Quote:
Originally Posted by ToothSayer
I define iPlane as the plane on which abstract ideas exist.
Problem solved.
Non real-ness for things that exist isn't a problem for math. Why should it be for philosophy?
Quote:
Originally Posted by VeeDDzz`
You don't perceive or experience maths in the world, in the same sense that you experience redness for example/qualitative similarity.
I disagree. There is nothing more fundamental than counting. Do I have one apple or two? The quality of there being "1" or "2" of something is no less real than the quality of something being "red" or "blue"
Qualitative properties are precisely like math. The are repeatable, objectively verifiable observations about structure and relations between structure.
If you do define a "color" dimension, then where something sits on that color dimension is an abstractly measurable quality.
Just like if you define a "y" dimension, then where something sits on that y dimension is an abstractly measurable quality.
There is no difference between those two observations. Both could be equally false or non-existence. Both can be tested by referring to other minds, or by measuring using an apparatus.
Space and the properties of something within 3 dimensions is no more real than color. Yep nominalists have no problem calling spatial observations ("this object occupies this part of space") real. Why? I cannot see a difference between them. They are both minds perceiving and naming a property it's capable of perceiving and naming.
Last edited by ToothSayer; 07-01-2017 at 07:24 AM.