How is someone morally responsible for doing x if it wasn't within her power to do otherwise than x?

Frankfurt...

Im not sure how you got that from what I wrote. I believe Im responsible for my decisions.I simply said Determinists define free will differently that we do. Determists define it as something like "will without cause."

I'm just stating what the issue is. If you say that free will is compatible with determinism, and your contention is that free will can be conceived as a higher order (although completely determined) mental faculty that involves conscious deliberation about the future, about moral factors, etc., it will still be difficult for you to explain (in the normative sense) why people should be held morally responsible for what they do.

No. Liberterian free will requires that actual free will exists outside the boundaries of cause and effect. Determinism is completely at odds with free will. It requires freedom from cause and effect.

I did make a bad characterization of compatibilists. Depending on who you read, you are correct in your description.

However, free will as a thing-in-itself is entirely incoherent with determinism. Dislike is not. Like is not. Change is not. Motivation is not. There is nothing inconsistent with me (as clockwork mouse) hating (for instance) injustice. There is nothing at all incompatible in determinism in noting that struggle, strife, argumentation, etc. exist and are wonderful.

Praise and blame both exist. To state that they don't is to ignore reality. To state that they are correct because we have a sense of them is also problematic.

Quite the opposite. We define it as will with cause.

I make all of my decisions based on what I know and who I am with some attention paid to the circumstances I find myself in.

Do you do differently?

Lol, i think we're crossed up. I'm saying determinist define free will something like will without cause - which is why they dont believe in it. Is that wrong?

Some determinists say that free will is something like 'will without cause'. They agree with libertarians about what free will roughly means but disagree that it exists. Other determinists say that free will is something like 'will with cause'. They disagree with libertarians and with other determinists about what free will roughly means; the former determinists are incompatibilists and the latter are compatibilists. The initial thing you said sounded like compatibilism.

Perhaps then I am a compatilist. I am perfectly comfortable knowing I have a choice to do whatever I feel and think is right (or wrong), which is how I define free will. I also have no problem with the notion that all of it could conceivibly be broken down to a series of thoughts and experiences for which I did not have full control; however, my decision was based on the culmination and prioritization of those components which I did conciously control through focus of reason.

Edit: btw, rereading the last post, Im still confused what you are saying- will revisit this sometime later

That is correct.

That it feels like we do have free will is because we go through an internal process that leads to decisions. In other words, "free will" to a determinist only exists as a false concept.

read...the...damned...thread.

lol, I am reading it, but it's gawdamn long.... and what I'm seeing so far, as in a lot of other threads on this topic, is a lot of wasted time where two or more people argue about this concept from different perspectives while also using differing definitions of free will. This tilts the shyt out of me because I think it is probably impossible to get anywhere in this manner. BTW, I think the different perspectives are fine and enlightening, but the differing definitions often create an impasse.

Anywho, I'll continue reading and maybe come back if I think I can contribute.

Look, I know what I'm talking about. Read the whole thing, then you can ask me questions. People in these debates (the philosophers, that is) are talking about the same things: we're not talking past each other, like you seem to think. Although, it's very likely that non-philosophers may be doing just that.

Determinists and Libertarians are using all of the same terms and concepts. Compatibilists disagree with them both on what it means to have "free will." The latter think that one can have free will even if everything is determined by causes and initial conditions. I think that the compatibilist view is incoherent, and I explain why in the thread (it has to do with the requirement of choice, and that choice can't happen with determinism).

This is what I'm talking about... it is a false concept because of the way you define it. To you, since will must have a cause it cannot be free, by definition.

I (and I believe many others) define free will in a different manner: as my ability to make choices on my own. It doesn't matter that my experiences and raw thoughts have causes that are beyond my absolute control, or even that much of this goes on unconsciously... it all still belongs to me. They are my experience, and my thoughts, and my unconscious mind, and my conscious rationality, and my priorities, and my focus, and my energy... So I am the one making the choices, ergo I have free will.

No problem, intend to. You may be a philosopher who has everything straight in his head. But are you contending that most of the other people ITT are as well?

This is why you're a compatibilist (or an agent-causationist).

You REALLY need to stop playing off the disagreement as people just "defining" things differently. Precisely what we're arguing about is the correct definition of free will.

The determinist/libertarian takes a look at your definition and says: but so what if we can draw a circle around an arbitrary shape ("you"), if what you decide was determined millions of years ago and there's nothing "you" can do to change that?

The determinist/libertarian says that THAT isn't "free will." You're just a domino in a long line, with no power to alter the future.

That most are NOT.

And this is what you are arguing to be true?

Edit: Nevermind, I'll just try and slog through this thread...

If you're a determinist or a compatibilist, it's what YOU'RE arguing is true. I'm a libertarian, so I think it's false.

http://www.informationphilosopher.co...atibilism.html

This looks similar to what I was writing, so I can see why I might fit into the category of Compatibilist. Maybe I am, or perhaps not because I am not a trained philosopher and I haven't quite worked it all out yet in my head. One could say I'm exercising my "free will..." and I'm sure others would say that's poppycock.

Anywho, this does seem to show an example where one group of philosophers is defining the term free will differently from another, which is something I was pointing at earlier as a hindrance to our collective progress in understanding the topic. Okay, back to reading.

Sigh...

We're arguing OVER the definition. It's not that people are using the same words, defining them differently, then arguing past each other, which is exactly what you said earlier ITT.

Seriously, STOP saying that.

Determinists/Libertarians say that "free will" means something different from what the compatibilist says it is. So that's where the argument focuses: is "free will" compatible with determinism?

Determinists and Libertarians say "no," Compatibilists say "yes." The further question, then, is whether what the compatibilist calls "free will" is the right thing. D/L's say that what C's call "free will" is nonsense: even if we can describe an agent as making a choice, she's not REALLY making a choice if determinism is true. If you're predetermined to do what you're going to do, then you're not "choosing" or "deliberating." Compatibilists, obviously, disagree.

I think compatibilism are incoherent: you can't deliberate or choose if all outcomes are determined.

How many examples from this thread of this shall I present so that you will STOP saying that? Look, I accept that you and the 2 other philosophers in this thread probably know when each other is talking about which definition, but you could probably do a better job making it clear to the rest of the crowd (and perhaps to each other).

Unless your free will is a part of the determination some how... I know it is hard to comprehend and I'm not making claims to understand. This argument reminds me a bit of certain paradoxes like the two envelopes problem, where the answer is pretty obvious to us from the outset, but damnit if logic/math seems to prove otherwise. It seems pretty obvious to most of us that we have control over our decision making, but it is not so simple to prove.

You are making this into a strawman argument again and conflating will with free will.

You are correct that you can't formally assign ultimate responsibility, or ultimate blameworthiness/praiseworthiness.

A determinist can recognize (and empirically study!!!) without any inconsistently or need for even bringing up free will that:

We can and do assign blameworthiness/praiseworthiness and guilt/innocence and make all sorts of ethical/moral judgements as part of the natural process of being human.*

We can and often are torn between two choices, even though the process neccessarily has one outcome which could be determined if we had perfect knowledge. A marble on a marble run can't just skip to the end despite the inevitability. Tear out the gearwork of a clockwork mouse and it doesn't act as a clockwork mouse.

We certainly can and do deliberate, even though the solution would be readily apparent with perfect knowledge. Add a bit of braininess to a dash of imperfect knowledge and a scant teaspoon of motivation, and you have the recipe for deliberation. Vary the quantities of the ingredients, and you can get quite a menu.

We can and do assign blame, just as I blame the rain for making me wet. Bringing up some esoteric fact about state of the universe during the big bang was as the cause would only make sense if I were capable of following the line of cause and effect. The more proximal cause is sometimes much more telling than a distal ultimate cause.

We can and do have intentionality, consciousness, values, judgements, etc. just as we have love even though it is obvious that it can be described it as a purely deterministic process.

We can and do scheme and struggle and put forth effort and argue and cajole and set up philosophy departments. None of these require the the least little bit of free will. They do require will (and the other stuff that everyone believes in).

*usually such judgements involve maleable things. We don't tend to rub a dog's nose in the carpet if it soiled it during a seizure, but will if it is requires better house-training.

Brian...ugh.

Just because we "do" blame (assuming determinism is true) doesn't mean that it's the same normative status as what we think it has. My claim is that "ought" only has normative force if there's genuine choice (or free will). This isn't true if determinism is true.

You're begging the question when you say that we do deliberate. I'm saying that what you're calling deliberation, if determinism is true, IS NOT actual deliberation.

CONTRADICTION, DUCY? (At least, for hard determinists and libertarians)


NO! This is the very question under discussion!

What does it MEAN to be "in control"? Is that sort of control required for "free will"? These are not settled questions.