If two concepts are defined by the same words, or by words and phrases that end up meaning the same thing, then the two concepts are the same. So state what you think these concepts 'undetermined' and 'random' are and let's see if there's any difference.

At some point ITT, if/when this current particular argument peters out, can smrk or another determinist address some of the leading theories (besides free will) which explain why we sense ourselves as having responsibility for our actions (under the assumption we really don't)?

In before "evolution" (that's the standard answer to every question of this kind around here).

I'm not a determinist btw, there's no conclusive argument for that. I like to think that people suck or do sucky things because they're unlucky, it's less depressing.

Ah, I was assuming you were a determinist because you were so vehemently arguing the case. Asses and me's, oh well.

Anyway, evolution is actually a very interesting model which combines a deterministic process (natural selection) with random processes (mutations) yielding ever more complex life forms suitable to the environment surrounding them. In the physical world this process moves relatively slowly. In the metaphysical realm might a similar process actually occur much, much faster in our brains... our decisions "evolving" from past causes and random thoughts? At any point could that process grant us real responsibility?

So you say.


PairTheBoard

Is there more than one way that Santa doesn't exist or more than one way that trilobites are extinct?

Yes, people actually think so. Metaphysics, wooo!

durka, have you read the new (?) ebook by Sam Harris Free Will? If yes, any comments? (I haven't read it yet).

I've read a bit of the thread but it is quite long ...

presumably everyone agrees that the proposition "humans have freewill" has a fixed truth value (it has always been true or false for a single semantic interpretation of the statement).

Has the question "what is the value of discovering whether or not free will exists" been discussed? Does this question belong in a different thread?

Obviously humans can believe things about the world that are not true (e.g. the sun revolves around the earth, all the false religions). It seems obvious that belief systems have a big impact of how humans act (another fact not in dispute?).

One might also argue that knowledge of whether (human) free will exists or not is unknowable, despite having a fixed truth value (e.g. along the lines of godel's incompleteness theorem).

It is also possible that believing a proposition to be true when it is actually false could result in behavior that confers a survival advantage to either a person or a meme.

If one were to believe that answering the question of free will's existence is impossible in the near term (e.g. one's life, or even the next 100 years) then the question: "Which belief (believing free will exists or believing it does not exist) moves humanity closer to the good life" might be more interesting.

Be specific for once and say what and how it's relevant, what I think you're talking about is not relevant to this discussion.

The book isn't out yet. I believe it comes out March 6th.

You raised a rhetorical question for reductio: do people believe that there's more than one way for Santa not to exist?

You would apparently be surprised that people in metaphysics work on this question, and some think "yes." It's often discussed under the topic of "truth-makers." Essentially, what "makes" a false statement true? What makes it the case that "Santa doesn't exist?"

I'm not "apparently" surprised that philosophers do their job from time to time (write about truth). I'm not surprised that you are muddying the waters as usual. I gave a definition of an undetermined event: an event is undetermined if it is not the case that there is a sufficient fact or condition (a 'conclusive reason') in the past for it occurring. Now please connect the dots -- you believe a discussion of "truth-makers" is needed at this point, that it's my burden to give a philosophical treatment of "it's not the case that" to refute your trolling "indeterminism=/=random" comment? As it is my burden to prove that undetermined and random are coextensive? How do I do that? How do I prove that "not on time" = "late"?

I'm f busy, leave me alone. But why is that definition COEXTENSIVE with "random"?

I can't answer that until you tell me what definition of random you're using (for this debate).

And if you're busy, don't quote me

Wow. People still believe in free will in the year 2012?

OMFG SIR MADNAK THE GREAT POSTED

'Epistemic determinism' and/or 'epistemological determinism'. I'm confused by these terms, and my googling has failed to clear up my confusion. Wondering if someone more philosophically literate than I am might explain what these refer to?

I don't know if it's the main thing (if there is a main thing), but the first google result for 'epistemic determinism' was in the context of divine foreknowledge; there 'epistemic determinism' is the view that God's foreknowledge of the future makes human free will impossible. Another usage I found was in the context of Laplace's demon; there 'epistemological determinism' is the view that it is possible to know or work out what will happen in the future (or what happened in the past) if you know the causal laws and the state of the world at some point in time.

Hmmm. Epistemic determinism seems fine. I'm wondering what about epistemological determinism distinguishes it from regular determinism, though, or if it's just a consequence that happens to be named.

I also wonder if the meaning I speculatively invented is an actual thing: an argument against free will based on our having no volition in what we regard as true. Which seems like it might lead to no volition in decision-making. You kind of have to say that every decision arises from holding some claim to be true, which is where I'm not sure it works.

Just to say, I'm not sure how many philosophers would actually use 'epistemic determinism' to refer to that argument (the google result I looked at was a forum post, not from a journal). The usual term(s) for God posing a problem for human free will is theological fatalism or theological determinism.

'Epistemological determinism' was defined in a journal article I looked at concerning the computability power of Laplace's demon, but I'm guessing that this is not universal usage either. But the difference between 'epistemological determinism' and regular determinism in that article is just that regular determinism can be true while it could still be impossible to figure out the future/past based on the facts of today and the causal laws; it could be too complicated or impossible in principle.

I don't think it's an actual thing as is, perhaps you can develop it into one (or maybe more development will show that it's equivalent to something else). At first pass, I think freewillers can accept that what we regard as true may determine our range of options but deny that what we regard as true determines our decisions.

Thanks.

The argument would be that the selection of any one option is always the outcome of regarding 'This option is the best' as true. I wouldn't really know how to go about making it more rigorous. It doesn't exactly look revolutionary, I'm just curious if there is some tendency making that case, even a discredited one.

Found this on IEP, so I was off a bit.

So you may have epistemic determinism without God e.g. if it's true that Mary knows Steve will do x, then Steve is determined to do x.

Given that, here's a better account of what theological fatalism is:

Are you aiming at compatibilists or libertarians (or both, if so how)?

I guess at libertarians (I at least think I understand their position). If every decision finds sufficient cause in a thing that is 'known' and if there is no volition in 'knowing', then there's no volition in decision-making.

I just had to say that this is really annoying. Like, obviously if I know you're going to do x, then you're going to do x. But this is a point about our concept of knowledge and not about some capacity that you may or may not have. This bit about being "powerless to prevent x" is just so wtf - my knowledge is the dependent variable here, not your behavior. I think language like this is why people get confused on this topic.

I think you mean to say 'belief' instead of 'knowledge', since most of the time when people decide to do something because they think it's best option they're wrong. But either way, I think it's easy for libertarians to deny both parts of your antecedent and say that the will is implicated in belief and also that beliefs underdetermine decisions. What about people who hold beliefs because those beliefs are comfortable and unpleasant to challenge? Isn't the will implicated there? And what about impulsive decisions?