Yes misapplication is always possible, but consider he hasn't used the program and is creating a strong opinion.

Having used it for like 6 months I can't imagine insisting it's no good.

Agree with BK. Monker is eye opening, though putting it into practice successfully has proven to be difficult for me. It requires some significant shifts in thinking.

For example, in a simple Button vs. Blinds scenario, Monker says CAP ~ 30% of your range after a button open, SB raise. Depending on the flop, it then checks 50% of the flops? It becomes maddeningly complex to try to figure out why the sim does what it does, but when you dissect the ranges you appreciate just how balanced it is.

Practically, I've found the heuristics outlined in Phil Newall's works are much simpler to incorporate compared with trying to mimic Monker GTO in a live game.

Yeah I mean incorporating a solver strategy in live poker is nuts. You'll never randomize correctly. Just understanding how it constructs its strategy is helpful to get the brain working, though.

I do agree that action ranges a la Newall is far easier to implement in live poker and doesn't sacrifice much versus a more complex strategy.

Not to put words in his mouth but I think Pete is just saying that monker will not magically make you better. It’s just a tool and if you don’t know how to apply it, it can be dangerous like any tool. That said if you are already a good player, monker will give you new insight.


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heres an idea I had today after getting buttoned for 8th time. let me know why this wouldn't work.

For all heads up hands the button is randomized. so if someone wants to quit when a game goes form 3h to 2h that last free hand is 50-50.

It wouldn't work because you won't be able to convince a site to implement it.

that wasn't my perception of his position.

Felt more like he didn't think the strategies from it were gto related nor worth trying to learn from them because they aren't GTO and will be misapplied

I guess my main point re:monker is that if you trust it and try to apply it to good games thinking you're playing GTO so it can't be bad, you'll not only miss a ton of exploitive EV but you'll occasionally own yourself. For example, pseudo GTO button opening ranges do really poorly against a loose passive (cold calling) SB.

They have value to guys like you. They have little value to a guy who plays mostly 20/40 live and doesn't have aspirations to play online or in (mostly nonexistent) high stakes live games. I guess if his game is often shorthanded that's a different story.

He also said he's not a computer guy and I'm pretty sure there isn't a single person who doesn't completely geek out on this stuff who has had any success using solvers. That might change as they improve user friendliness.

I could see it implemented, maybe initially for high stakes, on stars. They understand how big of a disincentive it is to play when you know others are playing the buttoning game.

Even a 6max random button game could work. They don't have to implement it on all the tables initially.

Do you mean that a Nash Equilibrium doesn't exist, or that the program in question has no functionality for calculating one?

There's no strategy that is guaranteed not to lose. Theres a Nash equilibrium that assumes your opponents are colluding but it has no value. The multiway "GTO" solvers are useful with caveats but aren't Nash

There is always a Nash equilibrium if there are a finite set of players and the space of pure strategies is compact. I don't know what it means for an equilibrium to assume your opponents are colluding.

It is true that multiplayer games need not have Strong Nash Equilibria (meaning that 2 or more opponents cant collude in a way that they all profit at the expense of the others).

If you assume your opponents are colluding it becomes a 2 player game (you vs the opponents) and there's a Nash equilibrium where you minimize the amount you lose against perfect colluders. But you lose a lot and knowing that strategy is mostly useless.