In your concept of how the brain works, when a neuron fires, is it "automatically and robotically following instructions"?

Edit: I see someone already beat me to it.

WTF?

They are built via circuits. That doesn't mean they have all the properties of circuits, and circuits have all the properties of them.

Humans are made out of atoms. Does that mean that a human being has the same properties as an atom, and an atom has the same properties of a human being? Of course not.

It's a fact that humans are "a bunch of atoms." But humans can do things that atoms can't do, like eat, think, and ****.

A computer is "a bunch of circuits." But computers can do things that circuits can't do.

I can point to a model inside the computer memory. A data representation of the move in question. You can't point to any model in your circuit - there is no internal representation or simulation of the outcomes.

It doesn't matter what it's based on. You can't determine the properties of a thing by looking at the properties of a component of that thing.

Probably so.

Don't tell me that you, too, are incapable of understanding emergence?

Never mind, clearly we won't get anywhere on that front.

Emergence is not a decided-upon topic. The metaphysics of emergence is extremely controversial. Are you presupposing that it is not?

I didn't say neurons were the same as circuits and computers. I said they were following its inputs automatically and robotically LIKE a circuit and LIKE a computer. Neural networks like the brain are just more complicated.

Right. And my particular arrangement of a resistor in series with a switch and light bulb results in properties that a resistor by itself doesn't have. So what?

You aren't giving special status to cognition and neurons again are you?

I never said anything about reductionism nor nihilism. I'm simply just following your definitions to their natural conclusions.

My light bulb circuit makes decisions. So what?

First, tell me what you mean by this. Because if it's some broad, nebulous thing like everything else you've put forth so far, the answer is probably that I don't understand a word you're saying, and you're only saying one word.

Whether emergence can "add new information" and things like that are controversial. Simple emergence is not.

What is "simple emergence"? And is it supposed to be "self-evident" that this is not controversial?

They are not "just" more complicated. They have different properties. "Complication" isn't the only one.

So, those properties are what define the circuit. A resistor alone is not a circuit. A resistor alone doesn't have the behaviors of a circuit.

A circuit alone is not a chess computer. A circuit alone doesn't have the behaviors of a chess computer (including choice).

You did, you just didn't mention them by name.

I never said they did. What I'm wondering is why are you giving special status to these other properties?

No, and I never said they did. I have no idea what your point is.

Yep, so what?

Yep, and my light bulb circuit can do things that a resistor can't do. So what?

The computer memory is COMPLICATED CIRCUITRY. I can point to a model in my circuit. A data representation of the state of the light bulb.


What does this have to do with ANYTHING in regards to "choice", "decision", etc.?

And WHY are you giving special status to these different properties???



Yep, so what?

I agree. So what?

Edit: I didn't see your (including choice) at the end. I obviously disagree with that part. Based on your definition of choice, my circuit is making decisions.



You mean the words and arguments I'm using have certain implications? IMAGINE THAT. WAIT, TIME TO REDEFINE STUFF.

It's pretty simple. Simple interactions can result in complex patterns that aren't a feature of the simple interactions themselves (when taken in isolation).

For example, atoms do not exhibit barking. But dogs are composed of atoms. And dogs do (as a result of the specific interactions) exhibit barking. Barking emerges from dogs based on how their atoms work together (even though none of those atoms is itself capable of barking).

And the ideal gas laws emerge from electrostatic interactions between atoms.
As does capillary action and surface tension in water.
Molecular orbitals, too.
Multicellular behavior emerges from the interactions of individual cells - and multicelled organisms engage in behaviors than no single cell is capable of.
Crystals have intricate patterns even though no such patterns can be found on the individual molecules composing those crystals.
Fractals can be generated from very simple algorithms.
In fact, many patterns emerge from algorithms.

Etc.

The fact that individual neurons do not exhibit choice doesn't imply that the brain does not exhibit choice, any more than the fact that individuals water molecules do not exhibit surface tension implies that bodies of water do not exhibit surface tension.

I just described it. And I think it would be self-evident, in an ideal world. Sadly, it's not self-evident in the real world.

Because that's how choice is defined in this conversation.

If you want to know why I view choice as meaningful, I've already answered but I can do that again.

But I don't think choice has "special status" in the sense you seem to mean. It's not magical.

It's the actions that need to be modeled. Not the state of the light bulb.

You said that a computer is the same as circuit, and has the same properties. That if a computer can choose, then so can a circuit.

That's false. Just because a computer is made up of circuits doesn't mean it's just a more complicated circuit - it has properties that circuits don't have. A chess computer, for example, has the properties sufficient for choice.

Funny. Except that none of my definitions implied possibility.

Madnak: your definition of emergence is still extremely controversial.

There are multiple ontological interpretations of what you're describing. What sort of 'reality' do the 'emergent' properties have? How do they come about from their substrative causes? How do they interact with those causes?

It's a thin line between that and dualism.

To me, this definition has never really meant anything. I'll explain why below:

A dog consists of atoms, but a dog is not defined by "a collection of atoms." There's some sort of dog-ness required by the arrangement of atoms before you can have a dog. This same type of objection to your categories applies at other levels:

A "gas" consists of "atoms" but a particular atom is not a gas.

"Water" consists of molecules of H2O, but a single H2O molecule would not be "water" in the same sense of the word. It is a "water molecule."

etc.

The relationship "consists of" is extremely nebulous with respect to the properties of the object. A "pair" "consists of" two objects. But it is not the properties of the objects which define "pairness." In fact, the entire *CONCEPT* of pairness exists in the absence of the objects from which it may be comprised.

So what reason would there be to expect that the properties of what an item "consists of" should be that which defines the properties of the item itself?

I go away for less than a day, and madnak makes a relevant point.

I think (hunch only) that free will would require some sort of duality. Emergence would not be sufficient, I think.

How is emergence controversial? The brain is just made up of a big old pile of neurons. Neurons work due to chemical reactions. Chemical reactions are deterministic.* I doubt anyone is prepared to argue that chemical reactions are conscious (even a little bit). Consciousness either is brain activity (which I doubt - see neurons bit above), or it comes from brain activity (unless you are dualist, in which case, you could have the brain as a conduit or some other silly thing), but it is not the same thing as the brain.

As proof, I cite The Might Be Giants: I'd like to change your mind (he said), by hitting it with a rock." I actually know how to do an icepick frontal lobotomy, and it clearly does "change your mind."***

FWIW, consciousness was completely disdained by psychology research up until relatively recently. Dennet and Searle annoyed psychologists enough that they started working on it.

*I admit there is the possibility that they are probabilistic, but I doubt that this is the case.

**footnote left out due to something or other.

***This would be considered a threatening comment if I were making this argument while holding an ice pick in your presence.

"No thing is an island" to rephrase.

That is just repeating your claim that we can't figure it all out, right?

I don't even know what there is to "figure out." It doesn't seem that there is any reason for there to be an obvious/direct connection between the object and the objects it "consists of."

It could well be that this is a "self-evident" property of stuff, but that seems to be true in some sort of tautological sense, and not in a meaningful non-reductionist sort of sense.

I think that there is a relationship can be proven to exist by the ability to change the object by breaking one of the objects it consists of. Rock to the head works pretty well, but is non-specific: "Ouch! I don't feel very smart any more."

Better evidence for this are temporal lobe epilepsy (which is WAY cool, unless you have it)*, lobotomies (which are oddly specific in their effects), strokes, Phineas Gage type accidents, etc. etc.

This is enough to establish a direct relationship must exist, I think. I can't think of any way in which there could be an indirect connection (other than some sort of dualism).

How to figure out the nature of the relationship is severely problematic though. Baby steps are being made by research, but afaik, so far only correlates have been found for perception and planning.

*there is nothing cooler than watching a pacifist attack someone with serious intent to harm (including growling and biting).

You should look into the underdetermination problem of science (ie, problem of induction). No such conclusive 'proof' is possible.

I'm not saying that the whole has no relationship with the parts. I'm just saying that the relationship "consists of" does not seem to carry any essential properties.

That a pair of shoes "consists of" two shoes does not mean that "pairness" is related to "shoeness." Obviously, if you lose one of the shoes, you don't have a pair anymore. But that's not the issue.

Here are the same examples phrased in those terms:

* "Brainness" has nothing to do with "lobeness."
* "Waterness" has nothing to do with "water molecule-ness"
* "Gasness" has nothing to with "atomness"

So to take the idea of "consists of" as if it must have some sort of "property-transferness property" seems to be an error.

This is nothing other than a big old pile of red herrings.

We are on the same page over all, as far as rules of engagement go, but you are being lazy here. Argue against my specific post, instead of arguing against an imaginary viewpoint.