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Originally Posted by DrunkHamster
Again, I don't really understand what you're saying. What would it mean to be a Platonist about 'Yes/No/Maybe'? I presume I'd have to accept that Yes, No, Maybe are real objects, which doesn't even sound grammatically well formed to me.
You tell me. You're the one positing that nonphysical "forms" of some kind exist in a "somewhere" you can't describe. I agree it's not grammatically well-formed. We're 2500 years beyond Plato and his naive ideas.
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You may say the same about numbers, for instance; but I think it's pretty clear that we do, in the course of ordinary language, refer to numbers as objects, and there is at least no unintelligibility in saying that I believe 1 exists.
I can as easily say that I believe "truth" exists, or that there exists a "negative" and an "affirmative." Of course I don't - I think Platonism is all nonsense. But you're the one picking and choosing. If you want to consider it real, you get to - but if it's inconvenient, then you can claim it's nonsensical. Can you provide a rational distinction?
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I'd also challenge your assertion that 2 and 4 need to be applied to some units in order for them to be intelligible; I just don't think they do - I can certainly conceive of them as being independent objects (if it helps, you can imagine them as their set theoretic constructions, or the set of all pairs/quadruples) and if you can't, I'm not sure what to say to you except commiserations.
And I challenge your assertion that you can conceive of them being independent objects. All Platonists of all kinds claim to have some special independent knowledge of these supernatural "objects" they see - but I don't think they do. Plato believed that all chairs were just expressions of an essential "chairness," and he believe that he was "in contact" with this "chairness" - I believe that Plato's concept of "chairness" was actually derived from the chairs he interacted with, and that if Plato had never interacted with a chair, he would have no conception of "chairness." This is more an epistemological question than a subjective question.
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The objection seems self defeating as well; what's a unit anyway
If we perceive it all within a linguistic framework, as description rather than metaphysical "truth," then there is no contradiction. "Unit" is a label that human beings have devised because it's useful, just as "4" is a label that human beings have devised because it's useful.
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Sure, I'm inserting value here with my 'just' qualifier. But that doesn't mean the value isn't there. You can compare mathematicians to theists all you like,
I'm not comparing mathematicians and theists.
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but the fact is that maths has been instrumental in the discovery of all of the most accurate and empirically verifiable theories of the world we have - can you say the same about theism?
No, but I can say the same about language. But this is nowhere near analogous - I'm not talking about maths, I'm talking about mathematical realism. Mathematical realism hasn't been instrumental in the discovery of anything. And I do think it's very much the same as theism.
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If you really do believe that mathematics is entirely a construction of the human mind, can you possible explain how, to pick just one example out of many, Dirac managed to predict the existence of antimatter using nothing but this human construction? If maths isn't out there, how come nature seems to conform to it to such a high degree?
I think my responses in
this post and
this post answer these questions.