If determinism is true, who the hell cares what people do? I think that all normativity is gone if determinism is true.

Also, I definitely don't care about what 'most people' would agree to. People are terrible at thinking and don't know what they mean nearly all of the time anyway.

In fact I've done explicitly this. This is you going 'nuh uh' instead of engaging the argument that I provided.

You don't even know what this means.

This is the direction this thread should go.

You can't prove free will.

I can't prove lack of free will.

The consequences of each line of thought are all we have left, right?

You couldn't resist responding. Therefore, you have no free will

I agree.

You haven't presented any such argument.

It doesn't matter any more, you've already let go of the common use argument.

You misunderstood the hypothetical -- we're not supposing that determinism is true, we're supposing that people think determinism is true. The point of the hypothetical isn't to suggest anything normative, it's to explore how people actually use the word choice. In particular, it should demonstrate that your use of 'choice' has a rather tenuous connection to the way the word is typically used.
This is one of the few matters where the thoughts of 'most people' are exactly what is important! We're not talking about deciding on a scientific theory depending on what 'most people' think, we're trying to settle on how a word is commonly used. Of what value is it to talk about 'choice' and determinism if you mean something entirely different from most people when you say the word 'choice'?

Then your original posing of the question was badly ambiguous.

I don't care about what linguistics practices the unwashed masses use when using a given word. People don't use language carefully when they should.

Ask what most people think "libertarianism" means and they'll come up with any variety of bull**** answers. It means something specific and I'm not a democrat about language.

What you want to do is linguistics and anthropology; I want to do philosophy.

Funny, because the only response you could summon up against MrBlah when he cut through your absurd attempts to redefine choice was:

Now, why did you mention 'choose' as we "commonly understand it" if you aren't concerned with common conceptions of choice?

You've been backed into a corner, as PtMx has given a strong argument that it is you who aren't using "choose" as we commonly understand it. You are the one defying convention, here.

And MrBlah's definition of choice is consistent with determinism and with common use.

MrBlah happens to be a compatibilist.

Ergo, we have a compatibilist who, according to the standards you yourself raised, is not internally contradictory.

lol

You have no idea what's going on, do you?

Yes, yes, you're in academia and academia is where smart people go -- it's delightful that philosophy is still serving a therapeutic purpose for you.
That's not especially relevant. Libertarianism is a word that came from philosophy, so that's the natural place to look to for it's meaning. But the entire reason that terms like 'libertarianism' were introduced was to address a perceived conflict between determinism and choice; if the common use of 'choice' doesn't have anything to do with determinism (let alone contradict it) then what exactly is the value of "doing philosophy" in this way?
I'm all for doing philosophy to resolve problems and to try to achieve a more harmonious worldview, but the entire discussion about free will and determinism is exactly the opposite of this. You've abstracted certain qualities of choice to the point where your version of 'choice' no longer resembles the original meaning and then contrived a contradiction. What problem are we resolving again?

What?

I never gave a definition of choice. I gave a conceptual analysis of Madnak's definition of choice.

The whole point of the analysis is a better understanding of the concept. He defined it in terms of selecting from a range of options. In order for this to count as a definition, you must define something less well known in terms of something better known. Therefore, we must understand what it means to 'select from a range of options.'

I then argued that there's only a 'range' of options if it's possible for an agent to select either disjunct. The problem is that this is not possible under determinism.

Madnak's saving throw is to say that it is possible to select from a range of options but only counterfactually.

I offered arguments rejecting this move. Instead, I argued that what we mean by a 'range of options' is for an agent to be able to select either disjunct in the actual world rather than counterfactually in nearby possible worlds.

That's not an argument.

An argument would be explaining why anyone should believe something so arbitrary as this. Of course it's not necessary for it to be possible for an agent to select either disjunct in order for there to be a range of options - you made that up just to support your point.

It's absurd and nobody believes it. And it's just a statement. You have never given any reason why anyone would believe it, and you have stomped your feet whenever someone refuses it.

That's not it at all. I said counterfactual possibility is the only possibility that applies.

NO FORM OF POSSIBILITY IS NECESSARY. Your claim that possibility is a necessary condition for a range of options is totally arbitrary.

I don't need a "saving throw" against something you pulled out of thin air.

Sorry, you don't get to make up some bull**** and assume I believe it.

I only used counterfactual possibility to refute your claim that there is no possibility under determinism. It's not relevant to your analysis of my definition of choice, that was a completely different discussion.

Again, that's not an argument.

Stating "nuh uh" isn't an argument.

You took your original arbitrary and baseless claim (that possibility is necessary for a range of options) and modified it with another arbitrary and baseless claim (that "actual world possibility" is the only relevant form of possibility).

Stating something is not the same as arguing it. Saying "what we mean by a 'range of options is x'" is not an argument.

An argument would be support for the bald assertion that this is what "we" mean by a range of options.

(It isn't, never was, never will be, you pulled that straight out of your ass because you thought it would be a convenient thing to say.)

This thread has gone on way too needlessly long about this point. Compatibilists can define choice as anything they want (as a result of a brain-process or a selection algorithmm) so long as they deny the possibility of more than one future (the 'do otherwise' criterion). There should be no conversation at all about what "choice" really means. Libertarians should actually follow the pessimist's line and ask the compatibilist whether he/she thinks it's just to send a person to hell for a "choice" he made (according to the compatibilist definition) to murder somebody. Like a young girl in Peru.

How? Do you really mean you can't make a normative statement if determinism is true? One ought not murder Peruvian kittens. <= Can't be true if determinism is true?

edit: I understand you will want to say one has no choice about whether he/she murders kittens but that's got nothing to do with the principle being true, to whatever degree that normative principles are "true".

This is exactly right.

But no libertarian will accept this. Because it means they are wrong, and they'd rather die.

They must maintain that it is impossible for a human being to use the word "choice" as a reference to a selection algorithm, because if that were true then some conception of choice would be compatible with determinism. And their claim that compatibilists are internally inconsistent would be revealed as the arbitrary rhetorical game that it is.

I read a card that says "Take the heavier object" and I take the heavier object. Is this a choice?

This was a point raised much earlier in this thread. It was in the form of the epistemological issue regarding "random." Your position was that "random is indistinguishable from free choice." But this is the wrong question to be considering because it's irrelevant. Knowing or not knowing whether a particular (edit: real life) action was a choice or was not a choice will not advance the conversation.

What is important is that your definition has particular consequences. Among those consequences it is now established that grabbing one object instead of another is not necessarily what you would call a "choice." This is fine. We disagree on at least one aspect of "choice."

Now I will take this logic and apply it in another situation. Let's go back to the chess-playing machine. Let's suppose that the machine is programmed to perform a random valid move. In essence, it is just grabbing a piece and moving it. Would you say that this machine is "choosing" its plays? (Edit: in the same sense as above.)

Not every action is a choice. But this has nothing to do with the position at hand.

Certainly, there are situations in which that can occur. But (perhaps not too surprisingly), these are situations in which people feel that they could not have done differently. You get statements along the lines of "I couldn't stop myself." What makes this type of situation difficult is that there is a usually a divorce between the "I" who did the action and the "I" who is evaluating the aftermath.

I view this as more of a red herring in the context of this conversation because your statement does not bear upon the definition presented. This is yet another example of not staying on topic.

Would you say that a person who quickly grabs toast instead of a bagel is making a "selection"? If so, this definition would then be in contradiction with your definition. The process of "selection" does not seem to imply the necessity of a "model" and "evaluation."

You may suspect that, and depending on the context, I might say that. But colloquial use of words is not the same as the technical use of words. This happens all the time when you work with technical language. I can talk about something being "normal" and mean one of a half dozen different things. The problem is that "normal" does not actually take on those half dozen meanings even if the word *can be* used with that meaning. It takes on the meaning in the context of the usage. You've done this with your use of dictionary definitions ("it can mean any of them") but from a linguistic perspective, it's highly disingenuous because language is context-driven.

It's your choice on how you present yourself. I'm just pointing out that excessive wording is common for you, and that it's worth considering scaling back. Most of my responses to you involve paragraphs which are roughly the same length as the thing I quoted. You are often coming back with responses several times longer.

It can be both yes and no depending on what specific context. However, this is not my point. My point is that I do not believe the universe boils down to an equation or even a system of equations. That is, a complete understanding of the universe is not strictly mathematical.

While it is true that the end of such a conversation can turn into just an empty back and forth, the "robustness" of science fails on many "practical matters."

In particular, there are many situations in which there is simply not enough evidence to confirm a claim. You have two kids playing in the other room, and you hear the sound of breaking glass. You enter the room to see that the window is broken and a toy is sitting on the front lawn. Each one is pointing at the other and saying "he did it." Which child threw the toy?

There is a reality, that one of the two kids threw the toy. But coming to a scientific case on the matter is unlikely to happen, even if a highly trained forensic scientist were to examine the matter. And in this way, there are many events in real life that happen for which a scientific methodology may not be sufficient for obtaining the desired information. Sometimes, you simply cannot confirm the information.

This story can be pushed even further. You can *WITNESS* the kid throwing the toy out the window, and still not have sufficient evidence to create a scientific case on the matter. That is, the only reason anyone would believe your story is because they believe that you wouldn't make it up. Other than that, there's nothing to distinguish between the kid throwing the toy and you throwing the toy.

I hold to the basic reliability of the human senses. This isn't to say that they can't be tricked sometimes, or that you can't sometimes be mistaken about the information you've received, or even that the brain will never give false information, but I hold that an overwhelming majority of our sensory input is accurate. And it is on these experiences that the bulk of my knowledge of the universe is based. That's just a reality I have to deal with.

And there are things (like the experience of free will, consciousness) that I know I experience, but I would not be able to create an argument (or even a thorough description) of any type (either empirical, philosophical, or other-ical) that I think would be sufficient to convince someone else that I've experienced it. And the only reason anyone else would have to agree with me that I've experienced these things is based on *THEIR* unprovable experiences.

The absence of proof does not negate anything.

*shrug* I still think you're making a strong claim. If you said that, and we ended up at McDonalds, I expect you would be quite disappointed with your dinner (and not because it's McDonalds).

I agree that proof/disproof is impossible.

At the moment, I have little to add here. The difference in the two positions is already clear (determined and not-determined), and everything else is coming to an understanding of the concepts in each system. I still don't know of a meaningful understanding of "choice" in a deterministic system, and I still don't know why an "illusion of free will" is a meaningful concept in a deterministic system.

This is absolutely wrong and really couldn't be more wrong.

You can't just define terms as you like and tell the other side to suck it or for them to define terms as they like and define-away all chance of discourse.

The content of the concept of choice is central to the debate; in fact, it's essentially the only area where discourse can happen. Choice is central to the concept of responsibility; therefore, it's central to the question of whether determinism and responsibility are compatible.

There is a view in philosophy that conceptual analysis is an illusion. That is, there is nothing behind our use of language--no logic or formal semantical system by which we can criticize certain uses of language as inconsistent. "Inconsistent" language is not a logical issue, it is just language that is not working quite right. That is, we use normative language when we talk about normative issues, and we use deterministic causal language when we about scientific issues, and there is nothing there behind this language to make consistent. The attempt to do so is just a sort of tic that some people have because they think language is something it is not.

To a certain extent, those who are arguing that we use words like "choice," "determinism," etc. in a certain way and that is all that matters are, consciously or not, relying on this view.

Durka clearly rejects this view of language. He is assuming that underlying language is a formal semantics, i.e. a system of meaning and logic. On this understanding of language, what we do in philosophy is take the common concepts expressed by language and analyze them into their more fundamental parts. Once we've done so, we can more readily identify inconsistencies between different concepts and so form more coherent theories.

On this view, it is not relevant to protest that our ordinary usage of these concepts (or "words") seem consistent. The claim made here is that only after a correct conceptual analysis are you able to correctly see the logical implications of the concept, and the fact that you didn't identify these inconsistencies beforehand is just to say that doing so requires philosophical expertise.

I'm not really sure where madnak is on this issue. Sometimes he seems to claim that he is doing the same kind of conceptual analysis as durka and that it is only that he disagrees with durka's conclusion. That is, he thinks that the correct analysis of these concepts doesn't show any inconsistency. But other times he seems to think that durka is just making different metaphysical assumptions about choice and on that basis is begging the question, which is not an issue of conceptual analysis.

I doubt this conversation is going to advance any further on the topic of compatibilism, but it is useful as an example of philosophical method.

This is an excellent summary. If I have time later today I'll try to make a more detailed response.

OP is correct in characterizing what I`m doing.

This is absolutely wrong and really couldn't be more wrong.

You seem to be forgetting the nature of the topic and the maturity of the debate. You yourself have offered the fact that compatibilism is the dominant philosophical position at the moment. Now, do you really think professional philosophers who are compatibilists all make some freshman mistake about the implications of what "choice" really means? Do you think professional compatibilists concede to libertarnians a notion of choice that is flagrantly inconsistent with determinism? Overwhelmingly (read SEP since this doesn't seem like your area of expertise), compatibilist literature is concerned with conceptualizing ordinary agent-related notions in a manner consistent with them being the by-product of a deterministic biological organism and natural laws. The way to attack this position is to ask them to give their definition of some agent-related notion like "choice", break that definition down into criteria and demonstrate what's internally inconsistent or intuitively unpalatable. As I've said before, I think compatibilism is LOL bad because I'm personally not interested in a definition of "choice" that denies the 'do otherwise' criterion. I can't see how you can justly send a genocidal murder to hell if he could not have done otherwise.

You are missing the point. I'm not denying that 'choice is central to the concept of responsibility'. I'm saying that it's a complete waste of time to argue about what the concept "choice" really stands for. If philosopher A wants to define a choice as such and such brain-process and deny that more than one future is possible, then that's their operational definition of "choice". If philosopher B wants to define a choice as such and such brain-process and affirm that agents could have done otherwise, then that's their operational definition of "choice". The philosophy should be about the implications of each definition, extending then to the issue of whether responsibility is compatible with A's definition or whether B's definition is a priori coherent.

The last few pages of this thread have not been this. It's been like a beam of light between two mirrors. M: I define choice as a selection-algorithm and therefore compatibilism is internally consistent D: you can't define choice as a selection-algorithm therefore compatibilism is incoherent.