Only to the extent that the laws of thermodynamics are unfalsifiable.

They're totally falsifiable. Holy crap; how do you not understand something so basic?

Okay, how do I falsify the hypothesis that energy can be neither created nor destroyed? (That the energy of a system is constant.)

It's an in principle falsifiable hypothesis. Predict some event, e, that would falsify the claim (this is not hard); if one observes e, then it's falsified. You can't do this for determinism/indeterminism.

There is no observable event that would falsify the claim by the standard you're applying here.

By ordinary standards, linking human behavior to quantum randomness would be sufficient to falsify the deterministic hypothesis.

Sure there is. This is DIFFERENT from the underdermination problem. But it's becoming clear that you can't make the distinction.

No, it isn't. There could be forms of energy that can't be observed, even in theory. This implies that thermodynamic hypotheses are underdetermined for all observable cases.

Again, DIFFERENT issue.

If you insist on basing your clockwork universe world view on the metaphor of the machine you ought to at least allow the full spectrum of machines rather than limit your metaphoric landscape to one particular machine type.

I think it's entirely feasible to program a computer to make decisions according to an algorithm based on fuzzy logic with a complex network of intermediate gates which open and close with dynamic probabilities according to indeterminate quantum random devices. The output of such a machine would be probabilistic and indeterminate in principle - assuming quantum indeterminancy. If you insist on seeing everything in the Universe, including the human brain, as being like a machine then you ought to at least consider the possibility it is more like this machine than your favorite swiss watch.

I understand this may say nothing about free will and I wouldn't argue such a machine has free will. I also think the human brain is likely far more complex than this indeterminate machine models. imo, making guesses as to its true nature based on what little we know now is less credible than David Sklansky debunking the big bang with a 4 letter acronym.



PairTheBoard

I think we know enough to connect some dots.

This seems bad.

I feel compelled to bump this thread.

I'm sorry to say you didn't do me a favor.

But let's get another round!

We like durkadurka to come back.

This thread is tldr. Why are we saying that compatibilism is incoherent? Compatibilist free will is just that which you have more of than an OCD patient or an alcoholic. I've always thought that libertarianism was incoherent.

I'm just really busy lately. I defend my dissertation next month, and I'm applying for faculty positions, as well as continuously sending out papers to journals. (I got my 2nd publication in October, which is good news. It's a much longer paper than my 1st.)

Then read the damned thread, because I go into it at length. Also, I'm not sure if you know what "compatibilist" free will means, since your analogy is so far off base. I think you mean something closer to "volitional control," which the compatibilist denies: compatibilists are just a special type of determinist.

This thread is pretty long. Can't I have a primer?

Why is "volitional control" a bad notion of free will? Also, I'm not sure I understand what you say compatibilists deny. Surely they don't deny that there is a difference between behavior that is compulsive and behavior that isn't.

My understanding is that compatibilism just says determinism is irrelevant wrt free will, not that it's true.

The free will debate is no longer in the hands of philosophers. Neuroscientists can give us much better answers:

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/y...at-you-choose/

Obviously, I don't find you to be of prime responsibility, but you will of course understand that I am compelled to wish harsh punishment to befall you for this.

For some reasons I won't get into, I'm compelled to feel kind-hearted today, so I will step in and try to help.

Determinism means that every effect is caused. Every little thing that happens, happens because it was made to be so due entirely to prior events.

Free will means that things (usually people) are able to act without regard to prior events to at least some extent. In other words, they have a degree of freedom to not follow the rules of cause and effect.

These two things are not compatible, even though the compatibilists state that they are compatible.

1) all things are perfectly caused
2) some things are not perfectly caused
3) WTF?!?

Volitional control is fine. But if you mean it to mean something about free will, you can't just limit it to freedom from current outside forces. You must also include freedom from your character, internal states, etc.

Mostly, people use volitional control to mean "I live a rich and important internal life filled with decision making based at least partly on my character and am not unduly influenced by the outside world. No one forces me to do what I don't want to do. I do what I want to do to some extent"* and forget that "what I want" and "character" are things that were caused.

Not really important, as they are spending their time arguing that the two things are compatible. You won't find any compatibilists who think that determinism isn't true afaik.

*A much shorter version is "I make my own decisions."

Right, so this is the part where compatibilists say, no, free will is something different and then they wonder whether the idea of a will that has the freedom not to follow the rules of cause and effect even makes sense.

I assume that there are arguments in this thread that try to show that compatibilism is somehow inconherent even working with the definition of free will that compatibilists advance, or that their definitions fail to satisify our intuitions or something like that.

Surely, "freedom from your character, internal states, etc." is something that one can have in greater or lesser degrees. That is why I bring up things like OCD, addiction, etc. Also I am tempted to go into a buddhist tangent about the concept of a "you" that is free from your own character, but I don't know if anyone will humor this.

I think it's kind of important, because I have no idea whether determinism is true, but I have a pretty good idea that free will has nothing to do with it. This is mostly based on the vulgar intuition that things like compulsions, bad habits, ideology, coercion, and etc. are more relevant to the concept of free will than one's preferred interpretation of the quantum formalism.

Brian, you got it wrong.

You described Libertarian free will. Compatibilists say: we have the sort of free will required for ascribing responsibility, but it's not the same as Libertarian free will. Compatibilists say that all events are determined, even our behavior, but that that doesn't matter: we can still have "free will" required for praising and blaming. I find that latter claim incoherent. And I've given arguments for that position. Hail needs to stop being lazy and do some work.

I can't remember where I read it, but who said it/what is it where you are free to do something if you could do it if you had chosen to do it?

Slightly grunching: In all the discussions about free will I've had so far (determinist v everyone else), I notice both sides are really talking about two different things.

Most people define free will as something like the ability to make your own choices based on a the combination of urges, motivations, and conscious deliberation. A determinist then argues that free will has nothing to do with that because everything is based on causation, i.e., prior states of urges, motivations, and even conscious deliberations are guided by past experience.

The discussion twists and spirals as both sides don't seem to get one another and try to prove their points. I began on the "everyone else" side, but as I've come to understand the determinist side (still not completely) it seems more and more like their side is not really incompatible with my beliefs. It's just that we are talking about two different things.

To me, the ability to deliberate, imagine the future consequences of my actions, weigh the morality of the situation, and eventually come to a decision is free will. Someone else with my exact experiences under the same situation may prioritize things differently, come to another conclusion and make a different decision. I realize a determinist can still distill all of my thoughts down to mechanical processes based on past states of being, etc., then claim that proves free will does not exist, but he's talking about something else entirely.

If you define free will this way (compatibilism), the main concern is that it's insufficient for moral responsibility.

I dont see why