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Originally Posted by tame_deuces
Assuming a mind that perceives/generates a universe is not a more "improbable" proposition from assuming a universe that generates a mind, in any way.
Right, neither assumption is justifiable. Thus, solipsism.
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The only reason you claim this must because you reliance on some perceived "complexity" notion that one must be more probable than the other, but this is exactly the territory where Kant shows how rationalism comes short - when it relies on empirical inquiry and can be used to disprove and prove itself at the same time.
My reality is indistinguishable from the contents of my mind. Thus, "reality" in any sense that I can refer to it, means the same as "my mind," in the broadest sense that I can refer to it.
A computer cannot display the Eiffel Tower. A computer can only display a graphic representation of regions of its own memory. We, sitting external to the computer, can say that the graphic representation corresponds to the Eiffel Tower. But the computer cannot know that. The computer only receives its data - and the data itself is the only information it has about the source. It cannot tell the difference between a photograph and a sufficiently detailed fantasyscape.
We have a tendency to assume that we are different. But here, that's not the case. When I think of the Eiffel Tower, I am only accessing my memories of the Eiffel Tower. If I am standing under the Tower, looking up, then I can also access visual inputs of the Eiffel Tower. But I have no direct access to the Tower.
The argument from simplicity is an argument from utility, not an argument from utility, not an argument from probability. You (and Kant) are continuing to clearly miss the point based on those characterizations. Of course I'm not talking about the probability that solipsism is "really true;" I don't believe it is meaningful for me to talk about "really true" in the first place.