Bad theories of preferences ITT.

Care to weigh in a little more Durka? I am curious as to what you think of a lot that I have been writing. Am I totally of base iyo?

IMO. Is it wrong to say that a person's actions are invariably the result of their preference? I can't see it as being any more or less warranted than a pro-free will position.

Jib, when you're talking about not cursing out your boss, how would you respond to someone saying that the reason you don't is because of the consequences, and that given those consequences, you prefer not to do so? You might say that you would prefer even more that those consequences not exist, but in my opinion that's a different statement - preferences of action concerning the world as is versus preferences regarding the world itself. It might be hard to draw a distinction, but probably not impossible.

In decision theory all actions are based on maximizing one's preference ordering. How this is explicitly spelled-out may differ, but it's taken as axiomatic of revealed preference theory. At least, as far as RATIONAL decisions go...you can make all sorts of irrational decisions but then we can't say why you're doing them.

I'm still waiting for a response to the domino/redness point.

Sure, fine. Now let Jib state his definition of 'preference'.

Best of luck (I'm not a compatibilist).

Is it fair to push on someone's definition of preference who doesn't know preference theory, decision theory, etc.?

Well I don't know those things. I just want to know what he means. I didn't mean that in some sinister or mocking way, if that's what you're thinking. It's just that a proper discussion won't be possible until terms are defined.

Preference can be defined as a psychological predisposition of emotional incentives and disincentives that encourage/discourage certain types of behaviors.

For example, I have a preference for spelling correctly, so while I write I fix spelling errors as I spot them. But in order for me to do that, first I must observe the mistake, then experience the dissonant reaction to that stimulus in my 'emotional space,' and thus end with me being propelled to hit backspace and strike the correct buttons on my keyboard.

I've been thinking about your reply for a while. It's a bit terse and unclear to me, but I appreciate the input regardless. You say there's no difference between a human and a tree under determinism, that the self adds nothing, and that it has no causal efficacy. I'm trying to figure out how far you intend your readers to take these statements. Are you just striking out at the meaninglessness of the concept of "freedom" when determinists attempt to espouse some version of "free will?" But it seems you're going beyond this, and claiming that not only should determinists abandon the word "free," but they should also cast aside special categories like the causal self.

I take it, then, that you're objecting to everything I said about the self acting and reacting humanly in the deterministic webs of material causality as either irrelevant or meaningless?

If so, I'm not entirely sold on why this is so. Though I do perceive that my definition of the word "free" in the phrase "free will" as 'relative freedom' (compared to inanimate objects) to exist, act, and react complexly or humanly in a deterministic universe -- that this interpretation of "free" is problematic or sufficiently stretched away from a conventional definition of "free" that it would be better to drop the word altogether. But doing so wouldn't in itself concede that concepts like the "causal self," the "human will," "responsibility," and "moral blame" entirely melt away. At least, you haven't shown me in any detail why they would, or answered my cheating example suggesting they wouldn't.

But in your toy analogy, the domino's redness does not participate whatsoever in the material process of causation that topples one domino into the next one. I am claiming that it is reasonable to propose that the structures I've designated as the "self" or the "will" (or the human being) do participate in the processes of causation that drive a deterministic universe from one state to another.

To put it otherwise: When you speak of the "self" adding nothing to causal efficacy, I'm a bit lost. In your analogy, one piece's redness (which is meant to stand for "self") adds nothing to the chain of toppling dominoes. But in the universe, what I'm calling "self" does not stand apart from the chain of successive states of the universe. Just because I draw special attention to it, recognize its unique properties, and label it "self," that doesn't imply that I'm pointing merely to irrelevant abstractions or false constructs. I am simply re-describing and re-characterizing entirely material organizations (for the purposes of illuminating a philosophical view) that are wholly involved in the causal unfolding of the universe.

As a strict determinist and non-domino, I can't answer for them, but if you ask the red domino whether it's redness is important, it would clearly say that it was. Wait, dominos can't talk or distinguish color, so it would say nothing. OK, in an analogy, a person's "sense" of free will (or what I would call wishful thinking due to conflating decision making and choice* with free will) would be important and meaningful to him as they believe they are more special than a tree.

*Trees clearly have less decision making and choices to make than people.

English translation: preference = what you desire most given more than one possibility

Correct?

Pls. explain how the combination of "decision making and choice" is different from "free will" without spewing a bunch of academic gruel.

Also, -1 for mocking a metaphor with a literal interpretation.

+1 for boiling down academic gruel into a tasty gravy.

Obviously, not speaking for Durka, but there is no loss of meaning for the self in a deterministic viewpoint. Your actions are caused by previous events, and you cause future events. Take you out of the system, and the system would be different (due to you not causing the specific future events).

Basically, you acting like a human is important to you because you are self aware. It is important to me, because I prefer that other humans act like humans. I would prefer if they didn't hold up lines at cashiers, but other than that, people matter to me. I feel a need to influence some of them, but that is just me being part of the chain of events.

"Free" would mean without controlling influence. It does not take away the process of decision making at all. Moral blame and responsibility are more difficult to reconcile with determinism, which is why (I think) most people reject it.

Personally, my way of rectifying responsibility is through making it proximal responsibility in deciding whether someone did something wrong (your father beating you leads to you beating your child. it is you that should be punished for beating your child*).

The redness doesn't matter. Nice catch.

The analogy doesn't really fall down (pun intended) because of this though.

If fails because the analogy is simplistic, and people's behavior is incredibly more complex (and probably will never be modeled perfectly) as compared to a row of dominos.

I happen to agree. Although, take one domino out and the rest don't fall...

That is because you are an incredibly complex red domino

*as a deterent and also because punishment works for the average Joe. Taking you out of society works out for everyone (except you, sorry - don't beat your kids!). As a nice side effect, this also leads me to be more understanding of others. Although you will be punished, ultimately you had your reasons for your actions, and I can treat you like a human being.

The frequency of my obfuscation is minute unless cornered

Will = decision making and choice

Free will* = decision making and choice without outside cause, either current or past.

*not to be confused with Free Willy**

-10 for mocking my mocking

I think you believe in free will and disbelieve in determinism but have some terminology issues.

A story can be told that relates ANY decision to an outside cause. That does not mean the story is true.

Not at all.

This is true, but irrelevent.

But, I do believe that there is a correct story that could be told.

I defer to Galen Strawson's Basic Argument. And while it'd be nice to have genuine resposibility, there is no prima facie/intuition parity in the debate afaict; what is the libertarian response to the basic argument?

Thanks for suggesting a source. I'm starting out by reading this to sample Strawson's views.

Yeah, that's a good piece, very accessible.

Although even he seems to wobble slightly: (bothered me when I read it the first time)

So 'thoroughly morally responsible people in a "clear, weaker, everyday sense"' is a superfluous and dubious caveat. But I likey the second paragraph.

Jib,

I can't find the exact post, but earlier you stated that wishing you had made a different choice implies that you could have made a different choice. I want to see your reasoning for that, because to me the wishing part implies pretty much nothing. In the biggest pot I ever played in, I had the best hand and lost when the river completed the flush. I really wish the river card had been different, does that imply that the river card could have been different? If not, what's the difference in the choice scenario?

Aaron feel free to respond as well because I think you implied something similar but I'm too rushed to find it.

Being able to "could have done otherwise" is not a necessary condition for responsibility...see Frankfurt (1969) "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility."

I never said that wishing you had made a different choice implies that you could have done differently, but that regret (wishing you had done differently) implies that you believe you could have done differently.

Yeah, this is a bad argument though since it's entirely consistent with all 4 of the positions. It doesn't favour libertarianism any more than hard determinism.

Even though it is compatible with determinism (although I don't see anything that couldn't be compatible with determinism), I don't see how it does not favor libertarianism. The argument is about the perception of reality. If I regret then I perceive myself as having free will, therefore free will is prima facie true.

What do you feel is wrong with what I wrote earlier?