Definitely not. I'm genuinely interested in finding out approximately how much of biology (or w/e) he believes can be overcome by free will. Maybe it is sort of limited (you can delay sleep), or maybe a very strong free will can overcome all kinds of things (you can levitate). Regardless, even the limited kind constitutes a free will (imo), it is not necessary that one must be able to control everything.

Or more concisely, what is the least amount of control necessary for one to have been said to possess free will? Always able to do otherwise? Sometimes? Once in a lifetime?

Alright then. No, I don't believe those things. Furthermore, all that's needed for the libertarian is that at least one choice in one's life is free in the libertarian sense (Kane got at least this part right with his "self forming actions"). So, it's fine if some things are 'biologically determined.' My point with the 'begs the question' is that there are alternative interpretations of at least the phenomena that you were referring to. Remember that I've argued at length for the underdetermination of the problem by empirical observations. So, in order to show that x is evidence for theory y, you need to show how it's logically incompatible with theory z.

Yeah, I see now. Kind of forgot that was your position. I have more questions but they aren't directly related to this topic... like what empirical observations can be used for if not this? But you don't have to answer.

Now that the misunderstanding is behind us, I'm happy to answer questions.

If you read the thread (I know, it's epic), I've argued that NO such observations could conceivably be used as evidence for either of the positions: this is what "underdetermination" means. It's not an empirical question (one capable of being settled by appeal to observations and 'evidence'). I also think that it's not an a priori question capable of being settled by reason. Personally, I think that soft determinism/compatibilism are incoherent but that still leaves determinism and liberterianism...either of which are plausibly true. I personally think that liberterianism is true but I can't give you reasons (for the reasons given above...pun intended).

First, thanks for the thread so far, Ive read about half of it in total and it is already epic.
Lets take a different route here.
Remove from our present universe all things. Is it now deterministic?
Bring back all the non-living matter. Is it now deterministic?
Add non-human living things. Is it now deterministic?
Add humans. Is it now deterministic?

Ignore the man behind the curtain!

Even if we remove all things we can't answer that it is definitely deterministic...this is the problem of induction and global underdetermination. Furthermore, we can't say that when we add x (say, humans) then we definitely get a non-determined universe...it's not an empirical question so we can't point to "aha, THERE, that's where indeterminacy lies!"

Very well. What are empirical questions in this view, if there are any? ie. are there things that can be settled on an empirical basis? If so, what is the difference with determinism?
I think you may have gone through this already, but I couldnt find it readily in the thread on searching.

As a sidepoint, with the assumption that our senses give a (partial, complicated) truth about the universe, do these arguments hold?

There are no empirical issues on this topic...it's hopelessly underdetermined imo.

Even if our senses reliably give us 'truth' about the external world, it's STILL underdetermined: any piece of "evidence" is equally consistent for any of the theories.

The first misses my point. Is there ANY knowledge to be gained by the empirical method and why is determinism different if there is?

Yes, we know things through empirical observations...I've explained why determinism is different: it's underdetermined.

To take Durka's point (that it isn't an empirical question) down to normal people thinking, here is an example:

Mr. Determined: You ate that sandwich just then because of a number of reasons.

Mr. Free Will: No, I chose to have it. I may have been influenced, but I wasn't forced.

Mr. Determined: One such reason is that you like ham.

Mr. Free Will: I do like ham, but I could have had something else, and made a free choice.

Mr. Determined: But it was only because you wanted it due to prior things that have happened.

Mr. Free Will: Nuh uh, I didn't have to eat it. I made a free choice.

Mr. Determined: No you didn't

Mr. Free Will: Yes I did

(repeat last two lines until one stabs the other)

...basically...

so this thread got good again the last few days... first nitty but necessary:

Peter Strawson was a compatibilist (Freedom and Resentment)

His son Galen Strawson is a pessimist (the cited comments by me are from 93 or 94)

If you weren't aware of the difference, then I wouldn't trust your judgment that "no on buys his arguments".

And arguments don't necessarily get worse with age.

I merely got the names/dates mixed up...I was still responding to Galen's "basic argument" and what you're referring to as the 'pessimistic' position. He's either begging the question (twice) or setting up a straw man. Libertarians can reject the need for "ultimate" responsibility AND they can reject the "you do what you do based on who you are." They can reject that one's personality overdetermines one's choices while still allowing that one's personality influences one's choices. Ultimate responsibility is not a necessary condition for responsibility.

edit: Furthermore, I've stated that there may be a difference between 'indeterminate' and 'random' such that Libertarian free will is indeterminate in that it's not determined but that it's not 'random.' So, another argument against G.Strawson.

And what exactly is the dispute with lagdonk and Aaron?

If lagdonk accepts pessimism, then he rejects any kind of genuine moral responsibility. Full stop. However, this has nothing to do with his account of the phenomenology of willing as robust illusion as long as he does not think that there's some feature of the phenomenology that gives us anything closer to moral responsibility. But Aaron seems to be making a point similar to durkas with which I had disagreed: just because the big bang is the ultimate cause of my illusion of freedom does not mean that a better, more proximate explanation is not in my brain. Determinists are fully entitled to describe and explain the world in normal terms - further, there's nothing even wrong with thinking about "possibilities" even if one and only one possiblity will be eventuated.

That's a good substantive response to the basic argument; we had discussed this a little bit and we can discuss it more if you like - but the point was different in what I quoted: you were handicapping the academic debate in that quote, in my view not quite faithfully (not because of the mistake, but because there's a robust plurality of views and pessimism is a widely held and credibly defended view).

?

Not sure what's ? worthy. Didn't you intend to say to lagdonk that nobody buys g strawson's argument(s)? If you did, that's not a faithful handicapping of the academic debate and not because it's trivially true that some nutcase will always buy one argument or another but because there is a readily acknowledged plurality of views (as you know and have explained to others ITT) about free will: pessimism/hard determinism/soft determinism/libertarianism.

Is it really that complicated?

The determinist will describe the world precisely how it was determined that he would describe the world. If you had some ability to "choose" how you would describe the world, you would be rejecting determinism.

I still dont understand why the ideas on determinism would be qualitatively different than other ideas in this regard.
Its underdetermined sure, I can accept that for arguments sake, but how is that different for other theories? Any other theory in fact?

I admit it is complicated by avoidable color commentary

Consider

(a) Determinism is true and P proved the Pythagorean theorem
(b) Libertarnianism is true and P proved the Pythagorean theorem

If (a), do you maintain that P didn't really prove the theorem or that P cannot say that the proof is certainly true (and that its truth does not depend on P being incidentally determined to believe that it's true)? If you do, then you think determinism is not only incompatible with freedom, but with truth and knowledge. That's a different far harder argument to make.

edit: how would libertarian freedom (b) provide the means to certain understanding that a mathematical proof is correct or incorrect?

I don't see where he mentioned choosing how to describe the world. Petrol does not really 'make my car go', that is a woefully incomplete explanation. A complete explanation would delve into chemistry, thermodynamics, etc. But if providing such an explanation does not suit my purpose, why should I not say that petrol 'makes my car go'?

Similarly, in a determined universe, the most comprehensible account of another's behaviour may nonetheless refer to whatever internal mechanism generates the illusion of choice. Referring to that mechanism does not necessarily 'reject' determinism, any more than saying 'petrol makes my car go' 'rejects' thermodynamics.

First, I don't really see how this analogy plays into any of the previous descriptions. But anyway...

Under (a), it's simply a matter of drawing up arbitrary boundaries. I think it makes just as much sense to say P proved the theorem as it is to say that P's parents proved the theorem, which implies that it makes as much sense to say that the big bang proved the theorem.

Furthermore, the question of "certainly true" is a bizarre one because the entire question of meaning seems nebulous to me. Consider the Conway life simulation. The system is completely deterministic. It would be fair to say that there are "complex patterns" that result from the program. It's not at all clear that it makes sense to assign meaning to those complex patterns. Even if it turned out that you could find an initial condition such that the cells spell out the words "I HAVE FREE WILL" over the course of time, it's not sensible to think that that message actually has meaning within the context of the program. In the same way, I'm not sure if it makes sense to say that anything that I type is particularly meaningful if determinism is true.

Under (b), the question of meaning has more content. It's not just a meaningless mess of symbols that we respond in a specific way because we had no choice but to respond in that way, but somewhere along the line, we have the ability to respond based on the actual content of the symbols. Indeed, the whole creation of the symbols can be seen as a willful act to create a system that communicates meanings effectively. Things like logic can be viewed as a true evaluation process in which people decide the value of a system of statements.

The declaration of one viewpoint as "better" than another (or "more complete" than another) is an evaluation process. This requires one to make some sort of decision about the merits of the situation. But since the conclusion was already prescribed, it calls to question whether an evaluation actually happened.