Sometimes we get a little rough, so it is nice to know that I haven't offended. I cannot assume your Bourgeoisie paper-thin skin can handle my roughness. I aim to hurt, but not to injure.

From now on, I will assume thick skin and self-directed humor, and assume that if I go overboard, you will ask me to step off explicitly.

And **** you. I was drinking pretty darn heavily just to make things fair for you. It really isn't helpful if I have to drink my self to oblivion just to bring myself down to your level.

*smiles* well **** you too!!!

I have really thick skin...don't hold back on my account. I've ruffled feathers more than once for suggesting that people lacking thick skin are "pussies" (or some such cognate). Thin skinned people won't do well in academia, imo. The best philosophers I've ever met have nearly no personal attachment to the truth of their arguments. They *expect* for someone to come along an 'prove' them wrong...I ought to be no different. Thus, I would be surprised to find out that any given position of mine is actually correct.

Good. You have heros that are much the same as mine.

I will do my best to change your mind. I hope that you will do the same for me.

...can't teach an old dog new tricks.

Ba-zing

Yes. Since we are discussing ethics, I am obviously much better authority (nice guy that I am), so it would be almost the definition of rational argumentation (appeal to relatively better authority) to just believe me, rather than Durka. I believe that ethical appeal can be trumped by correct authority.

I expect that if you listen to Durka's ramblings, you will find that those that you care about will die horrible deaths, world hunger will become the rule, and we will all be forced to sell our children into slavery for a pittance.

Moreso, you won't like it at all.

Still young enough here to be a humble seeker of truth

Well done, my friend. "It turns out," would have been better rhetorically, but I am impressed with your progress nonetheless.

It works both ways. "I don't know [x], therefore [x or not-x]" is the error. "Don't know" is not related to either, doesn't qualify as evidence, and is just silly.

What is the error called when you claim "I don't have any reason at all for my claim, but I prefer that it were true" called?

I only ask for educational purposes.

"A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices." (William James, 1842 - 1910).

My one (I think) contribution to this most illustrious thread. This is also a blatant appeal to authority that I make no apology for. Make the most of it.

-Zeno

Ah now i see why my post was rubbish, ive always just believed the determinism arguement, now i see there are other sides and that none can actually be proved or disproved and that it just comes down to personally feeling. Even so I still believe that in a universe with so much order and rules that a determinism view would fit better.

I wouldn't say that it just comes down to personal opinion. That's the wrong lesson. The point is that each position still needs an internal coherence. I don't think that compatibilism is internally coherent. One also has to check that one's other beliefs about responsibility and so on really are consistent with one's views on determinism; I suspect that most compatibilists/hard determinists have incoherent beliefs on this. There's a joke that philosophers are only skeptics or determinists on weekdays (while at work), and not on weekends.

I cannot imagine your reasons for why this is not an empirical question. I have tried for a few minutes now but have nothing so I would be interested to see what they are. Thread is TLDR so far but I am piecing away at it one night at a time.

Answer before you spoil this please.

Would like to continue this as well.

Would you call yourself an a-unicornist or an agunicornostic?

I will answer the other side from my end first: I do not call myself an agnostic, I am an a-theist.

Of course, you can't actually demonstrate any of that or even provide a concrete example, but that's hardly a big deal.

I have provided arguments and specific examples which I think are compelling. If by 'demonstrate' you mean something stronger, then you might be making a category mistake, especially in philosophical arguments.

I honestly can't tell if this is a troll post or not. You're certainly breaking Grice's cooperative principle if it was a serious post.

Like being a Christian only on Sunday.

It's probably true but sort of sad when you think about it. If you think a certain philosophical argument is right, you should try to be as consistent as possible and revise any incoherent beliefs. I've never met any of the hard-determinists I've read/respect, but if on weekends they go around admonishing people for being morally irresponsible, then I'd be surprised and disappointed.

This is off the cuff, but I don't see a problem with being, or rather, appearing inconsistent or incoherent if such human behavior is directly or implicitly posited and explicated in one's particular version of determinism.

For instance, suppose I have some mix of reasons that incline me to believe in a form of hard determinism. Can I not also coherently believe that I will be unable to live or fully inhabit my views on determinism in day-to-day life, outside moments of abstract philosophical reflection? Can I not also harmoniously believe or stipulate that I will experience it as virtually impossible not to play what appear to be social and mental games wherein "personal responsibility" and "moral judgment" have, within certain confines, an apparently real and agential significance? And that the perception that one is playing such games -- very seriously, and even for what seem to be the highest stakes -- and getting caught up in deep illusions of free will and freedom of action is just an inescapable part of being human?

I think durka was talking about 'internal coherence', so if a pessimistic incompatibilist* admonishes people for being morally irresponsible as a result of having internally incoherent beliefs about moral responsibility, then that's what I find unfortunate. The belief that you have to live as if free will is possible for other reasons is not internally incoherent.

*I should have said "the 'pessimistic incompatibilists' I've read/respect", since I think hard determinism is only half right.

For instance, how you think about yourself and others privately need not affect how you function socially (when freedom has apparent significance). If you are a pessimistic incompatibilist, do your private beliefs and feelings reflect your philosophical position? Would you say to yourself "I am morally responsible for my actions" even though you deny that moral responsibility is coherent?

No, I mean the theory itself is incoherent (there's a conceptual contradiction somewhere).

You said

which I more or less agree with, and you said

Are you saying the joke suggests that 'being a determinist on weekdays and not on weekends' indicates a conceptual contradiction (over and above the difficulty of applying the conclusion to normal life)? What's the conceptual contradiction in hard determinism?

No...that joke is about personal consistency...which you're right about. But I was worried that you were mistaking this for my entirely other claim regarding my view on compatibilism being an incoherent position.

You already know that I agree with you that compatibilism is incoherent. I don't think that pessimistic incompatibilism is incoherent, although it's true that it neuters our cherished view of ourselves as moral agents.

I don't know that It's too hard for me to keep track of everyone's metaphysical commitments in this forum

Carry on...no dispute here.

I guess I thought I was special