I`m aware of how smrk is using it (from Strawson`s argument).

'ultimate' is referring to being the 'end of the line' source of an action. Strawson argues that we're undeniably influenced by our parents and the environment, so it's in principle impossible to be the 'ultimate' source of one's behavior since all of our behaviors are somehow at least partly influenced from external factors.

I grant this! But whether this is a necessary condition of responsibility is another question. Strawson really begs the question here (he appeals to intuition).

Causa sui is no fallacy. He's trying to argue that in no relevant sense is a person the first cause of their action. However, I point to the kayaker example. Let's assume for the sake of argument that the river and the kayaker's kayak and equipment are all deterministically caused. However, let's assume for the sake of argument that the kayaker himself is a 'first cause' for his paddling actions. In this example, although the kayaker is not the "ultimate" cause of his movement from point A to point B in the rapids (because the water is partially responsible for his movement), nevertheless the kayaker has some influence in the system into his movements. If this is the case, then this is what the libertarian is calling 'free will.' It is the sort of 'value added' part of his movement above and beyond what the 'system' can be said to be the author of. The kayaker's role is necessary. (This is different from agent-causation though! qua O'Connor).

okay, I see what you're getting at

Instead of going through each point, I'm going to try to more clearly and fully state my position. There are two discussions here. Initially, my disagreement with you was regarding your claim that pessimism was an obvious solution to the free will dispute. The reason I gave was that in my view the role moral responsibility plays in making sense of our moral and other normative judgements, sense of self, and emotional life was absolutely central, and so denying its reality would rip out much of the wiring behind our practical reasoning regarding ourselves and others.

Now, this doesn’t mean that we are morally responsible for our actions. If we can come up with alternative methods of practical reasoning—or if we reject the unity of practical and theoretical reasoning—then changing our views on those matters might not bother us very much. But to my knowledge we haven’t come up with alternative satisfactory accounts of practical reason, and rejecting the unity of reason gives up on much of the central goal of philosophy.

You haven’t really responded to this argument, but just sort of gestured towards neuroscience. Instead, you’ve mainly focused on the strength of the pessimist’s case. But this is kind of like pointing out that Descarte’s skeptical arguments are really strong and so we should just all become skeptics, or rejecting the conclusions of science because of the problems with induction. In philosophy there is always the lure of the really strong argument with the weird conclusion. We can accept that conclusion. But the strength of the arguments in favor of that weird conclusion doesn’t make it any less destructive of our other beliefs.

The other discussion is my defense of an account of retributive punishment. Here I’m sympathetic to durka’s response. But let me flesh it out a bit. I’ve claimed that punishment for (partially) retributive reasons is justified. I’ll take this to mean that desert is relevant to our justification of punishment. The argument you are raising against this claim is that since it is necessary for a person to deserve to be punished that he be the initial cause of the crime for which his is being punished, and since no one is the initial cause of any action, no one deserves to be punished.

First, let me grant that no one is the initial cause of their actions in the way you mean in this argument. My disagreement with you is about whether that is a necessary component of desert. It seems to me that you treat “desert” as referring to a metaphysical property of human beings, such that if we only had a fine enough moral microscope we could tell by just “looking” at a person whether she deserved punishment. This is not my view. I don’t think desert refers to a property of humans, but rather refers to appropriate responses to those people. That is, desert only makes sense within a system of reward or punishment—it is not a natural property.

On this view, whether or not your grounds for justifying punishment is retributive, consequentialist, or a combination of the two depends on what system you think is best. For instance, if you think that fairness should be a consideration in setting up such a system, then you will likely have to add some retributive grounds as justification for punishment. But notice that a retributive system that claimed that ultimate responsibility is necessary for punishment would be a very bad system. If, instead, we accepted a system of punishment where we punish those who intentionally violate other people’s rights, then assuming such a system can be justified, punishment for retributive reasons without ultimate responsibility can also be justified.

A couple of other points. Let me point out again how difficult it would be to view no one as being in control or responsible for their actions. Our conative feelings and evaluations would never be justified. Yet I don’t think it is possible for us to us to just stop having these feelings or evaluations. This would mean that we are perpetually condemned irrationality at the core of our actions towards other people.

Second, I don’t think the appeal the appeal to punishment in hell is a useful conceit. As I’ve already stated, I don’t think eternal punishment can be justified even on retributive grounds. But more importantly, the punishment of hell is for sin, not immorality, and so is not really about the same kind of desert that I am concerned with regarding moral responsibility. Strawson should realize this—after all, according to the Calvinist tradition, salvation does come from the choice of the believer, but is rather a gift from God. In other words, no one deserves to be saved.

I know, too long; didn't read. So, here's my brief summary. The mistake you are making is assuming that desert must be conceived of as a natural property of humans (what Dworkin calls a “moron"), and then arguing that since there are no such properties we cannot punish on that basis. I agree that no such natural properties exist, but I think we can still justify retributive punishment on constructivist grounds. That is, I think we can justify retributive punishment as an important part of a system of cooperation with other humans.

I love 'morons'...too bad it took wading through a 50+ pg paper

That is basically why I've said that all normativity is gone if determinism is true; you can't just get rid of punishment: all normativity is gone (ie, epistemology, ethics, etc.).

I'll try to reply sometime tomorrow if I have time, if not then monday.

Same for any consequence, given your view, right?

Clarity is not sufficient.

None of these is a description of clarity of writing.

Of course the reader needs to think. The problem is that if a piece of writing can be taken in more than one way, the writing is not conveying a clear message.

My view is that if the writing is not clear (in that it can be taken as meaning more than one thing), the writer has not done their job.

No, in an argument over a difficult subject, if there is an inane interpretation of your argument that stands out, then your argument itself stinks.

That would be a silly bet for me to take. Also, he only has a basic understanding of the major points.

Possibly true, but not related to our little discussion on clarity. Unless you are stating that you are arguing your ideas ITT to the bottom 10%.

Well, that's my point. Yours was that if there is a failure of understanding, it is a priori a failure on the part of the author (teacher, speaker) and not of the reader (student, listener).

Any piece of writing can be taken in more than one way.

Most classic literature is interpreted in more than one way in classrooms around the world, and most popular literature is interpreted in more than one way in every half-assed neighborhood book club that exists.

If the writing of the best writers ever fails to convey a clear message, then conveying a clear message is overrated.

Shall I convey that on back to Nietzsche, Hegel, and Wittgenstein, then? This is ridiculous.

If the inane interpretation is the one that stands out to you, then your imagination stinks.

I'm stating that an explanation can be (in itself) perfectly clear, but that doesn't guarantee that it will be understood. And that the person receiving an explanation has as much a part in whether and how that explanation is understood as the person giving the explanation.

Please do convey back to Hegel that as a writer he didn't do his job.

How much Hegel have you actually read Madnak?

He successfully communicated more powerful and influential ideas than at least 99% of other writers, didn't he?

Not much, I only started one of his books while staying at a friend's house, I don't remember which one (probably the Phenomenology of Mind). I remember being impressed - not that it matters. Do you deny that there are varying interpretations, or that he was a damned genius?

That's not the point of my comment. You claim that some statement is absurd and yet you haven't read the author that you're referencing.

I'm not interested in drawn-out exegesis, so you are welcome to think you've defeated Strawson's version of pessimism (hey, I've never met the guy). Although I think you are not correctly rehearsing his argument, I've said at least twice that your objection, given your reading of Strawson's argument, has merit. So my response to your objection is: I wouldn't use the term "ultimate responsibility". I think the better term is "genuine responsibility". Ultimate responsibility could mean that you have to be responsible for all the factors in the history of your life, in which case, that's not anything libertarians ever argued we had. The question is can we have genuine responsibility for any aspect of a choice, for any aspect of our mental nature? The answer to that, according to hard/pessimistic incompatibilists, is still no. One cannot be genuinely responsible for *any* act or any aspect of an act (the slightest volitional wobble, the kayaker paddling against the current) because an act is either a necessary consequence of a prior state of affairs (determinism) or it is a random occurence. Since you're not a compatibilist, you'd go straight to saying "random" isn't the only kind of indeterminism. So then we'd have a debate about it, which we've sort of already had, but that's really the crux of the debate between pessimists and libertarians, not "ultimate responsibility (as necessary condition for responsibility)" in the sense you were objecting to.

Please define 'genuine' since you've introduced a term and I have no idea what you mean by that.

But, to the rest of your post: correct, the libertarian denies the deterministic thesis and then seats the existence of free will in an indeterminate but not random process. In a sense something contributing to a free act is "sui generis." The objection is for the compatibilist to say "How? Explain the mechanics of such a thing!" To which I respond: I can't...not yet anyway. But besides, if you're seeking an empirical answer, you're making a serious category mistake.

It's very probable that it would rip out much of the wiring. I still don't understand why that's an objection to the solution. Maybe you think it's a good reason to consider alternatives to the solution. But that's only sensible if you think the pessimist's solution isn't demonstrably correct (just merely compelling). Since I think the solution is demonstrably correct, I'd need an example of something else that's demonstrably correct that's incompatible with the pessimist's solution.

Let me just say, my gesture to neuroscience wasn't what you seem to be taking it as. I made a parenthetical remark about what could “explain” human psychology. So, I'm not really sure what argument you want me to respond to? Do I have a theory for how to live and feel given that free will is demonstrably false? No, not quite. If you want to read a relatively long paper about what hard incompatibilists think remains after you remove robust moral responsibility, you could try Pereboom http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/hom...om/ALDENTE.pdf

But the problem of induction isn't "it's demonstrably correct that inductive reasoning is unjustified" or that "it's demonstrably correct that inductive reasoning in science is as good as writing a bunch of hypothesis on pieces of paper, throwing them in a bag, and then going with the one we pick out." Nor is it the case that Descartes' skeptical argument was demonstrably correct.

Since you summarize these points in your concluding paragraph too, I'll respond to them there.

Again, I'm not downplaying the awkward consequences of denying moral responsibility. However, I will disagree that it's impossible to adjust to the idea. There are plenty of religious, philosophical and mystical traditions which throw out notions that seem indispensable. Many of these traditions explicitly reject free will. And concerning the possibility of stopping reactive feelings and evaluations, isn't accomplishing this the primary focus of spiritual enlightenment?

In my last post, I explained why I thought it was useful. This could be its own discussion. As interesting as it would be to have, I can't keep up. But, aren't the Calvinists the hyper-predestinationists whose motivation for moral activity was to demonstrate to themselves that they were predestined to be saved?

If Hammurabi thinks that “an eye for an eye” is a rule that maximizes moral behavior in Babylon, isn't that a consequentialist-based justification even if the “punishment” is nominally retributive? If Hammurabi thinks that “an eye for an eye” is just regardless of maximizing moral behavior, then that's retribution proper, I would say.

I can't make much sense of the distinction you draw between thinking that desert is a property humans have and not an appropriate response to an action in the context of a system of punishment and reward. I didn't think that I was thinking of it in terms of properties people have, but I guess I'll have to ponder some more about it.

Genuine responsibility is just the kind of responsibility that libertarians think we have. Genuine responsibility can be opposed to causal or nominal responsibility (the storm was responsible for the flood) and compatibilist responsibility (the kind of responsibility both of us probably agree we don't have if determinism is true). But it's also to contrast with randomness ie I am not genuinely responsible for the random swerve of a particle in my head that influenced my decision.

I don't know if you saw this post or not (2-3 weeks ago), but I thought I had a pretty good idea in there. It was to address your empirical underdetermination point.

1. Do you think (the question of) the existence of minds is empirically underdetermined?

2. Do you think the existence of souls is empirically underdetermined?

3. Do you think the existence of extended substance that can interact with non-extended substance (and vice versa) is empirically underdetermined?

The point would be that free will is like 3. It's impossible in the same way as extended substance interacting with non-extended substance would be impossible. In other words, there's an a priori argument against it.

I left out, "but it is necessary." Clarity of language is necessary for any meaningful transmission of clarity of thought.*

*Crap. Durka and OP are gonna burry me here, I think.

tldr; but are you stating that complexity might make it difficult on the reader?

Response: from the first paragraph, I gleaned that I need to draw a picture to understand the words.

Classic literature is taught to show that +/- thought is needed.

Popular literature is read in classroome +/- "make you think" about something or other.

The writing of the best authors DNE ITT. Apologies if others happen to write great works at a later time. Still, they are not writing great works here.

I am really looking forward to you getting the Hegel joke that other posters have made at your expense. I actually mean this in the nicest way. This is one of those rare points in time that you could actually learn something due to something I say.

Not at all. The specific reason why your arguments stink is that you confound common definitions [b]and their correlates[b/] with specific definitions.

In general, I do not oppose this view. However, if a the majority of people say, "wft are you talking about?" given "people" as meaning the majority of the posters in this specific thread, it is probably the author. If after further explanation, the thought is unclear to anyone other than the author, it is probably unclear within the author.

As I said, I don't view this as an argument against your view per se. It is just a way of me disagreeing with your claim that pessimism is the obvious answer. One of the things I would want any good theory of human action to explain is human responsibility. It is possible that this is a goal that I should give up on, but that in itself is an unsatisfactory conclusion. No doubt I have this bias because I come at at this issue from ethics and political philosophy, but if our best theories of morality rely on moral responsibility, then any view that claims that moral responsibility doesn't exist will also have to show why those moral theories are incorrect.

Anyway, this is not really an important point--it is more a reflection of my ignorance than anything else.

Yeah. But here's how it worked using the old TULIP acronym:
Total Depravity
Unconditional Election
Limited Atonement
Irresistible Grace
Perseverence of the Saints.

Every single one of those points emphasizes the claim that human are unable to have any impact on their own salvation--it comes solely from the grace of God. More generally, according to Calvinist doctrine (based on a reading of Augustinian notions of Original Sin) we do not deserve hell because of any action we've taken, but because of our very nature itself.

I am just unable to make sense of that in a recognizably moral framework, and this makes me suspicious of talk of "deserving" to go to hell period.

Let me try again. First, it is of course the case that in most systems of punishment, even consequentialist systems, the reason you are punished is for something you did in the past--and hence your punishment in a certain sense is retributive.

What we are concerned with is the justification for the punishment. According to pure consequentialists, all punishment, even punishment for past actions is justified solely by reference to the consequences of that punishment. Thus, if the punishment would not have those positive consequences, then barring complications coming from indirect utilitarian considerations, the punishment would not be justified.

But here we can see how a system of retributive punishment can be justified. A consequentialist would justify a system of punishment on purely consequentialist grounds--usually by maximizing average or total utility. But there are considerations other than consequences that people can use to justify moral actions without presupposing "ultimate responsibility."

For instance, let's say that you want a system of punishment that doesn't just lead to positive consequences, but also treats people fairly. Now, in order for the punishment to be fair, we'll build in considerations such as equal punishment for the same crimes, habeas corpus, and whatnot into our system of punishment. But then these considerations are not justified solely by the positive effects that accrue from such constraints on punishment. Rather, we are justifying them by appealing to a principle of fairness (or justice), and since this principle is procedural, it doesn't distinguish between better and worse consequences. In other words, in this system punishment is justified because the criminal deserves to be punished as well as the positive social effects of punishment. But he doesn't deserve to be punished because he was the initial cause of his actions. Rather, it is because he intentionally acted unfairly towards other people in ways that people recognize should be punished.

Notice how there is no place in this system where I rely on facts about humans being ultimately (or genuinely) responsible for their actions. In fact, I make the exact same assumptions about humans that the consequentialist is making.

Complexity, clarity and lack of ultimate answers ITT.

Well, I hope I'm not coming off as a fanatic about it. I think there's a serious argument for it and I think I can make it, it just happens to be the only philosophical argument I can make so I try to get bang for my buck. If you think the argument is not conclusive, then you have no reason to revise your other theories.

I need a source on this, is this from Soteriological Home and Garden?

I don't mean to be dense, but what's bolded is what seems to be at the center of the disagreement or my confusion. Let me step back and give this (simplified) overview first.

If you are a libertarian, you think that a certain kind of radical freedom is required for moral responsibility. That kind of radical freedom is denied by compatibilists and pessimists. If you are a compatibilist, you think that a certain kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility too, but you think that kind of freedom is compatible with determinism. If you are a pessimist, you deny the possibility of moral responsibility period. Now, compatibilists fill out their concept of freedom in different ways (e.g. Frankfurt and higher order volition). Pessimists may concede that the compatibilists describe our attitudes correctly (that they ascribe intent and belief and second order volition correctly), but they will disagree that such descriptions identify features that are actually sufficient for moral responsibility.

So when you say one might justify punishment because the perpetrator intentionally acted unfairly and not because the perp was the first cause, you're really not distinguishing anything that the pessimist considers relevant. The pessimist predictably will say that the perpetrator has no morally relevant control over his intentions. That he acted unfairly was determined by factors outside his control, and the carousel goes round and round.

Now, maybe this is the point I have been missing. Is your point that the principle of fairness is not related to this carousel? That it's simply fair to treat people in the same way, and that's why non-consequentialist punishment can be just? I'm acquainted with the principle of fairness from phil of law I think; the problem of freeloaders? It wouldn't seem right though that you could justify otherwise unjust punishment just to be fair (and all punishment would be otherwise unjust if moral responsibility were impossible, ignoring consequentialist considerations).

All three are empirically underdetermined. It's the difference between metaphysics and science.

Metaphysics need not produce testable predictions...science does. The positivists (and the pragmatists before them) rejected metaphysics for this reason. Fortunately, Popper put the matter to rest and explained how they were undermining their own project by trying to draw the distinction between metaphysics/science the way they were.

Here you go.

So you think that it is not a priori false that extended substance can interact with non-extended substance?