We aren't worried about operational definitions. They are useful, but not in terms of this argument. Determinism isn't the same thing as the ability to determine something.

You will note that we also can't predict the behavior of the sun. Notably, where and when sun spots will occur. Would you argue that the sun has free will?

Determinists will no doubt object that we come no where close to having the information required to predict human behavior, much in the same way we still cannot predict the weather with near certainty, though science is closing in. This does nothing to disprove their argument.

And I eagerly await this technology. Because I still contend that just because we don't understand how it works, doesn't mean it doesn't. If determinism and indeterminism aren't the answer, perhaps some combination of both is. Or maybe we just aren't thinking about it correctly. We still haven't figured out how life works, but we don't doubt it does. I doubt there is any other arena of science where an explanation which so conflicts with our experience of reality is so widely accepted, as is the deterministic argument. So, I believe, as long as we have this subjective experience which so convincingly feels like choice, we will continue to look for reasons why. It is interesting to think about this question from the point of view of accepting determinism and no free will.

I agree and disagree. I think their point is that even if it does work, it does no better a job giving us responsibility for our choices. Because we cannot be considered responsible for the outcome of a random process. (edit: oh that's what you said, duh).

This is where I point at quantum indeterminacy and how it has properties of randomness, but we can still predict it using wave theory. So it is not completely random after all. Figuring out how we tap into this indeterminacy in a way that grants us some responsibility seems to be the real trick.

This seems to be agreeable to darn near every scientist and philosopher.

A range-bound (only certain answers are possible) and probabilistic (you can predict the proportions of each possible answer) variable is still random. It can only do what is within its possible limits, and over sufficient trials you get a sense of what it tends to do. Each particle in a state of quantum indeterminacy acts randomly.*

It just isn't nonsensical. A light particle might land here or there indicates that it is random.* That a light particle doesn't land here or there or turns into a turnip would be a silly boundless variable.

Randomness is randomness. If you wish to equate indeterminacy with randomness you only get to take the ideas that can be derived from both in any argument.**

* or we don't have a good enough theory or precision of data to make an answer with certainty.

** Memorize that sentence. You can often be tricked into believing cleverly put, but incorrect, arguments when two relatively similar ideas are equated.

So then, is what is most attractive about indeterminacy that it provides us with more than one outcome for a given set of causes? And randomness is still a hurdle to overcome?

Fixed your post to make it consistent. See my, "memorize that sentence" in a previous post.

Not sure where the attraction lies, given my correction.

Is it the randomness which provides more than one option, or the indeterminacy? Let me try to clarify my post.

I don't think durka disagrees with the implications of determinism or randomness as argued in your posts. What he disagrees with is the assertion that those are the only possibilities. That assertion is the one he claims lacks an argument. As I believe he has explained several times in this thread, libertarians claim there is an alternative that suggests itself, namely free will choice which is posited as being something neither random nor determined.

PairTheBoard

There are only two possibilities, either an event necessarily follows from the past (determinism) or it doesn't (indeterminism). Either the state of the world at t1 necessarily follows from the state of the world at t0 or it doesn't. So say it doesn't. If it doesn't, then there's literally no fact or condition of the world at t0 that accounts for why any particular state of the world at t1 followed and not another. If a person has the ability to choose otherwise, this means that for any state of the world at t0, there's literally no fact or condition in that world that accounts for the actual choices that people end up making. How is it conceivable that the complete absence of 'any fact or condition' comes in two varieties, the random kind and the 'free will choice' kind?

On a side note, it's trivial to attach "we haven't figured it out yet" to any proposition, and so equally to nonsense, and it's trivial to say that an argument may be disputed in the future.

One thing escaped my edit (because we just discussed it) but in case it wasn't clear. When I say "there's literally no fact or condition in that world that accounts for the actual choices that people end up making" the emphasis is on the actual. There could be a fact or condition (or statistical statement) in the world that determines that Jane chooses A or B or C or D or Z with X probability, but there's no fact or condition in the world which determines the actual outcome when she chooses.

So if it's not determined the argument then for why it must be random is that it's "inconceivable" for it to be other than random?


PairTheBoard

The argument is that if the relation between the past and the future is indeterminate, then there is no fact or condition in the past that accounts for all the particulars of the future. If more than one choice can follow from an identical state of the world, then no fact or condition in that past can account for why that choice occurred and not some other possible choice. There is no alternative to not having "any fact or condition in the past", you're attaching a meaningless option.

Let's say your objection is right and I'm missing something and it's not inconceivable for it to be "other than random". Is it also then conceivable that there could be a third thing, a fourth thing, e.g. not "random" but also not "free will"; what possible meaning does this have?

This seems to be the reality of the world, no? I can think of plenty of situations where one set of conditions lead me down a path with many possible outcomes. For example, let's consider my last trip to the steakhouse. I was hungry, I wanted a steak, I wanted to have it prepared for me. There just so happen to be three steakhouses close to my office, so distance is not a factor. I might have searched my mind further for reasons to choose one steakhouse from the other (another determining cause) or I might have just flipped a proverbial coin (enter indeterminacy). In the latter case, which particular place I ended up eating may be considered random with X probability, but the fact that I was hungry, wanted steak and did not want to prepare it myself still accounts for why I ended up at that steakhouse.

On a side note, even though having the decision broken down like that seems to leave no room for free will, I obviously still feel as if I were responsible for the choice I made. Maybe it is because all the deliberating processes occurred within my mind, and I decided how much effort to put into it. Maybe it is because I was free to act on those urges or explore my psyche further for different urges, and make a decision with another possible outcome. Maybe in the end, none of that matters, but it is still interesting to understand from where our sense of responsibility is derived and if it is warranted.

QUOTE=BrianTheMick;31653818]We aren't worried about operational definitions. They are useful, but not in terms of this argument. Determinism isn't the same thing as the ability to determine something.

You will note that we also can't predict the behavior of the sun. Notably, where and when sun spots will occur. Would you argue that the sun has free will?[/QUOTE]

interesting thread

By classic definition, only living beings can have free will so that point about the sun seems irrelevant. Humans have unique cognitive features which are absent in all inanimate objects. Any deliberated behavior by humans that is unpredictable should be considered evidence of free will. Unpredictable behavior by the sun or any inanimate object might simply be called indeterministic or undetermined.

You're just explaining what it means to not be determined.



Do you mean to say, when not determined there's no alternative to being random? The libertarian claims there is an alternative to being random, namely free will choice. Are you now calling free will choice a "meaningless option"? If so, the argument against it evidently now consists in asserting it is meaningless, inconceivable, and incoherent.


Well, I did make the post suggesting that in a Universe ceaselessly seething with non determined uncaused effects at the fundamental level we might at least keep an open mind about the possibility of other non determined initial causes of effects yet to be discovered.

I also made a post in another thread where I suggested that while it may be true that the Universe and everything in it is a machine, it may not be the case that every machine in the Universe works like a machine.


PairTheBoard

To which I respond: indeterminism =/= random.

I physically submitted the dissertation today, but I'm still extremely busy. This is why I can't devote time to following this thread.

Libertarians can claim whatever they like. In addition to claiming whatever they like, they need to address the second part of the standard argument, that causeless events are insufficient for free choice.

I'm not 'now' or 'evidently now' doing anything. My view is that free will is incoherent and that there are no distinctions to be made about the manner in which events are uncaused. Free will is incoherent until somebody provides an analysis of the concept that works. Engaging in apophatic foolery and merely saying what it's not -- that it's not determinism but that it's also not randomness -- is redundant and poor philosophy.

It doesn't matter if it's is ceaselessly seething or forever foaming or perpetually effervescing. What does it mean for an event to be uncaused and what does it even begin to mean that an event can be uncaused in more than one way?

To which I respond: where's your (non-question begging) argument?

Meh, where's the argument that indeterminsm = random?

To say that two things differ in meaning, you have to say how. In this context, I'm saying they're interchangeable.

I think this is going in circles now and probably not worth further discussion unless something new is said. The point is that the second part of the standard argument is not an argument. It's an assertion that non determined events, or causeless events, or indeterminate events - whatever you want to call them - must be random. The only justification for this assertion that I've seen in your posts and by your quoted experts basically amounts to, "because that's the way it's got to be". "Nothing else suggests itself". Anything else is "inconceivable". If it's not random it must be determined or else it's "meaningless". And, "Otherwise it's incoherent because I say so."



Good question. Yet there you have it with quantum events. Another good question is, what does it mean to be random? I don't believe that's as easy to answer as one might think.


It's probably best to take that up with durka when he gets some free time again. Personally, I suspect our current level of conceptualization for "causation", "determined", "indeterminate", "uncaused events", and "random" are too undeveloped and primitive to inspire a great deal of confidence about what is and isn't conceivable in their regard.



PairTheBoard

Nah, you're saying they're coextensive: the onus is on you for the proof.

Two concepts are prima facie distinct until there's a proof of their being coextensive.

Not to interrupt the circle jerk, but I for one just do not understand what is meant by "indeterminism =/= randomness" so naturally it is tempting for me to say that it's nonsense. I assume smrk feels the same way. Maybe some progress would be made if you could explain what you think the difference is.

As far as I can tell, to say of two events A and B that it is indeterminate which will occur is to say that there is no reason why one should occur or the other, which to me is as good as saying that their occurrence is random. And it makes no sense at all to hold anyone responsible for the occurrence of events that have no reason for occurring.

The people I quoted are summarizing, they are not giving an extended nit-sensitive version of the standard argument – some of them are libertarians as I noted, so they obviously don't defend the second half of the argument (some of them are compatibilists, so they don't defend the first half). If you don't want to call it an argument, call it a seemingly unresolvable obstacle; libertarians generally accept that it's an issue they have to substantively address. They don't really say “you can't prove it's not a non-issue”. If you want extended nit-sensitive arguments one way or the other, you'll have to look for them in journals or books. That Information Philosopher site is good reference, it will lead you to the suitable materials, although most of them are not freely available.

At any rate, I think I've been reasonably precise in explaining what it is or what it takes for an event to be undetermined (for indeterminism to be true). An event is undetermined at t1 if the state of the world at t0 contains no fact or condition that accounts for that event occurring in the world at t1 (or for some set of properties of this event being realized or not). I don't then say that an undetermined event must be a further thing and that further thing is that it is random. I specifically think there's no meaningful way to break down 'undetermined' into any more categories. The absence of a thing, in this case the absence of a sufficient condition in the world to bring about some event, does not come in more than one variety. Saying that, I tend to use random as just another word for undetermined (in this context). If this usage is bothersome or confusing, I can make make my points without using it, in fact, it may be helpful not to use it.

That's fine but that's a punt, a nearly universal posture you can take about any conceptual problem that is unresolved.