Uh, sure he can say that. If he hadn't responded to it then the state of affairs would have been different. A different action would have resulted in a different outcome.

We haven't. Most cultures have no concept of free will, or "feeling" of it. Many of us even in Western culture where it's shoved down our throat have never had this "feeling."

Let's assume free will is true. Why do so many people never feel like they have free will? Why isn't this feeling universal, like self-awareness?

It "must" be that way given the set of causal factors (including random determinations) that led to the result. If those factors had been different, then it would have been a different way (and that would be the way it must have been as a result of those conditions).

Free will as proposed by libertarians violates the laws of physics, so yes, it does require dualism. Physics is stochastic or outright deterministic and always involved a mechanism, free will is noncausal and has no mechanism.

You can't have your cake and eat it, too.

Great. Then sit down and figure out why you think they're mutually exclusive. If you find that your reasoning is valid, put it into a propositional form and prove it. Otherwise, don't go around claiming that x and y are mutually exclusive unless you can present a clear and coherent reason why that would be so.

There's plenty you can do to bring about one state of affairs rather than another. Determinism says that the outcome of the system depends on your actions within the system, so you control what happens. In a system where one event doesn't follow from another, such as free will, it would be pretty tough to exert influence, but in determinism this is easy.

Mmhm, and you still haven't presented anything like a logical reason why it would do any such thing.

This position requires the assumption that the laws of physics as they are understood today are sufficient to explain everything that has ever happened in the universe.

Edit: This isn't quite true. It would require the assumption that the laws of physics will eventually be sufficient to explain everything that has ever happened in the universe, and that such laws are necessarily either stochastic or deterministic.

Lol, nifty strawman. A correct phrasing would be: "If you're going to claim process x is responsible for outcome y, you need to at least describe how it could have happened exclusively in terms of experimentally replicable phenomena." Otherwise it's not science, and you're just doin' that crazy hand jive.

Hardly. The burden is not merely for you to show that cognitive function is the result of action potentials. No one disputes that. Rather it is to show that cognitive function is the result of action potentials exclusively.

They require "could have been otherwise if things had been different." They do not require "could have been otherwise even if things had been exactly the same."

Explain what you think would constitute a beautiful thing if nothing could have been otherwise.

Agents did influence the outcome. That's why the outcome is what it is.

Uh, no it isn't. Hell, we know that computer simulations are deterministic, and yet we meaningfully use counterfactuals in reference to computer simulations, so we have clear empirical proof that counterfactuals are consistent with determinism.

Sure, if you're proposing physical mechanisms that violate the known laws of physics I suppose you wouldn't technically be a dualist, but I would hardly say you are a physicalist either.

No, you don't. At least, not in a step-by-step way. There are evolutionary pathways that we can't explain yet. Christ, we can't even come up with a theoretical model for the Cambrian explosion that works seamlessly. That doesn't contradict the theory of evolution. Of course, in some sense we can "explain" the Cambrian explosion, but then in the same sense we can also explain cognition (neurons firing in synchronous patterns) so it doesn't matter.

If we know that human actions can be described as a function of action potentials, then free will can only apply if there is some mechanism by which free will influences action potentials.

okay, one more try at explaining this...I honestly don't know how I can make it any clearer, but at least ur not attacking anymore. Thank you for that.

1.) We are observers of the world, we collect information, we deliberate, we act in a causal chain. We do not choose because we cannot do other than what the past, heredity, and environment determines us to do. We can imagine something that is not (a counterfactual that could never be), we can imagine a future state of events (that could be...we just don't know), and we can act in such a way as to attain the most desirable state of affairs. That is what deliberation is...and yes deliberation still occurs in a deterministic universe.
2.) No we cannot praise or blame anything. I said we could earlier, but that was confusing because I was trying to argue within your construct...let's forget that now. No praise or blame, just recognition. We the observer can recognize when states of affairs are desirable and undesirable. We can recognize beauty "a concept that differs widely amongst observers and indeed seats comfortably within the deterministic world" and we can see whether our actions bring about beautiful, desirable, ugly, or undesirable states.
3.) This is particularly the "shaping" that I am referring to, is merely our ability to observe our world, collect information, and watch that information get utilized in our causal chain to bring about a state of affairs. So no there is no choice in the action, just a more complex form of action reaction that is the human condition. This does not mean we can't desire to be a better actor... because we naturally would prefer a better state of affairs to a worse one. (this is the reason determinism does not beget paralysis...)

When we rid ourselves of responsibility we get a much different view of the world, a more accurate view imho, and can make more informed decisions (even if they are determined). This is what it is to be a constant observer.

Think of it like a play, the lines are written, you have the perspective of an actor in a world of actors...but none of the actors has any certain idea where the play is going...you essentially have the perspective of the actor AND the audience. There is nothing dull or ugly...one need not gnash ones teeth at the prospect, one need not find fault in others...one need only enjoy the ride, of the constant observer.

If you like I can put this into poker terms...I don't know if you even play

I wish I were as succinct as madnak

What definition of physicalist are you using? Because it seems to me that you're asserting something about "the laws of physics" in an equivocating manner in the same way that I accused Dawkins of equivocating.

All physicalism says is that everything is physical. It does not say that everything that is physical must conform to mathematical laws.

whether or not the physical is stochastic or deterministic... there is still no room for choice or responsibility. So i'll let you physicists argue this ad nauseum.

See Humes fork

This reminds me of another argument that was had not too long ago. The crux of the argument was that "random" is only a well-defined concept from a mathematical perspective, so if you're using it in that sense, you're creating a false dichotomy. However, if you're taking "random" as simply "not causally determined" then "random" becomes an equivocation of concepts (random as defined to be "not causally determined" and random in the sense of "flipping coins").

why is it a false dichotomy? You said the physical is either stochastic or determined...what sense of random did you mean? Regardless the burden of proof is on you for describing your mechanism of choice... since as madnak so exquisitely put it, free will is the extraordinary claim.

Are you saying that Hume misused it? If that is the case...I'm F'd. Back to the books for me.

Stochastic is a mathematical term that refers to a specific model. It can be said that certain physical mechanisms can be modeled stochasitcally, but it is not clear what it means that a physical mechanism is stochastic (edit: except by the interpretation that it can be modeled as such -- stochastic says nothing about the system itself, but rather it is a statement about the model for the system).

First, I reject the "extraordinary" claim concept. What is "extraordinary" is ill-defined. Free will seems pretty ordinary to me. If you reject that assertion, it's really fine with me. As for evidence, it seems impossible to present evidence either for or against free will and determinism, so there is nothing to be done here.

I have no idea what Hume actually said, and I'm not about to read a large volume to try to figure it out. My only reference up to this point is the wikipedia link from which I copied the statement.

But as a simple matter of logic, if Hume is saying "P or not P" where P = causally determined, then he's right to say that, but the claim that "not P" implies "no responsibility" is false. If Hume is saying "causally determined or stochastic" then he's making a false dichotomy.

Neither, you set up a false dichotomy. I won't deny that people will make a judgment "this is beautiful" in a deterministic universe, but it won't mean the same thing that we mean by "beautiful" in a free will universe. The meaning is lost with determinism. People will make the same utterance but the semantics are entirely different.

It does not require dualism at all. Physicalism is not only either deterministic or stochastic...nothing about physics demands that these are the only two options.

No, determinism says that the "agent" can't add anything. The initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature determine ALL future outcomes. The agent adds nothing. What you're trying to picture is what the libertarian wants! The agent ADDS something to the causal pathway such that the pathway is not determined by merely the initial conditions and laws of nature.

I already did this.

This seems to bespeak no formal training in any of these areas. You did not just give a proof for counterfactuals having meaning in a deterministic universe. With the language of counterfactuals, free will is presupposed. So, when we use them in analyzing computer simulations it's with this presupposition...if we were to remove that presupposition, we couldn't use counterfactuals. So, you've shown nothing. The fact that we use counterfactuals meaningfully shows that we presuppose free will when we use them.

You were doing fine until the bolded part. Then you're off the reservation. The agent cannot 'act' so as to obtain anything. All you can have in a deterministic system is the appearance of acting as such. But, there is no 'agent' doing anything. There is no active roll that the agent plays. You aren't understanding this. All you can do is describe it 'as if' these things are happening, but they're not. That's the difference.

You lose the meaning of 'deliberate' and 'choose' and 'act' in determinism.

There isn't anything the agent can DO to be "more informed" and make "better decisions". You just do not get that agency is lost in determinism. You keep mixing in libertarian concepts to your deterministic thoughts. You really need to sit down and think more carefully the ramifications of what you can/can't say as a determinist.

Uh, no, the agent adds nothing. The agent determines outcomes, and the agent himself is determined by prior outcomes, and so on. The first domino causes the last domino to topple. So does the fifteenth domino. So does the fifteen-thousandth domino. The fact that the initial conditions of the universe (if we assume that all random outcomes are part of those initial conditions, which determinism doesn't necessarily assume) determine the outcome does not mean that the agent doesn't determine the outcome.

The outcome is determined by the system, the agent is part of the system, and the agent determines the outcome. None of this is contradictory.

No, it isn't. Not even one mention of free will in that whole article. That is not a premise that has anything to do with counterfactuals.