What is the distinction between "modeling the game" and "modeling the actions"?

Modeling the action means constructing a representation or simulation of the action itself. (I don't consider the statement "take action x" to be a model of action x.)

Modeling the game doesn't require that - for example, you can model the game by simply representing the "branching structure" by which one route leads to another (as a tree diagram, for example). You don't need to indicate which action must be taken in order to reach a particular branch - only where that branch leads.

So...

Prompt: How many beans are there?

If four, then print "Take one bean."
If three, then print "Take one bean."
If two, then print "Take two beans."
If one, then print "Take one bean."

Does this model the action?

Given that the action we're talking about is taking beans? Yes, I'd say it does, but not internally.

Then it's a fallacy.

What does it take to "model internally"?

How do you mean?

That whatever is doing the choosing is also doing the modeling as part of its internal processing and not its interactions with the external world.

That's known as the fallacy of ignorance.

Because I don't know x, then x is false. Fallacy.

Your position may be different in that you may mean: If x is unknowable, then x does not exist.

This is different but still begging the question: why is knowability a necessary condition for existence?

Can you elaborate? It's hard to parse because you're telling me that I have a "model" of something, but apparently, I keep modeling the wrong thing (or I'm modeling in the wrong way or wrong place).

Also, would you consent to reducing the number of starting beans to 3? I chose 4 initially because 4 is two bits' worth of information, but in terms of not overcomplicating the issue, I think 3 would be a better choice.

Can we change the title of this thread to "durkadurka and the sound of crickets"? You want madnak to acknowledge his 'fallacies' and mistakes, but you won't acknowledge your own?

I think he is trying to get at something or other about modeling in the psychological sense.

Modelling is part of cognitive psychology that covers internal representations of the external world.

It is an attempt to understand how you can think about the world and imagine future possibilities without the world actually being in your head for you to mentally manipulate.

For instance, you can drive across town to a bar you have never been to, because you have a model of the layout of the city in your noggin. Modelling lite* would describe it as kind of sort of like a map in a way.**

Modelling is just an internal representation of the world. It also includes the ability to mentally manipulate the model to imagine "what if" scenarios without going through the expense of trying each potential scenario out.

*As in Miller Lite. Not quite the same as actual beer.

**There is also no actual map in your head.

[long winded aside] Perception and cognitive psychology can be very dense. You don't really actually see with your eyes. Everyone knows that, I think. You see with your brain (ok, your eyes do help and actually do some pretty cool initial "analysis" of the light). The way in which you see (and what you "see") is related to, but not at all the same as what is actually happening in the real world. Your view of the world is shaped by your brain in an entirely unconscious manner. You (unconsciously) fill in blanks, make assumptions, and throw out a huge amount of the information coming in through your eyes. You also unconsciously make "corrections" to reality to make it work better. So, what you see is only related to what it actually there. Some things that are clearly there are not even possible for you to experience.

Cool set of experiments that has been done: Put kitty cats in an environment with only vertical lines. They are incapable of jumping on a table. They are also incapable of avoiding clunking their heads on low tables.

Poor kitties.

Follow up experiment: Put different kitty cats in an environment with only horizontal lines. Put them in a maze. Watch and try not to laugh as they run into each every wall.

Poor different kitties.

Even without the experiments, people are tuned in biologically to notice certain things and ignore other things. Ignore is not quite strong enough of a word. We just don't see them at all.

We see objects that are important to our survival and are completely incapable of even noticing things that are unimportant to survival

I believe I had a point I was trying to make, but I can't remember what it was. Something or other about modelling and perception and cognition.
[/long winded aside]

Madnak, you are misunderstanding emergence and complex systems, which is killing me.

Emergence is complexity due to interaction between simple parts that change the future actions of the parts, along with the entire system of simple parts causing stuff that the simple stuff cannot cause by themselves.

The second part is the more important here. It causes something completely new that could not a priori be predicted purely by looking at the parts. There is no a priori modelling possible. There is something new that can be argued

The first part is just a more complex rube goldberg machine. It causes great difficulty in prediction, but you can work backwards at least. This can be modeled a priori, but would just take some thought.

Every single on of your examples and arguments has led to you making an excellent counterargument to what you appear to by trying to argue.

Seriously, you make decent intuitional first statements, but it is like after that you just want to be abused.

I guess I don't see how a chess simulation "significantly resembles or corresponds" to the action of moving a chess piece then. It's not like the computer is modeling the action of moving your hand, picking up a chess piece, and moving it to another square. It sounds like this is what you are wanting my simple circuit to model with respect to turning on a light.

If this is true, I don't understand how one "puts the action in" of moving a chess piece in a complex circuit.

The comment re your definition of "evaluation" and "weigh and rank" was tongue in cheek, given how at least 3 people in this thread have thought that you seem to be consistently shifting definitions around. Sorry if you missed that.


Then how is a more complicated chess circuit a model of moving a chess piece (the action)?

I know. I was pointing out the fact that you reworded "turning on a light" to "state of the light being on/off" simply so you can say: "See! it's not even an action!"


It is a fundamental aspect of information theory that the logic of something like a chess game can be programmed into a circuit. Again, that's how computers work. If the game situation is simple enough (like say there are only 2 legal moves and checkmate follows), it is trivial to program the logic of such a game into a circuit. And it would only take a simple variation of my light bulb circuit to program this.


OK, I'm really really curious as to what defining criteria you are using for a model then. As in, how do you tell whether X is a model or not a model.


Again, what the heck distinguishes a model from not a model then. It's trivial to program a circuit (a simple circuit; like mine with some simple variations) to analyze a situation where there are two outcomes, the values of these outcomes, and the actions of arriving at those outcomes (e.g. checkmate/draw). This is like the entire point of the field of information theory. The only reason you would need a full computer to model the chess game is if it got more complicated (and then, you'd obviously just be adding more circuit components).

How on earth does a blank picture meet any sort of defining criteria for a map?


I'm obviously really really curious as to what your answers will be to Aaron's latest questions.

He doesn't need to. Madnak's ideas are completely off the cuff.* Responding to his fallacies here is nearly a full time job.

Madnak is working purely within his own ideas, which would be cool, except that the ideas he has are not unique and have previously been argued to be inconsistent with reality and logic.

The objective of an argument/debate is to attempt to win and then admit defeat graciously, if necessary.** Madnak's arguments are so full of holes, that there is no reason for Durka or Aaron W. to defend their positions.

Smart dude, but reading a book or two on the subject before posting would be helpful.

Nothing he has said has been beyond the level of a genious, yet, uninformed 10 year old.

The sad part is that he is supposedly on my side of the fence. I would seriously have him court-martialed for aiding the enemy if this were a war.

*He has, in so many words admitted this.

**the willingness to accept defeat is the important part. Plus, I totally made the objective thing up.

Brian,

You're missing what the exchange was between me and durka. He offered an unsolicited critique of what I said and then insisted that he was right when he turned out to be demonstrably wrong. He then said that I had "a very hard time separating descriptive from prescriptive statements" which he fished out of his nether cavity.

And now that I've cited three contemporary philosophers (G Strawson, Kane, Dworkin - and I can just easily find 20 more) who use the term "pessimistic incompatibilism" and understand that it does in fact differentiate a specific view, he doesn't have the courage to say that he was wrong, and more importantly to promise to do a basic google the search next time he tries to correct someone ITT.

That madnak has been flailing in this thread for 20 pages is not anything I'd dispute, but he's not a grad philosophy student.

In a gesture of infinite magnanimity, I will let you know that Pereboom calls what I've called here "pessimistic incompatibilism" "hard incompatibilism" (again as distinct from hard determinism) so I was ever so slightly incomplete (although the labels point to one and the same general view).

It doesn't matter that Kane/Dworkin use it. I'm not contesting that it's in the literature! I'm saying that it's a stupid name for a position! Geebus!

This is why you don't get the distinction between descriptive/prescriptive. I'm not saying that you're wrong that people use that terminology. I'm saying that THEY (and you as well) shouldn't use it.

This would be better than 'pessimistic'...

Now you are just doubling down on the stupid. First, you didn't merely say it's a stupid name for a theory. You said it was a rhetorical term that didn't distinguish a position after you said pessimism only applies to incompatibilists who think determinism is true. Both claims are plainly, demonstrably false.

Second, if you are going to use the "aw shucks, all I said it was a stupid name for a theory" defense, then don't insult my intelligence again in the next line by reiterating that I don't get the distinction between descriptive/prescriptive!! How did I possibly make any such mistake when I have correctly recounted not only the philosophical view attached to the label, but also correctly shown that this is indeed the label philosophers use?!?! Dworkin, Kane, Strawson, Double, Honderich, Waller, Smilansky... THEY shouldn't use the term and THEY don't know the difference between descriptive and prescriptive? Are you ****ing joking?

I'm not saying that they don't know the difference. I'm saying that YOU think I was making a claim about the descriptive fact that they actually use it. You think that I was saying that they don't use the term. That is false. I was saying that they shouldn't use it because it's just a rhetorical term. They do know the difference between descriptive and prescriptive but they still shouldn't use that term.

I'm suggesting that you've made a mistake for my prescriptive claim thinking that it was descriptive.

I am grunching from somewhere or another (several hundred posts ago) but I noticed quite a few people (most? all?) itt believe that it is in principle impossible to determine if free will is or is not the case. If you hold this position why discuss it at all? Shouldn't it just be like... next topic? This is a serious question.

Like people have been arguing over certain ideas seemingly forever where both sides agree that it is impossible to determine which side is correct via any methodology. And... I don't get it.

Because if that's your criterion, you should stay the hell away from philosophy.

There are still interesting sub-topics that lead to an understanding of our intuitions and unconsidered concepts. Concepts such as causation and responsibility.

You think that it's not important to our daily lives if we find it difficult to justify the necessary and sufficient conditions for holding someone responsible for their actions?

It matters to some degree but I don't think people (or society) take cues or direction from philosophical discussions very often. Like I don't think philosophers philosophizing about free will has any significant social impact but when we look back trying to explain how society functioned we tend to say this society did such and such because these philosophers believed this and that. I'm not denying connection entirely.

This post was written under sleep deprivation and painkillers. I apologize if it doesn't make too much sense and I'm going to sleep now.