I think madnak changed his definition of choice from the one he used earlier in the thread. Could someone who has been following this thread more closely than I list the definitions he has used? I'm curious and I don't feel like mucking through all the posts.

(and sorry I haven't gotten back to my last post, I may at some point if I catch up on the thread)

I think it's a example of embarrassing and inexcusable philosophical impotence. The free will debate is one of the easiest, straightforward debates in philosophy. Yet a lot of people want to pretend that there are some kind of deep intuitive incommensurability reasons for why modern philosophers cannot come to an agreement about it.

Post #104:

Post #962:

By internal process what does he mean? Is he restricting this to the "mind" basically? Or are computers and other stuff included too?

And I'm assuming his 2nd definition is the working one?

If you remove the word "free" from your definition of choice are you left with anything? That would be a good place to start.

If not, we need either a new definition or a new word to attempt to understand each other. We have spent way too much time arguing to straw men versions of each other. I would like to avoid this as much as possible.

This is actually the part of the debate that interests me most. Not the definition part, but the consequences part.

We need definitions that we both can share that are devoid of assumptions regarding free vs. fully constrained.

At some point we will have to deal with some other issues, but this should be a good start.

You need definitions but you don't need one and the same definition. It's not like free will has a universal definition and then people offer evidence that it exists or doesn't exist or offer arguments that it is consistent or inconsistent with a priori principles. It's more like philosophers put forward a hypothetical account of what free will could be based on a set of ordinary language meanings and associations of free will and then they consider whether there are any a priori implications and evidence pro/con. The difference is that with the latter approach you don't spend 3 pages debating whether a choice *must* be defined as requiring more than one possible future.

You just said in a lot of words, what I said in a few.

The only thing you added was that complete agreement on definition and the implications of such definition is not necessary to begin a discussion.

You should probably ask him.

fyp:

http://www.scientificamerican.com/bl...y-d-2010-04-06

All definitions are (by definition) a priori. The definitions being offered are not necessarily of how we actually use the word "choice," after all, they might be revisionary of our language use. The question is not whether "choice" must be defined as allowing for actual possibilities, but whether the hypothetical definition of "choice" offered by madnak is consistent with our other views--such as our views about the nature of moral responsibility and determinism. If it is not, then madnak is free to continue defining choice in that way, but only if he changes his beliefs about determinism or moral responsibility.

I don't see why you are simply asserting the Wittgensteinian view of language I described above as if it were accepted truth in this thread when it is clearly not.

For the incompatibilitst thesis to go through, you have to show that all conceptions (definitions) of free will are inconsistent with either determinism or moral responsibility. Generally speaking there are two ways you show that any proposed definition of free will fails this critierion. Either you can show that the definition is inconsistent with determinism or moral responsibility or you can show that the definition is incoherent. Most of the argument (lately) has seemed to revolve around durka trying to show that madnak's definition of choice is incoherent.

Now personally I think that durka has failed to show this. I have not identified any contradiction in madnak's definition of "choice." Durka has also asserted that this definition is inconsistent with moral responsibility, but since I don't know what notion of moral responsibility either he or madnak is working with and I certainly haven't read everything in this thread...

That's been disputed (famously), although that's not my position. I'm quipping to understand why you're pointing this out. You can define a bluenicorn as a blue horse with a horn and then try to find evidence for the existence of bluenicorns or you can ponder about some a priori implication of bluenicorns.

This is what I meant to say; so if I failed to say it, I agree with you here. I don't know if you've followed the thread but my position is hard incompatibilism/pessimism - I think compatibilism is problematic for reasons very similar to the ones libertarians here cite. However, I also think the libertarians have recently not been mindful of what actual 'professional' compatibilism contends.

I do not intend to assert any specific view about language, but it's at least true that compatibilists do not define free will in the same way nor meeting the same criteria as libertarnians. My point is that it's fairly uninteresting whether they are nominating the same objective phenomenon or not.

That's my comment I guess - I don't see how madnak's conception of a choice as a selection-algorithm can possibly be incoherent (I understand people are accusing him of changing his tune or whatever - but assume that's his conception). If a person is inclined to say that a chess program "chooses" the best move, there's a thoroughly adequate conception there. What would be incoherent to me is if madnak says the selection-algorithm view of choice is sufficient for damning some one to hell for heinous crimes.

Alright so I guess I agree with you again?

Comity, it seems?

Sure, do you have a view about free will one way or the other btw?

Just as a point of fact, I haven't been using "free" with "choice" but this is because of the context of the usage of choice.

But to answer the question, an essential element of choice is the ability to actually make that outcome happen. For example, I cannot "choose" to turn off gravity. So the notion of "possibility" is tied very closely to some form of actually making it happen.

For example, I can consent to a notion of "random choice" by flipping a coin (treated as a random event) as long as the outcome for each side of the coin is different. I wouldn't say this is a "free" choice because it's constrained by the outcome of the coin, and in no sense tied to any "will" of the person.

But it really seems that choice requires multiple outcomes that can actually happen.

I hope my clarification on the concept of choice is more clear from the explanation above.

I can follow a position under a determinist view for the sake of discussion. But what this entails is that I'm going to ask repeatedly what things mean and whether it's still sensible. Going back again to my discussion with MrBlah, maybe he does view that an apple tree "chooses" when to drop its apples, and that rocks "choose" the path of water runoff, and that the earth "chooses" the path for a river. If he does, then he can at least move forward with a consistent notion of choice (and if he's going to make some sort of argument, I can consent to that definition to see where he's going). But if not, then the definition needs revision.

These consequences are the things that interest me, because they help to focus in on what is really at stake in the conversation. Is this what you mean by "consequences" instead of "definitions"? Or are you referring to other types of consequences?

This interests me. Why not?

As to the concept of moral responsibility I'm only using a sense which has choice as a necessary condition.

I'm trying to avoid the changing definitions (the latest is different than the one he used when I asked earlier), they confuse me and I don't understand how one can have a philosophical discussion when words mean different things from one post to the next. I haven't had time to catch up on the thread either so I'm looking for a baseline with respect to the definitions being used. I figured madnak clarified what he meant at one point... maybe not.

Plus Aaron and others are all responding much quicker.

If madnak responds first, then fine, but I have my reasons for asking the participants in the thread in general and not only him, so don't worry yourself.

If you've been following the thread at all, lots of us have no idea what Madnak means by his definitions because when they come under pressure things change really fast and not all that coherently.

So, "ask him" is really the only response we can give.

That's not enough information. Did you internally model and evaluate the action of taking the heavier object, or didn't you? If I have no reason to believe otherwise, I'll assume that you did and that it was a choice.

I agree that epistemological questions are a side-track.

So it seems. Should I take this to mean that you claim every time I grab an object, that's necessarily a choice? (And that, therefore, every time I grab an object there is some indeterminacy involved?)

No, it may be "choosing" to make a random move, but if it's just directly programmed to move randomly then it's not choosing. (It may appear to be choosing to an outside observer, but not to someone who knows its programming.)

If it's not relevant to why you think choice and determinism are incompatible, then I'm happy to leave it alone.

It's a broader definition, and it conflicts with my more specific definition in that sense. Fundamentally, how wide the circle is doesn't especially matter to the debate for my end of things - it can be broad enough to include apple trees and crags on mountains, or narrow enough to apply to only one specific choice, and it's consistent with determinism either way.

My point is that overall, I think broader definitions are better for clarity. However, I need a narrower definition here due to the word games being played (and maybe general nittery). My current definition seems to do the best job of fitting my behavior (my actual day-to-day use of the term), as I haven't yet been able to think of anything that fits my definition but not my use of the word or vice versa. (Barring obvious jokes and metaphors.)

I think my definitions are relatively clear in context. The characteristic tactic of my opponents here is to remove my words from their original context and try to redefine them. In some cases, maybe my use is ambiguous, but that still doesn't justify taking your preferred definition and running with it simply because my use didn't quite rule it out.

If I were to define "choice" as "high-quality," you would be right. But I think we all get the sense in which I'm using choice - the sense in which it applies to decisions. Within that sense, the broadest possible interpretation applies until some narrower interpretation can be agreed upon.

What's disingenuous is to attempt to narrow a definition without the consent of the other party. Such as defining a "range of options" as including "actual-world possibility" when nothing in the context suggests anything of the kind, defining "possibility" as temporal possibility when the context implies counterfactual possibility, and defining "time" based on temporal possibility when the context is a system in which temporal possibility cannot apply (determinism).

Conceptual analysis is NOT redefining words. It's taking YOUR definitions and analyzing their logical implications.

This sounds like a brilliant view, and almost seems like a truism the more I think about it. Looking on the Wiki, it seems like Quine is a proponent of this position. I really have to read that guy.

This doesn't only assume that there's "something there," but that the "something" is universal for everyone (that is, that my analysis of the "something" will, if performed correctly, always yield the same results as your analysis of the "something").

"Where I am" on the issue is that language itself is arbitrary, but the human brain is capable of containing "ideas" that are independent of language. However, these "ideas" are never the same from person to person and neither are their linguistic expressions. In other words, while Bob and Tom may both have "ideas" that they refer to as "choice," both Bob and Tom will never mutually refer to the same idea when they use that word.

Bob's ideas are part of Bob - they can't be viewed as independent from Bob. Same goes with Tom's ideas. No two people can have the same idea. Furthermore, I think neuroscience will prove this within my lifetime. When we learn how the brain stores concepts, I think we'll find that no two brains store the same concept in the same way. I believe this on the basis of our current neuroscience.

Since we are evaluating the internal consistency of my philosophical system, it is my conception of choice that is relevant. Durka can't just go off and independently perform a conceptual analysis of my conception of choice! Furthermore, even if he were right that two different people can analyze the same concept (which seems bizarre to me, but whatever), it would still be a problem when two people come up with different results. Durka wants to unilaterally move the result of his analysis forward, when others have achieved a different (and contradictory) result. Nuh-uh.

Your "actual-world possibility" is not a logical implication of any definition I've given (or anything I've ever said here or anywhere - you made it up).

I think including cognition was a mistake. Otherwise, any definition I've given works, they all describe roughly the same set of things.

But the definition I'm currently working with is "to take a course of action as a result of an internal process that enumerates and evaluates modeled actions."

The original one, modified to get rid of cognition, is (IIRC) "selection from a range of options."

Or for simplicity you could just simply use "selection" or maybe smrk's "selection-algorithm" is more descriptive.

So long as you don't try to add something (like possibility - none of these definitions mention possibility), take your pick. Most of them are just restatements of the others. For example, "selection" = "tak(ing) a course of action as a result of an internal process" and "range of options" = "enumerate(d) and evaluate(d) modeled actions." So, "selection from a range of options" can also be states as "to take a course of action as a result of an internal process that enumerates and evaluates modeled actions."

I'm just trying to be more specific with the new definition in saying exactly what I mean by "select" (pick internally) and "options" (considered/evaluated actions).

Then engage that argument! You can't just assert the opposite of the conclusion without an argument.

So far, your objection is merely "nuh uh." You've only made assertions and no arguments on this topic.

Oh, and Quine is bat**** insane. Indeterminacy of translation and no "fact of the matter" on language use and all normative issues is a problem. He removes normativity from all normative disciplines. You don't seem to want to do that: if you're a compatibilist, you think that speaking of responsibility and using normative terms is meaningful.

This is really lol. Actually, that is exactly what is allowed.

If your definition of Table has a problem for your position on objects, then something is either wrong with the definition or your theory.

I've suggested that your definition of choice is a good one. So either you'd need to reject the definition (and face charges of ad hoc-ery) or accept that the theory is in trouble. Or, alternatively, go after the analysis. However, you're still stuck on the mere methodology and applicability of conceptual analysis.

You're confusing the issue.

Which is it? The method or the content of the analysis?

Yeah, I'm basically a lazy compatibilist. That is, compatibilism is the view that would cause the least damage to my other views and the arguments for incompatibilism are strong, but not, in my view dispositive.

However, I will also admit to only a surface familiarity with the literature on the subject and a general aversion to metaphysics. At some point I will have to get much clearer on this subject--which is part of why I've been paying attention to this thread!