^Enter Berkeley.

Among properties of particulars, to be specific.

For clarity I'll use your terms in the below question.

If the property of redness in some particulars (e.g. apples) is instantiated in other particulars (e.g. blood) is this system of measurement (of redness) solely created by the mind?

If yes, you're a nominalist. However this position does not explain qualitative similarity at all. Rather it denies it's existence and substitutes it with - it is a fiction of the mind. This is inadequate for many philosophers because relations are universals too and relations exists independently to the mind (e.g. the European continent is - north of - the African continent, regardless of whether there's any mind to say so; many particulars can be north of many other particulars, and these particulars share this property).

Colour seems to be a highly technical and complex issue (of which I'm ignorant), and clarity is probably the last thing that will be achieved by using it as an example. I don't see what's wrong with sticking to length/distance as an example.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zgh34j6

I clicked on your reference , which leads to artists and their relationship to color. They do find the scientific relationship to color as a non starter and anyone who attempts to paint on using the idea of angstroms and all would be maddening.

The scientist measures color via waves of angstrom units and even speaks to colors not seen beyond the red and violet horizons which are measured in angstrom units. This is all well and good but the artist....

The artist has a relationship with color as if viewing a natural setting one can see that the presentation of depth is facilitated by using light violet in the distance. Contrasts in color are presented when a yellow is next to a dark blue it accentuates the blue whereas blue by itself would not seem so intense.

I believe that there are some scientists who see this activity as a fabrication or illusion because the angstrom units of blue or yellow or violet, in fact, are all the same, no matter where they are.

A "lie" , or "trick' only places the shallowness of the idea that "measurement" can speak exclusively to the world. Not to say that one shouldn't measure but one should also know the limitations.

After all, the fact that the man is 6 feet tall and weighs 170 pounds tells us very little. A square may be 16 square inches in area but if I say that a man is 276 square inches in area we still know very little.

Color is truth, stands on its own, and doesn't need the angstrom unit to clarify it in entirety. The real scientists in the world of color can be appreciated in your museums and walls of your own home, so to speak.

The "mathematics of quality' is futuristic and can only be a pointer for the mathematicians to explore.

Note Turner and the way the color spreads and decreases in hue which gives the impression of depth (better word) . to define a painting or life itself via the angstrom unit, or meters or weight is a falsehood but does have a quarter truth which is why so many believe.

https://www.william-turner.org/the-complete-works.html

Yeah, we can't even agree on how to spell it FFS.

Interesting article.

are-colors-innate-or-learned/

Think this may have been touched on, but this is where I just arrived at.


Just because two particulars share resemblance does not imply that this quality of resemblance is an existent universal.

You can have two types of bird that share qualities identifying them as such/similar i.e. birds. But a universal bird does not exist… The mind can create for itself a prototype of a bird. Even if we dig deeper to examine the exact qualities of a bird wingness, beakness, squakness, etc.. we still must concede that in each these qualities a prototype must be created in the mind. It to me seems, the mistake of the realist is to assume that a “universal quality” is a quality that is replicated in nature and can be found exact, when held *"under a scope"(although maybe it can???, Im not in the business of looking under scopes).

Might have went of the rails here, but I submit in hopes that I can avoid re-reading this thread and allowing my eyes to gloss over again.

*"under the scope" is to say that an absolute quality can be discerned.

Edit: I just seen this talk by Steven Pinker on birdness that was pretty cool. called concepts and reasoning, worth a look I think..

damn too late to delete.. Got my definitions mixed up.

edit: Or I didn't, or I dunno, heh

Resemblance or difference between any two (or more) things is a relation; for it denotes a certain type of relation between those things. The relation of resemblance - how much one thing resembles another - is a universal itself. Resemblance does not exist in the world in the sense that a tree, rock, bird or any particular exists. Resemblance, at the same time, is not solely created by the mind. A rock would resemble another rock more so than it would resemble a tree, regardless of whether there's a mind there to "create" any such resemblance. So then the obvious question here is: where does resemblance exist? If not in the objective, and not in the subjective?

The mind does not create the prototype that two rocks resemble each other more than they resemble a tree. By extension, it does not create the prototype of birdness. That prototype, if you will, exists independent to the mind. Yet does not have existence in the world, in the same sense that rocks, birds, trees and other particulars do.

Did you say the difference between two or more things is a universal? If then…. By tautology I think the nominalists must concede.

How much one thing resembles another is a relation, but I always figured relations to be the antithesis to universals... then again that’s just me.

Yes.

You're right, in that for a long time, only adjectives, such as red, blue, round, rigid, etc., were considered universals.

More recently, relations have also entered the mix.

Why? Because relations don't exist in the same sense as objects such as trees. They exist in a different sense. In the same sense as numbers and adjectives. Russell uses the example of how Russias relation to Croatia would be - north of - regardless of whether any human was there to say so. This indicates that relations do not exist only in the mind, nor do they exist in the world, since once again - they don't exist like trees and other objects in the world. They are thus universals.

Another reason they're universals is because Russia is also north of Pakistan and - north of - can be instantiated across numerous locations, in the same sense that redness or any other adjective can be in multiple things.

So I came across this idea again, and as such rabbit holed myself back to this thread. I will say I left dissatisfied last time.. I realize as well that I am relaying the same argument though phrased differently/thoroughly.

Even and odd numbers - before their categorization of such - are equally distinct. Yet with the axiom of, even and odd, we can produce a distinction/similarity model.

I think a leap must be taken to tie universality to the axioms succeeding it.

Seeming disagreeable, I don’t mean to degenerate this into a claim of solipsism, but on the same token I don’t think we can easily claim there is some underlying universality (outside of observable axioms) here either.

Was thinking on it a bit was curious on anyones take/or just some more content..

Said my peace, until next year

The distinction between odd/even numbers you could (somehow) argue is mind-dependent (/or subjective). However, is this the case for all distinctions?

For example, the distinction between planets and stars...

Our best models of the way in which our solar system developed would suggest that planets and stars have remained distinct - even before humans were around to suggest so. Their distinctness, in fact, was necessary to the creation of our planet; and subsequently, our evolution.

So then...there are mind-independent distinctions, with real-world effects...

What about the distinction between difference and similarity (/resemblance)?

Which is it?

thanks for op. never heard it explained in concrete terms, just what's wobbling in my head.

nominalist.

through the brain we know that there are atoms, and that atoms make the brain and there is randomness at the subatomic.

we "learn" redness through the senses, which evolved through time. this co-evolution is what makes it seem like red exists in some external realm. we can always "break it down". the objective is tonmake the universe "intelligible" and to ise the brain to "break it down" for us. realism and Plato's idealism simple do not break it down enough.

idealism works if the idea center is the individual brain, which is then "broken down". similar neurons fire with the image of Bill Clinton, whichbis further evidence that we evolved with similar sight and "impressionism" (for lack of a better word) within the brain. my spin on Plato. wouldn't brain scans adequately describe redness?

Concepts such as redness, counting numbers, etc. may have "grandmother cells".

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grandmother_cell

Do you agree that the relationship of even numbers (being mind-dependent) is not a universal?

The relationship between even numbers?
What relationship?

Like the relationship between one even number (E.g. 2) and another (e.g. 4)?

This would be a relationship of similarity (resemblance)/difference.

Resemblance is a universal.

Hope this helps:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images

I see. To realists relationships are synonymous with universals (this had to be hammered in, as I am not naturally a realist) but to nominalists, the mind cannot be separated from the reality wherein the mind operates.

Arguing beside each other?

There's a lightbulb moment to be had perhaps, in understanding universals.

It comes from questioning the existence of resemblance/difference; of questioning - where does resemblance/difference exist?

Human bodies exist in the objective world, as objects in the world - in the same sense as a tree, a rock or apple.

Opinions exist in the subjective world, in the same sense as beliefs and emotions. If you want to be difficult you might instead classify opinions as existing objectively (materialists) - but it really doesn't matter; it's one or the other at the least.

What about resemblance/difference? What about - in addition to, in subtraction to, to the left of, to the right of, similar to, different to?

Do these exist in the objective world? in the subjective world?

Closer consideration of these questions will lead to the conclusion that they neither exist solely in the subjective world, nor solely in the objective world.

Without humans (/without the subjective), stars and planets are still different to each other. We know this, because their interactions give birth to our solar system and to us - the difference between stars and planets pre-dates the subjective. Therefore, resemblance/difference does not exist solely in the subjective. Yet in the same vein, resemblance/difference does not exist as an object in the world (/objectively) - in the same sense as a tree, a rock or human body.

So where does it exist then? if not subjectively or objectively?

Universals are all things like this.

To better elucidate the nominalists view:

I think disregarding the terms objective world, and subjective world may be a better illustrator of the confusion…

Questioning where objects/objecthood exists.

Objects in a sense - can be said - to exist in the subjective world. As a categorical entity. It’s how we may reconcile bundle theory. This reconciliation comes at a price; the observer is an, inescapable filter, to the observed.

See: The problem of substance.